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Abstract
Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic (PCTL) is the established temporal
logic for probabilistic verification of discrete-time Markov chains. Probabilis-
tic model checking is a technique that verifies or refutes whether a property
specified in this logic holds in a Markov chain. But Markov chains are of-
ten infinite or too large for this technique to apply. A standard solution to
this problem is to convert the Markov chain to an abstract model and to
model check that abstract model. The problem this thesis therefore stud-
ies is whether or when such finite abstractions of Markov chains for model
checking PCTL exist.
This thesis makes the following contributions. We identify a sizeable frag-
ment of PCTL for which 3-valued Markov chains can serve as finite abstrac-
tions; this fragment is maximal for those abstractions and subsumes many
practically relevant specifications including, e.g., reachability. We also de-
velop game-theoretic foundations for the semantics of PCTL over Markov
chains by capturing the standard PCTL semantics via a two-player games.
These games, finally, inspire a notion of p-automata, which accept entire
Markov chains. We show that p-automata subsume PCTL and Markov
chains; that their languages of Markov chains have pleasant closure proper-
ties; and that the complexity of deciding acceptance matches that of proba-
bilistic model checking for p-automata representing PCTL formulae. In ad-
dition, we offer a simulation between p-automata that under-approximates
language containment. These results then allow us to show that p-automata
comprise a solution to the problem studied in this thesis.
3
Contents
1 Introduction 8
1.1 Model checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Abstraction and refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 (Finitary) completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Finite model property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Abstraction and undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.6 Witnesses for truth and falsity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.7 Research agenda of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.8 Achievements in this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.9 Outline of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.10 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.11 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Background on Models and Logics 29
2.1 Kripke structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Linear-time and branching-time temporal logic . . . . . . . . 36
2.3 Simulation and bisimulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4 Markov chains and Markov decision processes . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 Probabilistic branching-time logic: PCTL . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6 Probabilistic simulation and bisimulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.7 Unfoldings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.8 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3 Background on Automata and Games 85
3.1 Word automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Probabilistic automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Alternating tree automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Hintikka games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.5 Stochastic parity games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4
3.6 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4 Completeness for a Fragment of PCTL 114
4.1 Existing results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.2 Our setting: Markov chains and PCTL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.3 Completeness for a fragment of PCTL via 3-valued unfoldings 118
4.4 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5 A Game Semantics for PCTL 132
5.1 Game semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.2 Winning strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.3 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6 Completeness for full PCTL via p-Automata 159
6.1 p-Automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.2 Acceptance games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.3 Expressiveness of p-automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.4 Simulation of p-automata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.5 Wrong embedding of Markov chains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.6 Summary of chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7 Evaluation 206
7.1 Related work on completeness of abstractions . . . . . . . . . 206
7.2 Evaluation of achievements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.3 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Bibliography 213
5
List of Figures
2.1 A Kripke structure K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 A labelled transition system (T, s0). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 A partial Kripke structure (K, s0). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Hasse diagram of the information order on {tt,?,ff}. . . . . . 36
2.5 A Kripke structure C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.6 A Kripke structure A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.7 A Kripke structure M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.8 A Kripke structure N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.9 A Kripke structure L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.10 A Kripke structure A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.11 A Kripke structure C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.12 A labelled discrete-time Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.13 A 3-valued discrete-time Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.14 A Markov decision process M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.15 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.16 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.17 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.18 A Markov chain N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.19 A Markov chain B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.20 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.21 The finite unfolding M s03,3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.1 A deterministic word automaton A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.2 A deterministic Büchi automaton A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 A deterministic Büchi automaton B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 A non-deterministic Büchi automaton C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.5 A non-deterministic Büchi automaton A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.6 A probabilistic automaton A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.7 A probabilistic automaton C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6
3.8 A probabilistic automaton D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.9 A Kripke structure M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.10 An accepting run of B on M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.1 A labelled Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.2 The finite unfolding M s02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.3 Maximal height of an unfolding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 A concrete Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.1 Graph GA of automaton A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.2 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.3 Case 3 of acceptance game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.4 Case 1 of acceptance game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.5 A Markov chain M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
7
1 Introduction
Computing is becoming an ubiquitous part of our lives and an irreplaceable
factor in our modern society. Our daily lives and our society as a whole
are becoming more and more reliant and dependent on computer systems
and their well-functioning. At the same time the various computer systems
and especially interaction between them become more and more complex.
The systems grow in size and in complexity as well as in sheer number
and interconnectivity. Few systems are truly self-contained and many of
them interact with each other and with changing and partially unknown
environments. The need to understand such systems and their interaction,
and the need to be sure about their functionality and their behaviour is
becoming more and more pressing. The size and complexity of such systems
makes manual inspections obviously infeasible. Furthermore one would like
to be able to audit a system on more than one level between the high-
level specification and the source code. Actually, one would like to audit
systems at all levels between high-level specification and source code, or at
least to understand the relationship between the properties of the system in
its various descriptions. The result of such an audit should be a rigorous
verification and should be fully integrated in the engineering process.
The importance of (automatic) formal verification of system behaviour
has been recognised early on in the history of computing. According to Cliff
Jones [107] already some of the work by Herman Goldstine and John von
Neumann [83], by Alan Turing [171] and somehow even the “pre-electronic”
work by Charles Babbage [15] was concerned with (the formal verification
of) the correctness of programs. It was in the 1960s that the research in
formal verification and program analysis truly took off the ground [95, 137,
119]. Since then – with the growing importance of computer systems for
industry and society – the need for efficient automatic verification techniques
is becoming increasingly important, both economically and socially.
Although posed early on, the problem is far from solved. Essentially,
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the underlying, fundamental problems are undecidable and so incomplete
methods are required. Many verification techniques have been suggested,
analysed and deployed in applications, but all of them – even for decidable
settings – struggle to keep up with the growth in size and complexity of
current systems. Formal verification of system behaviour therefore remains
an important and active research area.
The importance of formal verification was recently acknowledged by Tony
Hoare’s declaration of The verifying compiler as one of the Grand Chal-
lenges in Computing [96], and by the UK Computing Research Commit-
tee (UKCRC) whose Grand Challenge 6 is Dependable Systems Evolution
[183, 182]. These Verification Grand Challenges found strong support in
the scientific community. Motivating examples, cases of support, different
approaches and perspectives were presented, for example, in the position
papers presented at the conference “Verified Software: Theories, Tools, Ex-
periments”, which was held at the ETH Zürich in 2005 [2]. As the motivation
for their Grand Challenge 6 the UKCRC formulates the general need for a
notion of justification and dependability:
The vision of GC6 is of a future in which all computer systems
justify the trust that society increasingly places in them. De-
pendability is a multi-faceted notion which includes fault toler-
ance, requirements engineering and verification amongst other
topics.
This broad definition is not restricted to formal verification but also includes
other evaluations of evolving and interacting systems. The available means
for evaluating systems are broad, ranging from testing and numerical sim-
ulation to the formally rigorous approaches such as theorem proving and
model checking. In model checking [69, 42, 155, 154], which this thesis is
concerned with, one tries to formally answer a query about a system, such
as “After each computation, will the program go back to its idle mode?” In
model checking the returned answer is usually rigorously proved as opposed
to the approximative nature of, say, testing and Monte Carlo simulation.
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1.1 Model checking
Formally speaking, model checking means to compute (effectively and pos-
sibly efficiently) the answer to a query M  φ, where M is a model which
formalises the system of interest, φ is a query specified in a formal language,
and  is the satisfaction relation which relates such models with the an-
swers of the queries from this formal language. Of course one is interested
in choosing models and formal languages which are expressive and intuitive
enough to be used for real applications, while making the model-checking
problem algorithmically decidable, and efficiently so. There are situations in
which one chooses to sacrifice decidability for the sake of usability. Even for
decidable instances the model-checking problem can – and in general will –
be very complex, i.e. computationally expensive, to solve. One of the main
problems for efficient model checking is not so much the complexity of the
algorithms but the size of the models. In general models of realistic systems
tend to be large; i.e. their size could be infinite and even when finite it usu-
ally grows exponentially in the number of interesting components, such as
variables or concurrent processes. Thus even efficient algorithms, e.g. even
with linear runtime in the size of the model, suffer from the so called state
explosion problem.
Research in model checking began in the 1980s when Edmund Clarke and
Allen Emerson [42]1, Jean-Pierre Queille and Joseph Sifakis [155], respec-
tively Orna Lichtenstein and Amir Pnueli [134] published the first model-
checking algorithms. In [42] Clarke and Emerson describe model checking for
branching-time logics as well as the synthesis of programs from branching-
time specifications via tableaus. Queille and Sifakis [155] demonstrate how
to convert branching-time specifications into Petri nets, and give an algo-
rithm based on a fixpoint iteration to verify branching-time properties on
such models. Lichtenstein and Pnueli give a model-checking algorithm for
linear-time temporal logic [134]. A lot of progress has since been made,
and model checking is already successfully being applied in industry and
academia. Data structures and algorithms for various models and logics
have been implemented in numerous model-checking tool kits. But although
many of the known algorithms for model checking are very efficient, all of
them still suffer from the state explosion problem: The model descriptions
1According to [68] the term model checking was “coined” by [42].
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themselves tend to be large, typically exponential in the number of critical
components. Therefore even efficient algorithms and efficient data struc-
tures or symbolic techniques [143] are not always sufficient to handle large
systems.
One can distinguish model-checking algorithms by the way they handle the
state space of a given model. One group of algorithms, we call them explicit
search, work on the explicitly constructed state space. The other group of
algorithms, we call them symbolic search, work on a symbolic representation
of the state space [143, 27]. Such a symbolic representation, for example by
Boolean formulae represented as BDDs [143], is potentially much smaller
than the explicit representation. Therefore symbolic algorithms can handle
larger models and avoid the state explosion problem to some extent.
The basic idea of most model-checking algorithms for explicit state repre-
sentations – as opposed to purely symbolic techniques – is an (exhaustive)
labelling of the complete state space of the model. Each state gets tagged
with a (partial) answer to the model-checking query until the answer for the
full model and query can be read off as sub-queries are being evaluated [105].
Unfortunately such an enumeration of the state space requires a small and
in particular finite state space.
Complementary to symbolic model-checking techniques there are various
approaches which address the problem of state explosion and try to reduce
the size of the state space. Important examples are
• compositional model checking [10, 132, 86, 123], which tries to answer
queries on the whole system by combining the answers for independent
components;
• symmetry reduction [45, 106, 34], which tries to avoid duplication of
work by pruning redundancy from the state space;
• partial order reduction [172], which tries to avoid unnecessary com-
binatorial complexity introduced by the permutation of executions in
concurrent processes;
• on-the-fly model checking [51, 80], and bounded model checking [41],
which try to perform model checking on large or even infinite-state
systems by deferring the evaluation of all but a finite subset of states;
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• abstraction [44], which tries to shrink the model in a way which main-
tains enough information so that a query computed on the abstraction
implies a meaningful answer for the original model.
The main research question of this thesis is connected to this last tech-
nique, i.e. abstraction, as we will explain in Section 1.2 below.
Of course every approach to model checking depends heavily on the cho-
sen models and the query language. Many such combinations have been
proposed and investigated, and it is rather difficult to organise the field of
model checking in a coherent and canonical form. One way to organise the
field, which suits our work, is to distinguish between probabilistic [125] and
non-probabilistic [47] model checking first. Within both fields one can fur-
ther distinguish between qualitative [175] and quantitative [40, 35] model
checking. Other organisations of the field of model checking are possible,
and some model-checking scenarios might not fit very well into our sim-
ple classification. Nevertheless, the given classification is sufficient in the
context of this thesis.
One major objective of this thesis is to find a solution to a problem –
let’s call it the completeness problem for now – for a particular instance of
probabilistic qualitative model checking, namely for Markov chains with the
probabilistic branching-time logic PCTL [14, 88] as query language. Pre-
vious work on the completeness problem was focused on non-probabilistic
settings [31, 117, 61, 58, 59, 73, 74], and did not address completeness of
probabilistic logics over Markov chains.
For the rest of this chapter we assume the queryM  φ to yield a Boolean
answer. This allows us to informally talk about some important concepts
(e.g. “A  φ implies M  φ”) whose meanings are rather intuitive in a
Boolean setting but less clear for other answer domains.
1.2 Abstraction and refinement
The two complementary notions of abstraction and refinement are central
concepts in model checking. Abstraction is one possible means to counter
the state explosion problem: Given a sound abstraction notion one can try to
solve the model-checking problem on the potentially smaller abstract model
and deduce the answer to the concrete problem from there. Thus, if φ is
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a query, and A is an abstraction of M , then we want that A  φ implies
M  φ for a class of queries of interest.
Abstraction is not necessarily just a relation between concrete and ab-
stract models. In general, an abstraction of the concrete model-checking
problem M  φ is an abstract model-checking problem Mα α φα, where
Mα is an abstract model, φα an abstract query and α an abstract satisfac-
tion relation [99]. Indeed, there are examples of useful abstractions where
the abstraction is the identity on the model, i.e. Mα = M , and only the
query or the satisfaction relation are abstracted. (For example: sample test-
ing, numerical simulation and finite-horizon model checking can be seen as
abstracted satisfaction relations α.) Such a general notion of abstraction
as triple (Mα,α, φα) is very powerful, and notions such as soundness, pre-
cision and completeness can be defined in terms of this general framework
[99].2 Nevertheless, in this thesis we focus on the abstraction of models,
while leaving the query language as it is, and only adapting the satisfaction
relation as far as necessary to match the abstract models. We thus obmit a
more detailed discussion of the general notion of abstraction as triple, and
refer to [99] for further details.
Refinement is the inverse concept to abstraction. But furthermore refine-
ment can be seen as formalising what it means to implement a specification.
If a model M refines a more abstract model A, it implements the formal
specification given by the abstract model A. Depending on the properties
of the refinement notion one can then investigate which properties φ the
more concrete implementation M inherits from the more abstract specifica-
tion A. An outstanding example for this idea of preserving properties all
the way from formal specifications to the actual source code is the so called
B-method developed by Jean-Raymond Abrial [5, 4]. The B-method uses
so called Abstract Machine Notation [3] for specifications, which are then
refined, step by step, all the way to an actual implementation in a program-
ming language. The Abstract Machines and their refinement techniques in
the B-method enable proving that
1. the specifications are consistent; and
2An interesting undertaking beyond the scope of this thesis would be to look at abstrac-
tion between triples (Mα,α, φα) and (M,, φ) in a category theoretic framework
[150], and to find out whether desirable properties of abstractions have a natural
correspondence in terms of category theory.
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2. each refinement is a correct implementation of the more abstract spec-
ifications.
In particular one can prove that the resulting source code is a correct im-
plementation of the initial specification.
In this thesis we are concerned with abstraction rather than refinement.
In particular, we are interested in the abstraction notion called simulation
[145], which is introduced in Chapter 2.3. Essentially, a model N simulates
another model M , if N can mimic the transition behaviour of M .
1.3 (Finitary) completeness
Informally, let an abstraction framework consist of a class of abstract models,
their abstract semantics, and an abstraction notion defined via some kind
of simulation relation. Anticipating a formal definition of completeness in
Section 4, let’s call such an abstraction framework complete for a formula φ
iff for all concrete models M that satisfy φ there is a finite-state model A
such that A abstractsM and A satisfies φ in the abstract semantics, denoted
as A  M and A  φ respectively. The abstraction framework is complete
for a set of formulae Γ if it is complete for each φ ∈ Γ.
This is motivated by the following practical question: Given a model-
checking problem, say M  φ, is there a model A such that
1. A abstracts M , e.g. A M ;
2. the answer to A  φ is easier to compute than the answer to M  φ;
and
3. the answer to A  φ implies that for M  φ.
The ability to infer an answer for the original problem from the solution
of the abstract model-checking query is ensured by the soundness of the ab-
straction notion. Formally soundness of abstraction  for formula φ means,
whenever A  M then A  φ implies M  φ. We say abstraction is sound
for a set of formulae Γ is it is sound for every φ ∈ Γ. This implication is
necessary in our context because our motivation for abstraction is to per-
form the model check on A as replacement for the, potentially infeasible,
model check on M . If we could not infer an answer for the query on M
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the whole abstraction would become useless for our application context. We
are therefore interested in abstractions which are sound for all queries of
interest, e.g. for the full query language.
With regard to the existence of an “easier to solve” abstract model, we are
in particular interested in models A which have a smaller state space than the
concrete modelM . For finite modelM one would like to find an abstraction
A with fewer states; for infinite model M one would like an abstract model
A with finitely many states. This latter reduction, from infinite-state to
finite-state models, is particularly important for model checking as explicit
search model-checking algorithms require a finite state space as input. The
abstraction of infinite-state models M by finite-state abstractions A is thus
also the primary concern of this thesis. In this sense we are concerned with
finitary completeness throughout this thesis: For every concrete (potentially
infinite-state) model M and query φ with M  φ does there exist a finite-
state abstraction A such that A M and A  φ?
The main research challenge in this thesis is the completeness of one partic-
ular abstraction framework, namely discrete-time Markov chains as concrete
models, PCTL as query language, and a suitable class of abstract models
with a matching variant of probabilistic simulation as abstraction.
A lot of work on completeness of abstraction has been done for non-
probabilistic model checking. Yonit Kesten and Amir Pnueli showed how to
achieve completeness for linear-time temporal logics, e.g. LTL, on labelled
transition systems via over-approximations and an explicit encoding of fair-
ness constraints in so called progress monitors [117]. There were several
approaches aiming at completeness for branching-time temporal logic such
as CTL and the modal µ-calculus. The main breakthrough in this context
was the work by Dennis Dams and Kedar Namjoshi [58, 59]. In their first
article [58] they prove that even 3-valued labelling and fairness on labelled
transition systems is insufficient to achieve completeness for CTL. They
then present focused transition systems as a complete abstraction frame-
work. The second article [59] re-formulates and summarises these and other
existing results in terms of automata. The abstractions presented in these
two articles are complete for the full modal µ-calculus, and by the use of
automata for encoding the models as well as the formulae the proofs in [59]
become stunningly elegant. There were other abstractions suggested which
achieve completeness for (fragments) of branching-time logics, e.g. disjunc-
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tive modal transition systems [73] and generalised Kripke modal transition
systems [61, 74]. These existing frameworks were summarised within the
terminology of tree-automata in Dams and Namjoshi’s article Automata as
abstractions [59] and will be re-visited in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
1.4 Finite model property
It is necessary and worthwhile to differentiate our research question, whether
an abstraction framework is finitary complete, from the so called finite model
property3. A logic L has the finite model property , with regard to a class of
modelsM, if and only if whenever a formula φ ∈ L is satisfiable then there
also exists a finite-state model for that formula. Formally,
whenever there exists a model M ∈M with M  φ
then there exists a finite model M ′ ∈M with M ′  φ .
At first finitary completeness of an abstraction frameworks for a logic L
on a class of models M looks very similar to the finite model property for
this combination of logic and models. Under certain circumstances both
properties actually coincide, but in general they are not the same. In fact
this thesis is concerned with such a case: PCTL does not have the finite
model property with regard to Markov chains [89, 30] but our p-automata
of Chapter 6 are nevertheless a complete abstraction framework for PCTL
over Markov chains.
While a complete abstraction framework (under some reasonable assump-
tions about the abstract class of models) always has the finite model prop-
erty4, the finite model property of a logic does not in general yield a complete
abstraction framework. For each formula φ ∈ L the finite model property
guarantees the existence of a finite-state model M ′ with M ′  φ but this
model does not need to be in any particular relationship with a given model
M with M  φ. Thus, in general M ′ does not abstract the concrete model
3Sometimes also called small model property .
4In the settings of this thesis, this means that PCTL has the finite model property
with regard to p-automata but not with regard to Markov chains. Although Markov
chains can be expressed as p-automata, this is no contradiction but illustrates that
p-automata are significantly more expressive than Markov chains, which they indeed
need to be for achieving completeness.
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M .
The situation looks different if every modelM has a so called characteristic
formula with the following properties. Let M be a model from a class of
models M. A formula ΦM ∈ L is a characteristic formula of M iff for all
M ′ ∈M
M ′  ΦM iff M refines M ′ , i.e. M ′ M .
So M ′  ΦM and M ′ M are then equivalent.
With such characteristic formulae and a suitable logic L which is closed
under conjunction, the finite model property and completeness as considered
in this thesis are equivalent. Let every model M ∈ M have a characteris-
tic formula ΦM in L and let the satisfaction relation satisfy the axiom of
conjunction elimination, then the following statements are equivalent:
1. L has the finite model property with regards toM.
2. Abstraction withinM is finitary complete for all formulae of L.
This equivalence is easy to proof.5The key point in this argument is the
expressiveness of the logic L: The characteristic formulae need to be ex-
pressible within the query logic L, and the logic must support conjunction.
The latter constraint is hardly a restriction since most logics used in applica-
tions contain conjunction. The other condition is much more restrictive. In
fact, for many classes of models it is not even clear if they have characteristic
formulae or not, let alone in which logic these formulae could be expressed
if they existed. But then again, proving that a logic L has the finite model
property is, in general, not trivial either. Indeed, the finite model prop-
erty is strongly related to the decidability of a logic. If a logic L is finitely
axiomatisable and has the finite model property then it is decidable [28].
There are some probabilistic logics [65, 176] which have the finite model
property, but in this thesis we focus on the (more expressive) probabilistic
5Proof: “1 implies 2:” Let M ∈ M, φ ∈ L and M  φ. By assumption M has a
characteristic formula ΦM ∈ L and L is closed under conjunction. Therefore ΦM ∧ φ
exists and is in L. Now, if L has the finite model property, then there exists a finite-
state model M ′ for ΦM ∧ φ. By the definition of conjunction M ′  φ; and by the
definition of characteristic formulae M ′  M . Hence M is a complete abstraction
framework for L. “2 implies 1:” Conversely, if M is a finitary complete abstraction
for L, then for each satisfiable formula φ, i.e. for each formula φ which has a model
M ∈ M, there also exists a finite-state model M ′ which abstracts M and for which
M ′  φ. Therefore every satisfiable formula φ has a finite model inM, and L has the
finite model property.
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branching-time logic PCTL over Markov chains as models. PCTL does not
have the finite model property [30], and we do not know yet if Markov chains
have characteristic formulae in PCTL or any other logic.
1.5 Abstraction and undecidability
In Section 1.4 above we related our completeness question to the finite model
property and therefore to other problems, such as the decidability of a logic.
This, of course, raises the question of decidability for abstraction in gen-
eral, and for our completeness question in particular. As one would expect,
already the abstraction problem is undecidable.
For example, Dams writes in [56]:
Appropriate abstractions of infinite state programs are not com-
putable in general: it would imply that the program verification
problem is decidable
Similarly, in [99] Michael Huth writes about probabilistic model checking:
The specification of may not be computable, e.g. [. . . ] we could
encode the Halting problem as a model check. Since Markov
decision processes faithfully subsume such qualitative systems,
the [model-checking problem] of infinite-state Markov decision
processes and CTL is undecidable as well. [. . . ]
The answers to individual model-checking instances M  φ may
be very hard to determine and such a determination may be
closely tied to finding a ‘magic’ abstraction.
Therefore even a complete abstraction framework, as the one we develop
in this thesis, can not provide the machinery to find these “magic” abstrac-
tions. Nevertheless, the completeness question is an important question: if
an abstraction framework is known to be incomplete, the search for abstrac-
tions or abstraction refinements will not necessarily terminate and thus will
need to be aborted at some point or replaced by a totally different approach,
e.g. adjusting the specification to yield a complete formula. Furthermore, to
address the completeness problem can be a way to attack the often closely
related problem of decidability of satisfiability of the underlying logic.
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1.6 Witnesses for truth and falsity
Another perspective on the work in this thesis is to look at abstractions as
witnesses for truth or falsity.
One of the big advantages of model checking over other techniques for for-
mal verification, e.g. theorem proving, is the availability of counter-examples.
If a model checker fails to establish M  φ then it can often point out where
in its search space the verification process failed. Since explicit search model-
checking algorithms work, more or less, directly on the actual state space
of the model, such a negative answer can provide debugging information
about the model, e.g. a counter-example which explains why M 2 φ. Such a
counter-example is very valuable as it provides an explanation for why the
model does not satisfy the property. This can help to uncover problems in
the model and to drive the engineering process.
There are several issues connected to the (re-)presentation of counter-
examples. For linear-time temporal logics the situation is quite convenient:
formulae are interpreted over all traces of the model and therefore a counter-
example is just a single trace. Reasonably short, single traces can be under-
stood by human users fairly easily and usually the shortest counter-example
is also the most interesting and meaningful one. For branching-time logics
the situation is more complicated and the counter-examples to a formula are
potentially more complex, e.g. tree-like counter-examples [46]. Let’s take for
example the CTL formula A F A X q, which informally says that
one can always reach a state where q is true at all successor
states.
This formula “does in general not have linear counter-examples” [46]. Such
complex counter-examples are potentially much more difficult to apprehend
than trace-like, linear counter-examples. So far little work has been done on
more satisfying representations of counter-examples for CTL model checking,
but we mention work on tree-shaped counter-examples [46].
In probabilistic model checking the construction of meaningful counter-
examples is even more difficult since counter-examples are sets of certain
paths with a sufficiently large or small probability measure. While each of
the paths on its own might not violate the (probabilistic) formula and may
even have probability 0, their entirety can constitute a counter-example.
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One is then concerned to find suitable representations, e.g. instructive sub-
sets which are maximal with regard to their probability but minimal with
regard to the number of (substantially different) traces and the length of
these traces [87, 11, 6]. Again, a sensible presentation of useful information
to the human user is crucial for debugging. Suggested approaches include
projecting counter-examples, i.e. sets of traces, on the graph structure of the
model [7], or encoding sets of counter-example as the automata or regular
expressions which accept them [55].
Another way to represent the answer to a query M  φ and its justifica-
tion, are winning strategies in suitable game-based semantics [167, 94]. In
this approach the truth or falsehood of a formula corresponds to a winning
strategy for one of two adversarial players. The respective winning strategy,
interpreted as an operational description, can be seen as a witness itself. For
example Colin Stirling writes in [167]:
in the model checking case not only do [games] allow a user to
know that a process has a property, but also why it has it. Games
also allow a user to know why a process fails to have a property.
In both these cases the justification can be given as a winning
strategy.
Our game-based semantics for PCTL in Chapter 5 can be seen from this
perspective of winning strategies as witnesses.
Counter-examples are also connected to abstractions and to the complete-
ness of abstractions – the main research focus of this thesis. Let A be an
abstraction of the concrete modelM . Now let this abstraction be sound, i.e.
A  φ implies M  φ for all formulae φ ∈ L .
Even for sound abstraction one can in general not deduce an answer to the
model-checking query on M from a negative answer on A, i.e. A 2 φ does
not imply M 2 φ. In this sense one could refer to soundness of abstraction
as soundness with regard to verification. In the context of counter-examples
one could be interested in soundness with regard to refutation:
A 2 φ implies M 2 φ for all formulae φ ∈ L .
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Both types of soundness are related if the logic allows for a syntactic negation
whose semantics is equivalent to non-satisfaction: Whenever satisfaction of
¬φ is equivalent to not satisfying φ on abstract and concrete models, then
soundness for verification is equivalent to soundness for refutation.6
For sound abstraction and logics with negation this suggests to check
A  ¬φ whenever the query A  φ is inconclusive. Unfortunately, in many
abstraction frameworks, an abstraction A of M might be fine-tuned espe-
cially for checking a particular formula φ. This abstraction does not need
to be equal or even related to an abstraction A′ which would be suitable to
check ¬φ. To achieve small abstract models it can even be reasonable to drop
the duality between negation and non-satisfaction on the abstract models.
For example 3-valued frameworks [102, 31], e.g. with may and must condi-
tions, allow for models which must-satisfy neither φ nor ¬φ but may-satisfy
both of them.
Let the abstraction A of M be sound (for verification only). If model
checking returns a negative answer A 2 φ together with an abstract counter-
example c, then this answer is in-conclusive for M and we are left with two
possibilities:
1. The counter-example c is a real counter-example, i.e. one can derive a
concrete counter-example on M from c and hence show that M 2 φ.
2. The counter-example c is spurious, i.e. it is an artifact of the abstrac-
tion. It does not decide whether M  φ or M 2 φ. A spurious
counter-example only reveals that the abstraction A is too coarse to
yield a conclusive answer to the query on M .
In an approach called counter-example guided abstraction refinement (CE-
GAR) [43] such spurious counter-examples are used to refine the abstraction
A incrementally. If model checking the abstract model Ai yields a spurious
counter-example, then Ai is refined to a model Ai+1 which rules out this
particular spurious counter-example. The refined abstraction Ai+1 is then
model-checked, and the next iteration of the so called CEGAR loop begins.
The refinement of abstract models in the CEGAR loop is monotone, in the
6Proof: Let X  ¬φ be equivalent to X 2 φ, let A abstract M , and let A 2 φ. Then
A 2 φ iff A  ¬φ. Soundness for verification of ¬φ yields A  ¬φ implies M  ¬φ.
Again we invoke the semantic equivalence of negation and non-satisfaction, now on
M : M  ¬φ iff M 2 φ. Thus A 2 φ implies M 2 φ.
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sense that its iterations remove more and more spurious counter-examples,
but in general it is not guaranteed that the CEGAR loop will ever terminate.
The CEGAR loop might not terminate for two quite different reasons.
1. The class of abstract models, e.g. all finite-state ones, from which
the CEGAR loop chooses the next refinement in each iteration, does
simply not contain a witnessing abstraction at all. (This connects to
our question of completeness.)
2. Even if the class of abstract models contains suitable witnesses it is
not guaranteed that the CEGAR method will terminate and find a
suitable abstraction. The algorithm might choose the wrong “branch”
of the search space for the refinement and follow it to infinity.7
Recently CEGAR algorithms for probabilistic model checking were pro-
posed in [93, 114]. Of course the same theoretical questions as for the non-
probabilistic CEGAR algorithms apply. Furthermore, the problem of (find-
ing and representing) probabilistic counter-examples has to be taken into
account [87, 180].
1.7 Research agenda of this thesis
The aim of this thesis is to find a complete abstraction framework for PCTL
on discrete-time Markov chains. Furthermore this thesis aims to provide
a deeper insight into the particulars of PCTL and probabilistic verification
in general. To this end we define an operational semantics for PCTL in
Chapter 5, in addition to the work on the PCTL completeness problem in
Chapter 4 and 6.
We chose the combination of PCTL and discrete-time Markov chains be-
cause they have been well established and are widely used as a means of
modeling and specification. PCTL model checking on Markov chains is de-
cidable in polynomial time [14] while the logic is rich enough to express
specification patterns which are of interest for the specification of real ap-
plications.8 There also is well established tool support for PCTL model
checking, e.g. PRISM [1, 62]. Our work thus contributes to the theoretical
7In general, depth-first search over infinite domains is not guaranteed to terminate even
if the search space contains a correct solution.
8The extension PCTL* is already in PSPACE [14].
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background for state space reduction methods which are used in existing
model-checking toolkits to counter the state space explosion problem, e.g.
symmetry reduction [45] and predicate abstraction [23, 113]. We will com-
ment on possible extensions beyond PCTL and Markov chains in this thesis,
but our focus is firmly set on PCTL as the probabilistic logic of choice in
most probabilistic model checkers for discrete-time Markov chains.
Despite the theoretical nature and the non-constructiveness of the com-
pleteness question, it has some very important implications for practitioners.
A non-existence result would be stunning because it would expose an inher-
ent problem of the logic and models. If a complete abstraction framework
could not exist, it would imply that there are (infinite) systems which can
not be model-checked for certain properties φ by any method which depends
on explicit but finite state representations. On the other hand the existence
of a complete abstraction framework may allow us to use predicate abstrac-
tion, CEGAR, and other approximation techniques, with the knowledge that
a finite abstraction does at least exist.
The class of models which constitutes a complete abstraction framework
also gives a deeper insight into the expressiveness and the pitfalls of the logic
PCTL, and into discrete-time Markov chains as a means of specification and
modeling. For example, our result on completeness for a fragment of PCTL
via 3-valued unfoldings in Chapter 4 identifies the benign part of PCTL
for which finitary abstractions can be “traditional” 3-valued models, and
reveals the part of PCTL which needs new technical machinery for complete
abstractions.
We break down our research agenda into a list of concrete objectives:
1. Summarise and reformulate the existing relevant work in a coherent
fashion.
2. Define an operational semantics for PCTL over discrete-time Markov
chains via an infinite two-player game.
3. Derive a first partial completeness result for a fragment of PCTL based
on existing work and on insights from our operational semantics.
4. Define a new abstraction framework based on automata which achieves
completeness for full PCTL.
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5. Explore the complete abstraction framework with regard to its appli-
cation above and beyond answering our completeness question.
1.8 Achievements in this thesis
This thesis presents three main contributions:
• We identify a “benign” fragment of PCTL for which completeness can
be achieved with rather simple methods. These methods, namely, 3-
valued abstractions (in fact, a 3-valued form of finite unfoldings) with
approximative but compositional semantics, suggest themselves from
a model-checking perspective.
A finite unfolding A is essentially an unwinding of the concrete model
M up to a fixed depth k. Abstracting the concrete model M by a 3-
valued finite unfolding A intuitively means that the concrete model is
explored up to a certain depth k (as in bounded model checking) and
that all the information beyond this finite horizon is ignored (or rather
aggregated and approximated) in some meaningful way. This mean-
ingful aggregation is achieved by 3-valued propositional labels under a
conservative (“pessimistic”) semantic interpretation. A 3-valued label
can assert that a property may be true or may be false in the abstract
model A. This uncertainty in the abstract model is then resolved by
further information in the refinement of A, e.g. the concrete model
M . Such 3-valued labels are a widely used means of abstraction for
(branching-time) model checking [102].
Our benign PCTL fragment is maximal for our choice of abstractions
– and for most sensible choices of abstraction relation – as we provide
counter-examples which show that any syntactic enrichment of the
fragment is in general not complete.9
• We present a Hintikka game (i.e. an operational semantics) for PCTL
which provides a deeper insight into the logic and the corresponding
completeness problem.
9In a different context, “non-extendable” subsets – which we call maximal here – are
sometimes called complete, too. To avoid confusion we use the term “complete” exclu-
sively for the finitary completeness as described in Section 1.3 and as formally defined
in Chapter 4.
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A Hintikka game [94] is a way to capture the semantics of a logic
as a 2-player game. This allows for an operational understanding of
the truth and falsity of formulae. The fact that model M satisfies
formula φ (in the standard semantics) corresponds to the existence
of a winning strategy for one particular player in the Hintikka game
for the logic. Such winning strategies are useful witnesses for M  φ
[167], and they have applications, e.g., in in programme synthesis and
counter-example generation.
• We develop a new class of automata, called p-automata, to achieve
completeness for full PCTL. The fundamental difference of these p-
automata to other probabilistic automata, such as the classical vari-
ant for finite words [157] (called probabilistic finite automata in [16])
or probabilistic Büchi automata and other probabilistic automata for
infinite words [16], is that our automata accept entire Markov chains
rather than words. Our p-automata combine the combinatorial struc-
ture of alternating automata [179] with the ability to quantify the
probabilities of regular sets of paths. They constitute a new frame-
work for Markov chains and PCTL, which opens a range of future
work, e.g. on automata based probabilistic verification.
1.9 Outline of this thesis
Chapter 2 provides the necessary background on models, logics and ab-
straction relations, while Chapter 3 provides more specific background on
automata and games. Chapter 4 formally defines the notion of finitary
completeness, i.e. our research question. In the same chapter we present in-
completeness results for full PCTL and prove completeness of abstraction by
3-valued Markov chains for a sizeable fragment of PCTL. Chapter 5 defines
a game-based semantics for PCTL. In Chapter 6 we develop p-automata as
complete abstraction framework for full PCTL. Chapter 7 evaluates our re-
sults, discusses relevant related work and gives an outlook on open questions
and directions for future work.
The background material of Chapter 2 is needed throughout this thesis
while the material in Chapter 3 is specific to Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The
three core Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present our technical contributions. These
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three chapter are independent of each other and can be read in any order.
Thus, there are several alternative approaches to read (the main part of) this
thesis. Besides the linear read from cover to cover, there are the following
two noteworthy variants.
• For a model checking approach, starting with classical models and
achieving partial completeness via 3-valued abstractions: read Chap-
ters 2 and 4.
• Focusing on automata and games one can move straight to the most
general completeness result – namely completeness for full PCTL – by
skipping Chapter 4 and 5: read Chapters 2, 3, and 6.
The order in which we present our contributions in this thesis differs from
the chronological order in which we achieved the results. Chronologically,
we started with counter-examples as in [58] to show that we will need a
more sophisticated machinery to achieve completeness for full PCTL. Next
we developed the Hintikka game for PCTL, now presented in Chapter 5.
This was also motivated by the work of Dams and Namjoshi [58, 59], which
suggests that some sort of game or automata machinery will be necessary
to achieve completeness. The game-based approach also aimed at gaining a
better understanding of PCTL and the PCTL completeness problem. The
Hintikka game indeed provided deep insights into the completeness question,
and we were able to derive the complete fragment presented in Chapter 4
more or less directly from certain winning strategies in the Hintikka game.
After establishing this complete fragment, which requires rather simple ab-
stract models, we addressed the full completeness problem. We approached
the full problem by capturing PCTL formulae as automata. This required
the development of a new class of automata which are substantially differ-
ent from existing (probabilistic) automata: our so called p-automata accept
and reject whole Markov chains as inputs; their languages are unions of
bisimulation equivalence classes of Markov chains; and Markov chains and
PCTL formulae can both be expressed as p-automata. These p-automata
are presented in Chapter 6. They achieve completeness for full PCTL and
thus answer the main research questions of this thesis.
In this thesis we present the results in a slightly different order which
moves from the simple concepts to the more complex ideas. First we discuss
how far one gets with standard methods of 3-valued abstractions, which
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is an obvious idea from the model-checking perspective and which already
yields completeness for a sizeable fragment of PCTL. We then construct
certain counter-examples which show that the 3-valued approach alone can
not be sufficient for full completeness and that we need to move on to more
complex methods. Next we introduce our Hintikka game, to pinpoint the
remaining problems with solving the completeness problem, and to provide
technical machinery for the following introduction of our p-automata. We
then introduce p-automata and related stochastic games, and show how they
capture and exceed the previous results and finally achieve full completeness.
1.10 Publications
Selected results from this thesis have been disseminated in scientific publi-
cations. Details of the four publications which are based on the work of this
thesis are given below.
The game-based semantics for PCTL (Chapter 5 in this thesis) was de-
veloped in joint work with Harald Fecher, Michael Huth and Nir Piterman
as a first step toward finitary abstractions. It was published in the article
Hintikka Games for PCTL on Labelled Markov Chains in the Proceedings of
the International Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems (QEST)
2008 [75]. Based on these results we consequently were invited to submit
an extended paper – titled PCTL Model Checking of Markov Chains: Truth
and Falsity as Winning Strategies in Games – for a special issue of the Inter-
national Journal on Performance Evaluation, which was published in 2010
[76].
The completeness results which were achieved for a fragment of PCTL via
3-valued unfoldings of Markov chains (Chapter 4) was published jointly with
Michael Huth and Nir Piterman in 2009. The article appeared under the title
Three-Valued Abstractions of Markov Chains: Completeness for a Sizeable
Fragment of PCTL in the proceedings of the International Symposium on
Fundamentals of Computation Theory (FCT) [103].
Our p-automata framework (Chapter 6) was accepted for publication as
p-Automata: New Foundations for Discrete-Time Probabilistic Verification,
to appear in the Proceedings of the International Conference on Quantitative
Evaluation of Systems (QEST) 2010 [104]. The article is co-authored with
Michael Huth and Nir Piterman.
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1.11 Summary of chapter
This chapter gave an informal introduction and motivation to our research.
It explained our main research questions and the contributions made in this
thesis.
The context of this thesis was outlined as model checking. One important
motivation for our research are finite-state abstractions as a means to counter
the state explosion problem for model checking.
This chapter then introduced the notion of soundness and completeness
of an abstraction. Soundness guarantees the usefulness of an abstraction for
model checking as it allows to derive an answer for the concrete model check-
ing problem from the answer for a corresponding abstract model checking
problem. Completeness guarantees the existence of a finite state abstraction
for every concrete model checking problem. This notion of completeness is
in general distinct from the finite model property as it requires a prescribed
abstraction relation, e.g. simulation, between the concrete model checking
problem and its abstraction.
As research topic for this thesis we identified probabilistic verification, i.e.
for PCTL over Markov chains, as one particular model checking framework
with previously unsolved completeness question. This chapter then stated
our main research aims, i.e. to develop a complete abstraction framework
for PCTL over Markov and to advance the understanding of probabilistic
verification through a new automata based framework for PCTL and Markov
chains.
Other themes touched in this thesis were identified as, e.g., game based
semantics for probabilistic logics; winning strategies as witnesses of truth
and falsity; and probabilistic automata.
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2 Background on Models and Logics
In this chapter we provide relevant technical background on the models and
logics used in this thesis. Before we introduce the probabilistic models and
logics in Section 2.4 which are used in the main part of this thesis – i.e. in
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 – we introduce some non-probabilistic models and logics
first. We discuss general concepts and intuitions on these non-probabilistic
models and refer back to them in the probabilistic context. Completeness
results from the literature for these non-probabilistic models are discussed
in Section 4.1 and Section 7.1.
The non-probabilistic part (Section 2.1–2.3) and the probabilistic part
(Section 2.4–2.6) of this chapter each follow the same structural outline:
(i) presentation of models;
(ii) logics and accompanying satisfaction relation;
(iii) refinement and equivalence of models.
In the following we assume familiarity with basic set theory and graph
theory. We try to use well established notations wherever possible but mod-
ify some standard notations to facilitate the presentation of our main results
later in the thesis. While we aim for clarity and consistency of notations,
we sometimes use “sloppy” notations if they enhance readability without
jeopardising clarity.
In this thesis most sets come with relations on them, for example sets
of states come with a transition relation on them. Therefore we use direct
product not only for sets, but also for sets with relations. The direct product
then lifts the relations to the (set-theoretic) direct product of the respective
sets.
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Definition 1 (Direct product)
Let Si = (Si, Ri) for i ∈ {1, 2} be a set Si with a relation Ri ⊆ Si×Si. The
direct product1 of S1 and S2 is
T = S1 × S2
where T = (T,Q) with set T = {(a, b) | a ∈ S1, b ∈ S2} and with relation
Q ⊆ T × T such that
((a, b), (c, d)) ∈ Q iff (a, c) ∈ R1 and (b, d) ∈ R2 . 
2.1 Kripke structures
For non-probabilistic model checking two important classes of models are
Kripke structures and labelled transition systems. They are largely equiva-
lent but offer different perspectives on the modeled systems [82]. We take a
(state-based) model-checking approach and therefore focus on Kripke struc-
tures. Kripke structures also resemble discrete-time Markov chains, which
are the models used in the main part of this thesis, more closely than la-
belled transition systems. We do normally think of models as graph struc-
tures decorated with labels of some sort. More formally we use the following
definitions:
Definition 2 (Kripke structure)
A Kripke structure K is a tuple (S,R,L) where
(i) S is a non-empty set of states,
(ii) R ⊆ S × S is a (total) transition relation,
(iii) L is a total labelling function L : S × AP −→ {tt,ff} for a finite set AP
of atomic propositions. 
The labelling function L determines which atomic propositions q ∈ AP
are true (tt) respectively false (ff) in a state s. Thus the labelling function
1Somtimes also called Cartesian product.
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L defines the set of all propositions q which hold at state s. By abuse of
notation, we write:
L(s) := {q ∈ AP | L(s, q) = tt}
For the transition relation R we often use the infix notation s−→Rs′ instead
of (s, s′) ∈ R, and omit the subscript R whenever R is determined by the
context. For Kripke structures K = (S,R,L) we sometimes abuse notation
and write s ∈ K, meaning s ∈ S.
We now introduce further concepts and notations for Kripke structures.
Definition 3
Let K be a Kripke structure.
1. K is called finite branching iff for all states s ∈ S the set of successors
of s, Succ(s) := {s′ ∈ S | s−→s′}, is finite.
2. K is called finite state iff the set S is finite. A finite state Kripke
structure is always finite-branching.
3. K is called pointed iff it has a designated initial state sin ∈ S. We
write (K, sin) to indicate the initial state sin of K.
4. K is called serial iff each state s ∈ S has at least one successor , i.e.
some s′ with s−→s′. (Thus K is serial iff the relation R is total.) In a
serial structure every sequence of states can be extended to an infinite
sequence, i.e. a path as defined below.
5. We call a state s absorbing iff it has a self-loop s−→s and no other
outgoing transitions. 
A Kripke structure K = (S,R,L) contains a directed graph GK := (S,R)
where the vertices are the states S and the edges are defined by the transi-
tion relation R. In a graphical representation of this graph propositions q
annotate states s to indicate L(s, q) = tt, as seen in Figure 2.1. We define
paths in K as paths in the directed graph GK .
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Definition 4 (Path)
A path pi in K = (S,R,L) is an infinite sequence of states s0s1 . . . where
si ∈ S and (si, si+1) ∈ R for all i ∈ N. Furthermore, let
• pi[i] := si be the element at position i in pi;
• pi[i, . . . , j] be the subsequence si . . . sj of pi; and
• pii be the suffix sisi+1 . . . of pi starting at the i-th state for i ≥ 0.
We denote Path(s) the set of all paths starting at state s. Whenever we
write about paths of Kripke structure K without stating another start state,
we mean paths which start at the initial state sin of K. 
Example 1
Figure 2.1 shows a Kripke structure K over AP = {q, r, s} represented as
directed graph GK . State s0 is marked as initial state by an incoming arrow.
State names si are written in the vertices; atomic propositions x for which
L(si, x) = tt are written next to the state si. Throughout this thesis we use
a typewriter font for propositions, e.g. s, and a serif font for states, e.g. s0.
All paths in K are infinite sequences of one of the following four forms:
s0
ω
s0
∗s1ω
s0
∗s1∗s2ω
s0
∗s2ω
where we use the standard notation of regular expressions. In particular x∗
stands for zero or finitely many repetitions of x, and xω stands for infinitely
many repetition of x. 
Example 2
The Kripke structureK in Figure 2.1 is finite-branching, finite state, pointed
with initial state s0, and serial. State s2 is absorbing and the only absorbing
state of K. 
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s0
s1
s2
q s
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Figure 2.1: A Kripke structure K.
Seriality of Kripke structures can be enforced by adding a self-loop s −→ s
to each state s ∈ S which has no other outgoing transitions. Alternatively
a sink state d, which has only one outgoing transition to itself, can be in-
troduced and connected to each state s without outgoing transitions via
s −→ d. In particular, seriality is convenient and a standard assumption for
the definition of semantics for linear time temporal logics. If sn is an absorb-
ing state, we sometimes abbreviate the (infinite) path pi = s0 . . . snsnsn . . .
by writing pi = s0 . . . sn.
Assumption 1 (Pointed serial Kripke structures)
In this thesis all Kripke structures K are pointed and serial. 
As mentioned above, another important class of models are labelled tran-
sition systems. The notion of a labelled transition system T = (S,R, Act)
is somehow dual to that of a Kripke structure K = (S,R,L). While the la-
belling function of a Kripke structure decorates the states, the action labels
Act of a labelled transition system decorate the transitions. Formally we
have the following definition:
Definition 5 (Labelled transition system)
A labelled transition system T is a tuple (S,R, Act), where
(i) S is a non-empty set of states; and
(ii) R ⊆ S × Act× S is a transition relation;
where Act is a finite set of action labels. 
A labelled transition system T = (S,R, Act) contains a directed graph
GT := (S,R′) where vertices are the states S and edges are defined according
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Figure 2.2: A labelled transition system (T, s0).
to R. An edge from s to s′ is annotated with action α ∈ Act if (s, α, s′) ∈ R.
An example of such a graph is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Example 3
Figure 2.2 shows a labelled transition system T represented as directed graph
GT . State names si are written in the vertices; the initial state s0 is desig-
nated by an incoming arrow; action labels x are written next to transitions.
Rather than drawing separate edges (s, x, s′) between the same states for
multiple actions, the actions are written on a single edge in the illustra-
tion. 
The notions of Kripke structures and labelled transition systems are basi-
cally equivalent but differ in that they “provide complementary views for rea-
soning about reactive systems” [82]. Kripke structures “model state changes
of reactive systems”, while labelled transition systems “model the external
behaviour of a system (i.e. sequences of actions the system can perform)”
[82].
As a unifying formalism doubly labelled transition systems were introduced
in [97] as models which include action labels on transitions as well as propo-
sitional labels on states. Doubly labelled transition systems contain Kripke
structures and labelled transition systems as special cases, but are not more
expressive than either of them [82].
In the following we restrict ourselves to Kripke structures as our choice of
non-probabilistic models, because they resemble Markov chains more closely
than labelled transition systems. Markov chains – the models which we will
use in the main part of this thesis – are labelled with propositions on states
and with probabilities (not actions) on transitions.
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q s
s0
s1
s2
s
r s?
Figure 2.3: A partial Kripke structure (K, s0).
Especially in the context of abstractions, 3-valued generalisation of models
arise rather naturally [31, 32, 98, 102]. For Kripke structures such generali-
sations are called partial Kripke structures [31]. They are Kripke structures
where the propositional labels have three different truth-values (tt,?,ff),
rather than just two (tt,ff). For each proposition p ∈ AP, at a state s ∈ S
the truth-value of p can be true (tt), false (ff) or “unknown” (?). We in-
troduce this generalisation now. It is then revisited in Section 2.2.4, where
we discuss the practical application of 3-valuedness for abstraction, and in
Section 2.3 in the context of sound abstractions.
Definition 6 (Partial Kripke structure)
A partial Kripke structure K is a tuple (S,R,L), where
(i) S is a non-empty set of states;
(ii) R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation; and
(iii) L is a total labelling function L : S × AP −→ {tt,?,ff} for a finite set
AP of atomic propositions. 
In the graph representation we use the label q? to mark states s for which
L(s, q) = ?. The absence of any label q or q? indicates L(s, q) = ff.
Example 4
A partial Kripke structure K is illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
The 3-valued generalisations of labelled transition systems are calledmodal
transition systems [133]. A unifying framework for partial Kripke structures
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tt ff
?
Figure 2.4: Hasse diagram of the information order on {tt,?,ff}.
and modal transition systems is called doubly labelled modal transition sys-
tems [102] which is the 3-valued generalisation of the doubly labelled tran-
sition systems mentioned above. Again, doubly labelled modal transition
systems do not increase the expressiveness of the models; translations be-
tween the three types of 3-valued models are possible and require only linear
time and logarithmic space [82].
To establish a partial order of refinement respectively abstraction between
3-valued models or between 2-valued and 3-valued models, one needs an
underlying partial order on the three possible truth-values. With regard to
soundness of abstraction we choose the so-called information order.
Definition 7 (Information order)
We define the following partial order ≤ on the set of truth-values {tt,?,ff}:
? ≤ tt
? ≤ ff
where these are the only non-reflexive instances of ≤. This partial order is
called information order and goes back at least to Stephen Kleene [118]. It
is illustrated as Hasse diagram in Figure 2.4. 
2.2 Linear-time and branching-time temporal logic
There is a trade-off between the expressiveness of a logic and the complex-
ity of the related decision problems such as, for example, the corresponding
model-checking problem. In practice model checking is done for modal log-
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ics, because they are considered a good balance between expressiveness and
complexity.
For temporal modal logics there are two main paradigms: linear time
[151, 152] and branching time [42].
In linear time one reasons about time as linear sequences of states; each
state of such a sequence in time has exactly one successor, the next step in
time. Linear time logics then quantify over all such sequences for a system.
Such logics express properties of paths, for example “Every path eventually
reaches a state that satisfies proposition good”.
Branching time on the other hand treats time as a sequence of states
each of which is a branching point for multiple possible futures. In contrast
to linear time the states in such a sequence may have multiple successors.
Branching time logics then reason about sequences of such states in terms
of their branching behaviour, for example “Every state has at least one suc-
cessor which satisfies proposition good”. Hence a process in branching time
is essentially a tree of all its possible temporal developments, while in linear
time it is a set of linear paths capturing all its possible temporal develop-
ments.
Linear time and branching time are in general incomparable with regard
to their expressiveness. Which one of the two paradigms is more suitable
as specification language and for model checking is still an ongoing debate
[128, 127, 70, 174]. Allen Emerson and Joseph Halpern [70] recognise linear-
time temporal logic for its simplicity but advocate branching-time temporal
logic for writing specifications. Indeed branching-time logic seems to have
the easier model-checking problem and is closed under negation which linear-
time logic is not – in the sense that it “cannot express a fact such as ‘property
P does not hold along some execution of the program’ ” [70]. More recently
Moshe Vardi [174] argued strongly for linear-time logic for specifications and
model checking especially from a practical perspective.
In the main part of this thesis we are concerned with PCTL which is essen-
tially a probabilistic branching-time logic. For probabilistic systems, such
as Markov chains, the location of the (probabilistic) branching is crucial,
so that a branching-time approach seems appropriate. At the same time
certain parts of PCTL – namely the predicates for path formulae – resemble
a linear-time logic. Therefore, we now define and discuss both linear-time
and branching-time logics.
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In the following we call two formulae φ and ψ semantically equivalent
if they have the same set of models for an underlying satisfaction relation
between models and formulae.
2.2.1 LTL
In this section we introduce linear-time logic [151, 152].
Definition 8 (LTL syntax)
The formulae of Linear Time Logic (LTL) are as follows:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | Xφ | φUψ
where q ranges over a finite set of atomic proposition AP, and X, U are the
temporal operators called Next and (strong) Until respectively. 
We use the usual abbreviations:
ff ≡ ¬q ∧ q
tt ≡ ¬ff
φ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
φ⇒ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ
Fφ ≡ tt Uφ
Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ
The temporal modalities F and G are called Eventually (“in the Future”) and
Globally respectively.
Recall that all our Kripke structures K = (S,R,L) are pointed and serial,
and that a path pi is an infinite sequence of states. (Refer to Definition 4 on
page 31 for path notations such as suffixes pii.)
Definition 9 (LTL semantics)
The semantics of LTL on pointed Kripke structures K = (S,R,L) is defined
via paths pi as follows:
• pi  q iff L(pi[0], q) = tt.
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• pi  ¬φ iff pi 2 φ.
• pi  φ ∧ ψ iff pi  φ and pi  ψ.
• pi  Xφ iff pi1  φ.
• pi  φUψ iff there exists k ∈ N such that pik  ψ and pii  φ for all
i < k.
The Kripke structure (K, s0) satisfies an LTL formula φ, denoted K  φ, iff
pi  φ for every pi ∈ Path(s0), i.e. for all paths pi = s0s1 . . . which begin in
the initial state s0. 
Definition 10
Let K be a Kripke structure and α an LTL formula. Then Path(s, α) is the
set of paths pi which start at s and satisfy α:
Path(s, α) := {pi path in K | pi[0] = s and pi  α} 
Clearly we have Path(s, tt) = Path(s) which justifies the similarity of
notation.
Example 5
Kripke structure K of Figure 2.1 on page 33 satisfies X s and G s but neither
X q nor X r. We have Path(s0) = {s0ω} ∪ {s0∗s1ω} ∪ {s0∗s2ω} ∪ {s0∗s1∗s2ω}
and Path(s0, qU r) = {s0∗s1ω} ∪ {s0∗s1∗s2ω}. As Path(s0, qU r) is only a
subset of all paths from s0, namely the ones which visit s1, Kripke structure
K does not satisfy qU r. 
Interestingly, the negation of an Until formula can be expressed as a dis-
junction of an Until and a negated Until:
¬(φUψ) = ((¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)) ∨ G¬ψ (2.1)
= ((¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)) ∨ ¬(tt Uψ)
A widely used syntactic extension of LTL uses the weak Until operator W,
which encodes this disjunction explicitly. The operator φWψ, sometimes
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also called Unless, behaves like the strong Until φUψ except that the second
condition ψ does not have to be realised. Formally:
• pi  φWψ iff for all l ∈ N we have either pil  φ or there is 0 ≤ j ≤ l
with pij  ψ.
The weak Until W can be expressed by strong Until U and vice versa:
φUψ ≡ ¬((¬ψ) W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ))
φWψ ≡ ¬((¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ))
(2.2)
Thus, the weak Until does not increase the expressiveness of LTL, but it
allows to write another intuitive equivalence:
Gφ ≡ ¬F¬φ
≡ ¬tt U¬φ
≡ φW ff .
With the two variants of Until in the syntax one can convert every LTL
formula φ into an equivalent formula φ′ in the following negation normal
form.
Definition 11 (LTL negation normal form)
The formulae of LTL in negation normal form2 (NNF) are as follows:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬q | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | Xφ | φUψ | φWψ 
Arbitrary LTL formulae φ can be converted to an equivalent formula in
negation normal form by applying the following rules recursively to the sub-
formulae of φ, starting with φ itself:
nnf(q) = q
nnf(¬q) = ¬q
nnf(¬¬φ) = φ
2Also called positive normal form by other authors.
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nnf(φ ∧ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∧ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∧ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∨ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf(φ ∨ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∨ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∨ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∧ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf(Xφ) = X nnf(φ)
nnf(¬Xφ) = X nnf(¬φ)
nnf(φUψ) = nnf(φ) U nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φUψ)) = nnf(¬ψ) W nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
nnf(φWψ) = nnf(φ) W nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φWψ)) = nnf(¬ψ) U nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
Both, weak and strong Until, can be expressed in terms of the Release
operator R which is formally defined as follows:
pi  φRψ if and only if there is no l ∈ N such that:
pil  ¬ψ and pij  ¬φ for all 0 ≤ j < l .
Weak and strong Until can be written in terms of R:
φUψ ≡ (¬φ ∨ ψ) R(φ ∨ ψ)
φWψ ≡ ¬(¬φR¬ψ)
Since the Release is rather un-intuitive in its meaning and thus not well
suited for writing specifications, we do not include R explicitly in the syntax
of LTL.
Example 6
Below we state some LTL formulae, each followed by an equivalent formula
in negation normal form:
G(¬(started ∧ ¬ready)) ≡ (¬started ∨ ready) W ff
G(¬started ∨ F acknowledged) ≡ (¬started ∨ (tt U acknowledged)) W ff
¬G F enabled ∨ G F running ≡ ((tt U¬enabled) W ff)∨
((tt U running) W ff) 
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Assumption 2
We assume W to be part of the LTL syntax, although we may not explicitly
mention it in, for example, structural inductions or definitions. We do not
include the Release R explicitly in the LTL syntax. 
2.2.2 CTL
In this section we introduce the branching-time logic CTL [42].
Definition 12 (CTL syntax)
The formulae of Computation Tree Logic (CTL) are state formulae φ gener-
ated as follows:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | A[α] | E[α]
α ::= Xφ | φUψ
where q ranges over a finite set of atomic proposition AP, X and U are the
temporal modalities Next and (strong) Until respectively, and E and A are
the existential and universal quantifier respectively. 
The CTL semantics casts path formulae α into state formulae φ by quan-
tifying over the paths Path(s) starting from a particular state s.
Definition 13 (CTL semantics)
The semantics of CTL on Kripke structures K = (S,R,L) is defined as
follows. Let s ∈ S be a state.
• s  q iff L(s, q) = tt.
• s  ¬φ iff s 2 φ.
• s  φ ∧ ψ iff s  φ and s  ψ.
• s  E[Xφ] iff there exists s′ such that (s, s′) ∈ R and s′  φ.
• s  A[Xφ] iff for all s′ with (s, s′) ∈ R we have s′  φ.
• s  E[φUψ] iff there exists a path pi ∈ Path(s) starting at s with
pi  φUψ, i.e. there exists i ∈ N such that pi[i]  ψ and pi[j]  φ for all
j < i.
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• s  A[φUψ] iff for all paths pi ∈ Path(s) starting at s we have pi 
φUψ, i.e. there exists i ∈ N such that pi[i]  ψ and pi[j]  φ for all
j < i.
A pointed Kripke structure (K, s0) satisfies φ, denoted K  φ, iff its initial
state s0 satisfies φ. 
Example 7
The Kripke structure K in Figure 2.1 on page 33 satisfies E[qU r] but not
A[qU r]. It also satisfies A[X s] and A[sW ff]. 
We use similar abbreviations as for LTL, but with the difference that CTL
temporal modalities always occur in the immediate scope of a quantifier:
EFφ ≡ E[tt Uφ]
AFφ ≡ A[tt Uφ]
EGφ ≡ ¬AF¬φ
AGφ ≡ ¬EF¬φ
Dualities for the Until operators in CTL are not as straightforward as
in LTL. In particular EU and AU are not dual to each other, since the
disjunction which results from a negated strong Until formula in LTL (see
equation (2.2.1) on page 39) does not fulfill the syntactic restrictions on path
formulae α. As a result EU cannot be expressed as combination of other CTL
operators [139]. The expressiveness of CTL operators is discussed in [130]
and [139]. The latter article identifies adequate3 fragments of CTL. The main
problem is that the quantifiers E and A do not distribute over the logical
operators ∧ and ∨ respectively. The logic CTL* [70] allows combinations of
path-formulae within the scope of a quantifier. Thus equation (2.2.1) can
be lifted to CTL* with the usual duality between universal and existential
3A syntactic subset A of a logic L (seen as a set of formulae) is adequate iff it is as
expressive as the full logic L, i.e. for each φ ∈ L there exists some ψ ∈ A such that φ
and ψ are semantically equivalent.
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quantification:
¬A[φUψ] = E[((¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)) ∨ G¬ψ]
¬E[φUψ] = A[((¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)) ∨ G¬ψ]
As for LTL, CTL syntax can be extended with a weak Until operator
W. The weak Until in its two quantified variants E[φWψ] and A[φWψ]
behaves like the corresponding variants of strong Until, i.e. E[φUψ] and
A[φUψ] respectively, where the second condition ψ does not need to be
reached. Formally:
• s  E[φWψ] iff there exists a path pi ∈ Path(s) starting at s with
pi  φWψ, i.e. for all l ∈ N we have either pil  φ or there is 0 ≤ j ≤ l
with pij  ψ.
• s  A[φWψ] iff for all paths pi ∈ Path(s) starting at s we have pi 
φWψ, i.e. for all l ∈ N we have either pil  φ or there is 0 ≤ j ≤ l
with pij  ψ.
Weak Until W can be expressed by strong Until U and vice versa:
E[φUψ] ≡ ¬A[(¬ψ) W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]
E[φWψ] ≡ ¬A[(¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]
A[φUψ] ≡ ¬E[(¬ψ) W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]
A[φWψ] ≡ ¬E[(¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]
Nevertheless, not all dualities for LTL formulae have a direct correspon-
dent in CTL. For example the duality
φWψ ≡ (φUψ) ∨ ¬(tt U¬φ)
does not in general have a direct correspondent in CTL. The universal quan-
tifier does not distribute over the disjunction. Even if it would, a quantified
variant of the right conjunct, e.g. A[¬(tt U¬φ)] syntactically would not be-
long to CTL but to CTL* – a more general logic which we discuss in Section
2.2.3.
Nevertheless, with the dualities at hand we can convert CTL formulae
into equivalent formulae in the following negation normal form.
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Definition 14 (CTL negation normal form)
The formulae of CTL in negation normal form4 (NNF) are state formula φ
generated as follows:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬q | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | A[α] | E[α]
α ::= Xφ | φUψ | φWψ 
CTL formulae in negation normal form are all those CTL formulae in
which negation only occurs on propositions. In addition to the syntax in-
troduced in Definition 12 the negation normal form explicitly contains the
logical disjunction ∨, which in NNF can not be derived from conjunction ∧
via negation, and the weak Until W as negated counterpart for the strong
Until U. Every formula φ of CTL can be transformed into a semantically
equivalent formula φ′ in NNF by recursively pushing negations inward using
DeMorgan’s laws and the dualities between U and W as described above.
This conversion of formula φ is formalised by the following recursive rules:
nnf(q) = q
nnf(¬q) = ¬q
nnf(¬¬φ) = φ
nnf(φ ∧ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∧ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∧ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∨ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf(φ ∨ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∨ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∨ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∧ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf(Aα) = A nnf(α)
nnf(¬Aα) = E nnf(¬α)
nnf(Eα) = E nnf(α)
nnf(¬Eα) = A nnf(¬α)
4Also called positive normal form by other authors.
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nnf(Xφ) = X nnf(φ)
nnf(¬Xφ) = X nnf(¬φ)
nnf(φUψ) = nnf(φ) U nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φUψ)) = nnf(¬ψ) W nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
nnf(φWψ) = nnf(φ) W nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φWψ)) = nnf(¬ψ) U nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
For every formula φ in negation normal form, the formulae
AFφ = A[tt Uφ]
EF = E[tt Uφ]
AG = A[φW ff]
EG = E[φW ff]
are in negation normal form, too. Hence one can use the abbreviations F
and G also for formulae in negation normal form.
Example 8
Some CTL formulae and equivalent formulae in negation normal form are:
¬EF(started ∧ ¬ready) ≡ AG(¬started ∨ ready)
¬AF(AG deadlock) ≡ EG(EF¬deadlock) 
In negation normal form one can syntactically define meaningful fragments
of CTL, such as ACTL and ECTL.
Definition 15 (ACTL)
The universal fragment of CTL is called ACTL. It contains the CTL for-
mulae in negation normal form restricted to universal quantification over
paths:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬q | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | A[α]
α ::= Xφ | φUψ | φWψ 
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Definition 16 (ECTL)
The existential fragment of CTL is called ECTL. It contains the CTL for-
mulae in negation normal form restricted to existential quantification over
paths:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬q | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | E[α]
α ::= Xφ | φUψ | φWψ 
Some authors define ACTL and ECTL as the sets of CTL formulae φ
(without explicit syntactical restrictions) whose negation normal form is in
the syntactic fragment which we use for the respective definitions.
ACTL contains the safety-properties [138, 8] expressible in CTL. Intu-
itively, safety formulae state properties of the form “Something bad will
never happen”:
A G¬bad
Another important class of properties, besides safety, are the so called
liveness properties. Informally they state that the system stays “alive” in
the sense that it always remains possible to reach a “good” state.
A G A F good
Safety and liveness are more naturally related to each other than it might
seem at first. Safety asserts something about finite prefixes of paths, e.g. no
bad state may occur in a finite prefix of any path. Liveness on the other hand
states something about behaviours which are independent of finite prefixes
of paths, e.g. no matter how much of a path was already examined, it will
always eventually visit another good state. This allows for a topological
definition of safety and liveness. The topological approach is rather elegant
in its independence from concrete syntax, and reveals the natural duality
of safety and liveness very clearly. As it is not relevant for the remainder
of this thesis, we omit the topological definitions of safety and liveness and
refer to [8, 138, 9] and [177].
Historically safety and liveness are concepts of LTL [8, 153, 137] which is,
in general, semantically incomparable to CTL [127, 70]. Our interest lies in
branching-time logics such as CTL and PCTL, however. Within the logic
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CTL*, which contains both LTL and CTL, the corresponding fragment to
ACTL is ACTL*. This fragment contains full LTL, ACTL and all safety-
properties expressible in CTL*. See Section 2.2.3 below for more details on
the incomparability of LTL and CTL, and for CTL*. For more information
on safety and liveness in branching time see [138, 102] and in particular [20,
Chapters 3 and 7]. For safety and liveness in the modal µ-calculus see, for
example, [161].
2.2.3 Modal µ-calculus
At first, one might think that branching-time logics are strictly more expres-
sive than linear-time logics, and that it should be possible to express every
LTL property in CTL. Actually, this is not the case; the expressiveness of
the two logics is incomparable. Many properties can be expressed in both
logics, but there are properties which can be expressed in CTL but not in
LTL and vice versa. Here we say a property P can be expressed by two
formulae φ and ψ, if the formulae are semantically equivalent, i.e. they have
the same set of models, namely the set of all models with property P . In
this sense a formula φ expresses (the intent of) another formula ψ, if φ and
ψ are semantically equivalent.
Example 9
The following formulae are in LTL but can not be expressed in CTL:
F q⇒ F r
F G q
F(q ∧ X q)
Conversely, the following formulae are in CTL but can not be expressed
in LTL:
AF AG q
AF(q ∧ A[X q])
48
AG EF q
The examples are taken from [98] and [20] respectively. 
For a more detailed comparison of LTL and CTL expressiveness see [20,
Chapter 6.3].
The logic CTL* was developed by Allen Emerson and Joseph Halpern to
unify LTL and CTL [70]. Unfortunately the model-checking problem, i.e.
whether a formula φ holds for Kripke structure K, for CTL* is PSPACE-
complete, while there are efficient algorithms for model checking CTL and
important fragments of LTL [70, 165, 98, 164]. In particular LTL model-
checking is linear in the size of the Kripke structure K and PSPACE-
complete in the length5 of the formula φ [164]; CTL model-checking is linear
(i.e. P-complete) in both the size of K and the length of φ [164].
The universal fragment ACTL* of CTL* contains LTL as a strict subset.
CTL* itself is subsumed by Dexter Kozen’s modal µ-calculus [122] which
is even more expressive and contains least and greatest fixpoint operators
[54]. As we are interested in PCTL, which is more similar to CTL than
CTL*, we do not discuss CTL* further. Instead we move straight on to
the modal µ-calculus. The modal µ-calculus has a strong connection to tree
automata which are introduced in Section 3.3. This connection provides
some motivation for our probabilistic automata in Chapter 6.
Definition 17 (Modal µ-calculus)
The formulae of the modal µ-calculus are defined as follows:
φ, ψ ::= q | Z | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | EXφ | µZ.φ
where q is a proposition from a finite set AP and Z a variable. The least
fixpoint operator µZ binds recursion variables Z. In every fixpoint formula
µZ.φ all free occurrence of Z in φ are in the scope of an even number of
negations. 
The even scope of negations in µZ.φ is necessary for the formula φ to
be monotone and thus to guarantee the existence of the fixpoint. Indeed,
5The exponential complexity actually stems from the number of nested Until operators.
49
Kozen calls this requirement syntactic monotonicity [122].
We include the standard derived operators tt, ff and ∨ in the above syntax.
Further, we write φ[Z/Y ] for the syntactic substitution with Y for all free
occurrences of Z in φ. We also include the greatest fixpoint in the µ-calculus
syntax. It is defined as
νZ.φZ ≡ ¬µZ.¬φ[Z/¬Z]
where φ[Z/¬Z] is the formula φ except that all occurrences of variable Z
are replaced by ¬Z.
Including νZ.φZ, φ ∧ ψ and AXφ explicitly in the syntax and enlarging
AP by q¯ = ¬q for every q ∈ AP allows for a negation normal form of the
modal µ-calculus where all negations are pushed inwards and regarded as
propositional. Formulae of this form, i.e. without negated subformulae, are
called positive in the original article by Kozen [122].
Example 10
The Kripke K structure of Figure 2.1 on page 33 satisfies, for example, the
µ-calculus formulae
φ = νZ.(s ∧ A XZ)
ψ = µZ.(r ∨ (q ∧ E XZ))
which correspond to A G s and E[qU r] respectively in CTL. 
This concludes our discussion of the modal µ-calculus in this chapter.
The modal µ-calculus is revisited briefly in Chapter 3 when we discuss its
connection to (alternating) tree automata.
2.2.4 LTL and CTL semantics for partial Kripke structures
Partial Kripke structures allow for two interpretation of L(s, q) = ?, where
L(s, q) = ? is either under-approximated as ff or over-approximated as tt. In
the terminology of Glenn Bruns and Patrice Godefroid [31] we call these two
modes of interpretation optimistic and pessimistic respectively. For example,
an optimistic interpretation of L(s, q) = ? justifies the CTL assertion s  q;
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while pessimistically it justifies s 2 q. This gives rise to a 3-valued semantics
with truth values in {tt,ff,?}.
We omit a formal definition of 3-valued semantics for LTL and CTL here
and refer to Bruns’s and Godefroid’s work on generalised model checking
[31, 32] for details.
Partial Kripke structures and 3-valued semantics have a very practical
application in abstraction. We omit formal definitions and only briefly sketch
the idea. Intuitively, states labelled with L(s, q) = ? can abstract infinitely
many concrete states such that a formula is true respectively false on the
concrete model whenever it is so in both the pessimistic and optimistic
interpretation on the abstract model. That is, whenever the pessimistic
and optimistic interpretation of a formula yields the same truth-value on
a 3-valued abstraction, then the formula has this truth-value also on every
refinement of the abstraction. The abstraction is inconclusive, i.e. too coarse,
only if pessimistic and optimistic pessimistic yields different answers.
This semantics allows to verify a variety of useful formulae on partial
Kripke structures with 3-valued semantics. A formal description of this
approach and some instructive examples can be found, e.g., in [31, Section
5].
Example 11
Partial Kripke structure K of Figure 2.3 on page 35 satisfies A[X s] opti-
mistically but not pessimistically as s1 is labelled with s?. 
We define a 3-valued semantics for PCTL over 3-valued Markov chains in
Section 2.4. This semantics is then used for our first partial completeness
result in Section 4. The partial completeness result is achieved by abstraction
via 3-valued unfoldings of Markov chains which is similar to the abstraction
via partial Kripke structures mentioned above.
2.3 Simulation and bisimulation
We now define some important relations between states of a Kripke structure
respectively between whole Kripke structures, and discuss their connection
to the logic CTL. Our presentation follows in part [20, Chapter 7] and we
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refer to [20] for a much more detailed discussion, for further examples and
for many of the proofs which we omit in this background chapter.
First we introduce simulation, a relation between the observable behaviour
of systems, whose definition goes back to Robin Milner [145].
Definition 18 (Simulation)
Let J = (S,R,L) and K = (T,R,L) be pointed Kripke structures with ini-
tial state sin and tin respectively.6 A relation Q ⊆ S×T is called simulation
iff for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T we have whenever (s, t) ∈ Q:
• L(s) = L(t); and
• for all s′ ∈ S with s−→s′ there is some t′ ∈ T with t−→t′ and (s′, t′) ∈
Q.
We say “t simulates s” (or “s is simulated by t”), denoted by t  s, iff there
is a simulation Q with (s, t) ∈ Q.
We say K simulates J , denoted K  J , iff the initial state of K simulates
the initial state of J . 
Intuitively, t simulates s if it matches the “local information” of s, i.e. t
has the same labelling as s, and if t “can mimic all stepwise behaviour” of s
[20, Chapter 7.4].
Unfortunately there is no universal agreement in the literature on the
direction of the relational sign ; i.e. on whether to write K  J or J  K
for “K simulates J”. There are arguments for both variants:
• Seen as abstract specification K and more concrete (or refined) speci-
fication J , then K (potentially) allows more implementations than J ,
e.g. describes a larger set of models.
• Seen as abstract model K and concrete model J , then K can be un-
derstood as (potentially) smaller than J , e.g. having a smaller state
space.
6To simplify presentation we use R and L to denote the transition relation and labelling
function respectively of both Kripke structures. Their domain, e.g. R ⊆ S × S or
R ⊆ T × T , is clear from the context.
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Figure 2.6: A Kripke structure A.
We favour the latter intuition, and therefore write K  J whenever K
simulates J . In this sense of “abstract specification K simulates concrete
implementation J”, the definition yields that K can mimic every transition
of J , i.e. every transition of J is allowed by the specification K, but K
can feature additional transitions which are not implemented in J . In the
same sense one could read “simulate” as “abstracts”, and as the opposite of
“implements”. The  sign then indicates “more abstract” and “potentially
smaller”.
The following example is adapted from David Schmidt’s tutorial-style ar-
ticle on abstraction and refinement [161].
Example 12
Let C and A be the Kripke structures illustrated in Figure 2.5 and Figure
2.6 respectively. Then A simulates C.
The simulation relation is R = {(sin, tin), (si, ti), (s2, t1) | i = 0, . . . , 3}. 
53
as0
s1 s3
s4 s5
b c
Figure 2.7: A Kripke structure M .
Simulation can be seen as relation between specifications and implemen-
tations. We now introduce two notions for models which satisfy the same
specification, or which in some sense exhibit the same observable behaviour.
The first notion is mutual simulation, called similarity. The second notion
is bisimulation, which is a co-inductive variant of mutual simulation.
Definition 19 (Similarity)
We say Kripke structures K and J are similar (to each other) iff K  J
and J  K. 
The following example is adapted from Example 7.63 in the book by Chris-
tel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen [20].
Example 13
Let M and N be the Kripke structures illustrated in Figure 2.7 and Figure
2.8 respectively. Then M and N are similar to each other, i.e. M  N and
N M .
The simulation relations are R = {(si, ti), (s1, t3) | i = 1, . . . , 5} and
Q = {(ti, ti) | i = 0, . . . , 5} respectively. 
Similarity is an equivalence relation. Another important equivalence re-
lation between Kripke structures is bisimulation which goes back to David
Park [144].
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Figure 2.8: A Kripke structure N .
Definition 20 (Bisimulation)
Let J = (S,R,L) and K = (T,R,L) be pointed Kripke structures with
initial state sin and tin respectively. A bisimulation is a relation Q ⊆ S × T
such that for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T with (s, t) ∈ Q:
(i) L(s) = L(t);
(ii) whenever s−→s′, there is t′ ∈ T such that t−→t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ Q;
(iii) whenever t−→t′, there is s′ ∈ S such that s−→s′ and (s′, t′) ∈ Q.
Two states s and t are called bisimilar , denoted s ∼ t iff there is a bisimu-
lation Q such that (s, t) ∈ Q.
Kripke structures J and K are called bisimilar , denoted J ∼ K, iff the
initial state of J is bisimilar to the initial state of K. 
Bisimulation is well-defined, in particular there exists a greatest relation
with these properties.
Example 14
Let K and L be the Kripke structures illustrated in Figure 2.1 (page 33)
and Figure 2.9 respectively. Then K and L are bisimilar.
The bisimulation relation is R = {(si, ti), (s1, t3) | i = 0, . . . , 2}. 
Bisimilarity clearly implies similarity, but interestingly the converse is not
true in general. The following example shows two Kripke structures M and
N which simulate each other, i.e.M  N and N M , but are not bisimilar.
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Figure 2.9: A Kripke structure L.
Example 15
The Kripke structures M and N of Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 respectively
are similar but not bisimilar.
The simulation relations are as in Example 13 above, but there is no
bisimulation relation between M and N . 
This phenomenon is related to the notion of label-determinism, which
basically asserts that successor states must be (locally) unique with regard
to their labelling.7
Definition 21
We call a Kripke structure K label-deterministic8 if for s ∈ S whenever
s−→s′ and s−→s′′ and L(s′) = L(s′′)
then s′ = s′′. 
For label-deterministic Kripke structures bisimilarity and similarity coin-
cide.9
7The analogous notion for labelled transition systems is called action-determinism.
8Determinism here means that all successor states s′ of a state s are uniquely determined
by their labelling. Two successor states s′ 6= s′′ of s may not have the same labelling.
9In the label-deterministic case bisimilarity and similarity also coincide with trace-
equivalence which we do not introduce formally in this thesis.
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Lemma 1
Let K and J be label-deterministic10 Kripke structures, then
(K  J and J  K) if and only if K ∼ J .  
Simulation is of interest for us as it can be used as an abstraction rela-
tion which preserves certain properties. This preservation of properties is
formalised in the following lemma.
Lemma 2
Let J and K be Kripke structures. If K simulates J , then J satisfies every
ACTL formulae which is satisfied by K. Formally, if K  J , then for every
ACTL formula φ:
whenever K |= φ then J |= φ . (2.3)
 
This lemma does in fact also hold for ACTL* and thus in particular for
LTL.
We call property (2.3) of an abstraction relation (which is the simulation
relation in this case) soundness. Informally we say, simulation is sound for
ACTL. As discussed in Section 1.6, this is not a very precise statement and
we should rather say something like “simulation between Kripke structures
is sound for the verification of ACTL formulae”. Soundness is actually a
property of a relation between model-checking frameworks – i.e. the triple of
models; relation between models; and logics – rather than just of the relation
between the models.
Example 16
Let A and C be the Kripke structures depicted in Figure 2.10 and Figure
2.11 respectively. Let φ be the ACTL formula φ := A[qW(r ∨ s)]. As A
simulates C, i.e. A  C, and A  φ we know C  φ by the soundness of
simulation for ACTL. 
10The definition of label-determinism requires that whenever two successor states s′ and
s′′ of s agree on all propositions, s′ and s′′ must be the same state. In fact, Lemma 1
already holds if we weaken this condition of equality to bisimilarity, i.e. s′ ∼ s′′ rather
than s′ = s′′.
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Figure 2.11: A Kripke structure C.
Simulation is not sound for the full logic CTL.
Example 17
Let A and C be the Kripke structures of Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 respec-
tively. For ψ = E[qU s] we have A  ψ and C 2 ψ although A  C.
The simulation relation is R = {(a1, ci) | L(ci) = q} ∪ {(a2, ci) | L(ci) =
r}. 
Simulation is also sound for refutation of ECTL, which follows directly
from the soundness for ACTL via negation.
Lemma 3
Let J and K be Kripke structures. If K simulates J , then K satisfies every
ECTL formulae which is satisfied by J . Formally, if K  J , then for every
ECTL formula φ
whenever J |= φ then K |= φ . (2.4)
 
Analogous notions of simulation, similarity and bisimulation can be de-
fined for partial Kripke structures. Their definitions agree with the defini-
tions above on the structural part, e.g. on the transitions, but refer to the
58
information order for the conditions on the state labelling. This introduces
some technical issues which are not relevant for the work in this thesis and
hence are not discussed here. With notions such as property-reflecting and
property-preserving simulations one gets similar soundness results for par-
tial Kripke structures as for 2-valued Kripke structures [161]. The formal
definitions of these relations and the corresponding technical results are not
relevant for the main part of this thesis, and we refer to [161] for further
details.
We mention the concept of nearly bisimilar (in the terminology of [82])
as it is the relation for partial Kripke structure which corresponds closest to
the probabilistic simulation for 3-valued Markov chains which we use in the
main part of this thesis.
Definition 22 (Near bisimulation)
Let J = (S,R,L) and K = (T,R,L) be pointed, partial Kripke structures.
A relation Q ⊆ S × T is called near bisimulation iff for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T
we have whenever (s, t) ∈ Q:
• for all q ∈ AP we have: L(t, q) ≤ L(s, q);
• for all s′ ∈ S with s−→s′ there exists t′ ∈ T with t−→t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ Q;
and
• for all t′ ∈ T with t−→t′ there exists s′ ∈ S with s−→s′ and (s′, t′) ∈ Q.
We say “t is nearly bisimilar to s” iff there is a near bisimulation Q with
(s, t) ∈ Q.11
Partial Kripke structures K is nearly bisimilar to J if the initial state of
K is nearly bisimilar to the initial state of J . 
This relation establishes that two states s and t are “bisimilar except that
the atomic propositions in state t may be less defined than in state s” [82].
Near bisimulation coincides with bisimulation for 2-valued Kripke structures.
A more thorough overview on simulation, bisimulation and their connec-
tions to various logics is given in [20, Chapter 7].
11One needs to be careful with the order of s and t here as near bisimulation is not a
reflexive relation.
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2.4 Markov chains and Markov decision processes
We now introduce labelled, discrete-time Markov chains as the class of mod-
els which we use throughout most of this thesis. In analogy to Kripke
structures, Markov chains can be seen as graph structures where states are
labelled with propositions and the outgoing transitions of each state are
decorated with the probabilities of a discrete probability distribution.
There is broad literature on Markov chains. We mostly follow the termi-
nology used in [85] and [149].
Definition 23 (Discrete-time Markov chain)
A labelled discrete-time Markov chain M is a tuple (S,P, L) where
1. S is a countable, non-empty set of states;
2. P is a stochastic matrix whose entries define transition probabilities
P : S × S −→ [0, 1], such that the countable sum∑
s′∈S
P (s, s′)
exists and equals 1 for all s ∈ S; and
3. L is a total labelling function L: S×AP −→ {tt,ff}, where AP is a finite
set of atomic propositions. 
The transition probabilities P(s, ·) form a probability distribution over S.
The set of all distributions over S is denoted by Dist(S).
As intuition one can think of Markov chainsM as serial Kripke structures
where the transitions are labelled with probabilities, such that for each state
s the probabilities on the outgoing transitions add up to 1. Dually, one
can also see each Kripke structure K as a Markov chain by assigning a
(e.g. uniform) distribution to the outgoing transitions of each state. Both
conversions are just meant as intuition, they do not in general preserve all
information and meaning.
In a Markov chain every state needs to have at least one outgoing tran-
sition – to itself or to another state – so that the matrix P actually is a
60
stochastic matrix, i.e. the entries in each row add up to 1. This is differ-
ent from (non-serial) Kripke structures which may contain states with no
outgoing transitions.
Assumption 3 (Labelled Markov chains)
In this thesis all Markov chains are labelled Markov chains and we often
omit the attribute “labelled”. 
We now define some useful concepts, notations and naming conventions
for Markov chains:
Definition 24
Let M = (S,P, L) be a Markov chain.
1. M is called finite-state iff the set S is finite.
2. M is called finite-branching iff for all s ∈ S the set of successors
Succ(s) := {s′ ∈ S | P(s, s′) > 0} is finite. A finite-state Markov chain
M is necessarily also finite-branching.
3. M is called pointed if it contains a designated initial state sin ∈ S. We
write (M, sin) to denote the initial state sin of M .
4. A state s is called absorbing if it has a self-loop of probability 1,
P (s, s) = 1, and thus no other outgoing transition. 
Assumption 4 (Pointed Markov chains)
In this thesis we assume that all Markov chains M are pointed, i.e. have an
initial state in. 
A Markov chain M = (S,P, L) determines a directed graph (S,E) where
the vertices are states S and edges are defined by (s, s′) ∈ E iff P (s, s′) > 0.
Edges (s, s′) are decorated with P (s, s′). Thus, we sometimes use graph
terminology for features of Markov chains, e.g. cycles and strongly connected
components. In this graph sense we talk about a transition between two
states s and s′ of a Markov chain if the probability P (s, s′) is strictly positive.
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A path pi from state s in M is an infinite sequence of states s0s1 . . . with
s0 = s and P (si, si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 0. Note that each state s has at least
one outgoing transition and therefore every finite sequence of states can be
extended to a path in M . We write Path(s) for the set of all paths from s.
For Y ⊆ S, we write P (s, Y ) as a shorthand for the (possibly infinite but
well defined) sum
∑
s′∈Y P (s, s
′).
The labelling function L(s, q) determines the truth value of atomic propo-
sitions q ∈ AP at state s. Thinking of a Markov chain as a graph struc-
ture, L assigns (the truth value of) atomic propositions to the vertices s
in the graph of the Markov chain M . Here we use the same conventions
as for Kripke structures: the set of propositions that hold at s is denoted
L(s) := {q ∈ AP | L(s, q) = tt}; in figures the label q indicates L(s, q) = tt,
and the absence of such label means L(s, q) = ff. As with partial Kripke
structures we will generalise Markov chains to 3-valued labelling function L
in Definition 26 below.
Example 18
The Markov chainM from Figure 2.12 is pointed, finite-branching and finite-
state. It has two absorbing states s1 and s2. 
Example 19
Figure 2.12 illustrates a labelled discrete-time Markov chain M with ini-
tial state s0 designated by an incoming arrow. State names are written in
vertices, labels indicating the value of L(s, q) are written next to states s.
Transition probabilities P (s, s′) are written on the edges. Edges with prob-
ability 0 are omitted. A probability label 1 on a transition s−→s′ may also
be omitted as it is implicit by s−→s′ being the only transition from s. 
Time is not explicitly mentioned in a discrete-time Markov chain. As we
use discrete time (as opposed to continuous time) no parameter t is needed.
Time is handled implicitly: one transition is taken at each discrete time step.
Thus, the probability for a discrete-time Markov chain to be in a certain state
after k time steps is computed by the k-th power of the stochastic matrix P
[149].
For a Markov chain M we are interested in the probability measure of
paths which satisfy certain properties; for example in Figure 2.12 the set of
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Figure 2.12: A labelled discrete-time Markov chain M .
paths which satisfy qU r. Hence we need to derive a probability measure on
path sets from the transition probabilities P (s, s′). The standard way to do
this is via cylinders [115].
Definition 25 (Basic cylinder)
For a finite prefix ρ = s0 . . . sn of a path we define the basic cylinder :
∆(ρ) = {pi path | ρ a prefix of pi} 
These cylinders generate a sigma-algebra which gives rise to a unique
probability measure Prob via the product of transition probabilities in the
prefix:
Prob(∆(s0 . . . sn)) =
n−1∏
i=0
P (si, si+1)
For more details on this construction and proofs see, for example, [115].
Analogously to partial Kripke structures, we now define Markov chains
with 3-valued labelling by replacing the labelling function in Definition 23.
Definition 26 (3-valued Markov chains)
A 3-valued discrete-time Markov chain M is a tuple (S,P, L), where
1. S is a countable, non-empty set of states;
2. P is a stochastic matrix such that the countable sum∑
s′∈S
P (s, s′)
exists and equals 1 for all s ∈ S; and
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Figure 2.13: A 3-valued discrete-time Markov chain M .
3. L is a total function L : S × AP −→ {tt,?,ff} for a finite set AP of
atomic propositions. 
In graphical representations of 3-valued Markov chains M the label q
indicates L(s, q) = tt; label q? marks L(s, q) = ?; and the absence of any of
the other two labels means L(s, q) = ff. To stress that a Markov chains M
is 2-valued we sometimes call it concrete.
Example 20
Figure 2.13 illustrates a 3-valued discrete-time Markov chain M . 
Another possible generalisation of (2-valued) Markov chains is the in-
troduction of non-determinism. Instead of having one unique probability
distribution at each state one allows non-deterministic choice from a set of
distributions. Such models are called Markov Decision Processes (MDP).
Kripke structures are in general non-deterministic, Markov chains can be
seen as deterministic although probabilistic, and Markov decision processes
are non-deterministic and probabilistic. These are crucial distinctions for
example with regard to fairness, optimistic and pessimistic semantics, and
with regard to our completeness question.
Definition 27 (Markov decision process)
A labelled Markov decision process (MDP) M is a tuple (S,D,L) where
1. S is a countable, non-empty set of states,
2. D: S −→ 2Dist(S) is a mapping from states to sets of distributions over
S; and
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Figure 2.14: A Markov decision process M .
3. L is a labelling function L: S × AP −→ {tt,ff}, where AP is a finite set
of atomic propositions. 
The function D assigns a set D(s) of distributions to each state s. The
choice between distributions from these sets is non-deterministic. If D(s)
is a singleton for every s, the MDP M is equivalent to a standard Markov
chain.
Example 21
Figure 2.14 shows a Markov decision process M . We use the same notations
as for Markov chains; additionally non-deterministic choice is depicted by
dashed arrows to small filled circles where each circle represents one possible
choice of distribution. 
2.5 Probabilistic branching-time logic: PCTL
The probabilistic branching-time logic PCTL (Probabilistic Computation
Tree Logic) was introduced by Hans Hansson and Bengt Jonsson in 1994
[88]. It was subsequently used, sometimes in slightly modified variants, for
probabilistic model checking [14, 26] and is now widely used in probabilistic
model-checking tools, for example in PRISM [1] and Verus [17, 35]. Hans-
son and Jonsson define PCTL in [88] without the Next modality X. Leslie
Lamport even argues in [128] that the Next modality should be excluded
from any temporal modal logic. We use a variant of PCTL which is based
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on [88] but includes X. We also include the bounded versions of the Until
modalities which are present in [88] but omitted in other variants of PCTL,
for example in [14, 26, 17]. A restriction to the finitely bounded Until op-
erators is fairly common in practical applications – for PCTL as well as for
CTL – as it yields an upper bound on the search depth for model-checking
algorithms. Model checking with limited depth as a means of approximating
“unlimited” model checking is known as bounded model checking [27].
Definition 28 (PCTL syntax)
The formulae of PCTL are given by the following state formulae φ:
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | [α]./p (state formulae)
α ::= Xφ | φU≤k ψ | φW≤k ψ (path formulae)
where q is a proposition from a finite set AP, p ∈ [0, 1], ./ ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}
and k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. 
Path formulae α are essentially “LTL modalities” Next (X); (strong) Until
(U); and weak Until (W). They are interpreted as predicates over paths of
M . PCTL formulae wrap path formulae with probability thresholds (turning
predicates on paths into predicates on states), and may add a propositional
logic layer on top of that, which may then be used to build up new path
formulae.
We define constants Truth and False: let ff be an abbreviation for any
[α]>1, and let tt denote any [α]≥0. We write φUψ as a shorthand for
φU≤∞ ψ, and write φWψ as shorthand for φW≤∞ ψ. Further, we use the
usual abbreviations for derived operators:
φ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)
φ⇒ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ
Fφ ≡ tt Uφ
Gφ ≡ φW ff
For labelled a Markov chain M = (S,P, L), the denotational semantics of
a PCTL formula φ is a subset JφKM of S. We write JφK if M is clear from
the context and define JφK by structural induction, as follows.
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Definition 29 (PCTL semantics)
Let M = (S,P, L) be a Markov chain. The semantics of PCTL is defined
inductively as:
JqK = {s ∈ S | L(s, q) = tt}Jφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψKJ¬φK = S \ JφKJ[α]./pK = {s ∈ S | ProbM (s, α) ./ p}
where ProbM (s, α) is the probability of the measurable set Path(s, α) of
paths in M that begin in s and satisfy the path formula α where the seman-
tics for path formulae is as follows:
• pi  Xφ iff pi[1] ∈ JφKM ;
• pi  φU≤k ψ iff there is a l ∈ N such that 0 ≤ l ≤ k, pi[l] ∈ JψKM and
for all 0 ≤ j < l we have pi[j] ∈ JφKM ;
• pi  φW≤k ψ iff for all l ∈ N such that 0 ≤ l ≤ k we have either
pi[l] ∈ JφKM or there is 0 ≤ j ≤ l with pi[j] ∈ JψKM .
We say Markov chain (M, s0) satisfies φ, denoted M  φ, iff s0 ∈ JφKM . 
Occasionally we need to assert that a PCTL (sub-)formula φ holds at a
state s of a Markov chain M . We denote this s  φ, and we write s M φ
to clarify which Markov chain M the state s belongs to.
We say that two PCTL formulae φ and ψ are semantically equivalent iff
for all labelled Markov chains M we have JφKM = JψKM .
Note that the semantics of PCTL state and path formulae is mutually
recursive, reflecting the mutual recursion of their syntax. Until formulae
φU≤k ψ are strong Untils since paths that satisfy such a formula have to
maintain temporary invariant φ until they reach a state satisfying ψ, and
such a state has to be reached within finitely many transitions (and within
k transitions if k 6=∞). Weak Until formulae φW≤k ψ are weak Untils since
reaching a state satisfying ψ is optional if φ is an invariant on the sequence
s0s1 . . . sk, which is understood to be pi when k = ∞. The value k = ∞ is
being used to express unbounded Untils, whereas k ∈ N expresses a proper
step bound.
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Figure 2.15: A Markov chain M which satisfies the PCTL formula
[qU r]≥1, but – seen as Kripke structure without fairness
constraints – does not satisfy the LTL formula qU r.
The Until operators of PCTL allow to express useful properties such as
reachability with probability 1. More examples of practical specifications
expressible in PCTL are given, e.g., in [88]. In general such probabilistic
properties are very distinct from their non-probabilistic analogons, as illus-
trated by the following example.
Example 22
The Markov chain M in Figure 2.15 satisfies the PCTL formula [qU r]≥1.
The underlying Kripke structure – M without the probabilities – neither
satisfies the LTL formula qU r, nor the CTL formula A[qU r]. 
Example 23
Let M be a discrete-time Markov chain as illustrated in Figure 2.16. The
state s0 of M satisfies the PCTL formula [qU r]≥1/2 since the probability of
all paths which start at s0 and satisfy the path formula α = qU r is
Prob(s0, qU r) =
∞∑
j=1
(
1
3
)j
=
1
2
. 
Next we define a PCTL semantics on 3-valued Markov chains. It is very
similar to the semantics on 2-valued Markov chains but based on an opti-
mistic and a pessimistic interpretation of propositions [81, 100]. Optimisti-
cally, we interpret a proposition as true if it is not false, i.e.
JqKoM = {s ∈ S | L(s, q) 6= ff}
= {s ∈ S | L(s, q) = tt or L(s, q) = ?} ;
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Figure 2.16: A labelled Markov chain M which satisfies [qU r]≥1/2 because
ProbM (s0, qU r) = 1/2.
pessimistically, q is true only if the labelling says so, i.e.
JqKpM = {s ∈ S | L(s, q) = tt} .
Definition 30 (PCTL semantics)
Let m ∈ {o, p} be two modes of interpretation, ¬o = p, and ¬p = o. For φ
in PCTL, we define JφKmM :
JqKoM = {s ∈ S | L(s, q) 6= ff}JqKpM = {s ∈ S | L(s, q) = tt}Jφ ∧ ψKmM = JφKmM ∩ JψKmMJφ ∨ ψKmM = JφKmM ∪ JψKmMJ¬φKmM = S \ JφK¬mMJ[α]./pKmM = {s ∈ S | ProbmM (s, α) ./ p}
where ProbmM (s, α) is the probability of the measurable set Path(s, α)
m of
paths pi = s0s1 . . . in M that begin in s0 = s and for which pi m α in mode
m:
• pi m Xφ iff pi[1] ∈ JφKmM
• pi m φU≤k ψ iff there is a l ∈ N such that l ≤ k, pi[l] ∈ JψKmM and for
all 0 ≤ j < l we have pi[j] ∈ JφKmM
• pi m φW≤k ψ iff for all l ∈ N such that 0 ≤ l ≤ k we have either
pi[l] ∈ JφKmM or there is 0 ≤ j ≤ l with pi[j] ∈ JψKmM 
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Example 24
LetM be the 3-valued discrete-time Markov chain illustrated in Figure 2.13.
The above PCTL semantics for 3-valued Markov chains yields
s0 o [qU s]≥3/4
s0 2p [qU s]≥3/4
s0 o [qU s]≥1/2
s0 p [qU s]≥1/2
according to the optimistic respectively pessimistic interpretation of s? on
s1. For formulae φ which do not contain s, such as [qU r]≥1/2, the two
semantics o and p coincide with the standard PCTL semantics . 
Recall the duality between (strong) Until and weak Until in LTL as in
equation (2.2) on page 40. While in LTL the duality
φWψ ≡ (φUψ) ∨ ¬(tt U¬φ) (2.5)
holds, it does not hold for PCTL. As in CTL, PCTL path formulae are not
closed under logical disjunction ∨ which appears in the right hand side of the
equation. Nevertheless very similar dualities can be established in PCTL.
Hansson and Jonsson state in [88] the following dualities between U and W:
[φ1 W≤k φ2]≥p = ¬
(
[¬φ2 U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)]>1−p
)
(2.6)
[φ1 W≤k φ2]>p = ¬
(
[¬φ2 U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)]≥1−p
)
(2.7)
We now look at the derivation of one of these dualities in detail. Note that
our argument uses formulae as intermediate steps which are not in PCTL,
i.e. we reason in the logic PCTL* [14] which contains PCTL.
[φ1 W≤k φ2]≥p = [φ1 U≤k φ2 ∨ Gφ1]≥p
= [¬(φ1 U≤k φ2 ∨ Gφ1)]≤1−p
= ¬[¬(φ1 U≤k φ2 ∨ Gφ1)]>1−p
= ¬[¬(φ1 U≤k φ2) ∧ ¬Gφ1)]>1−p
= ¬[(¬φ2) U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2) ∨ Gφ1) ∧ ¬Gφ1)]>1−p
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As Gφ1 ∧ ¬Gφ1 is false in all states we omit Gφ1 from the disjunction:
= ¬[(¬φ2) U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)) ∧ ¬Gφ1)]>1−p
= ¬[(¬φ2) U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)) ∧ F¬φ1)]>1−p
= ¬[(¬φ2) U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)) ∧ F¬φ1)]>1−p
= ¬[(¬φ2) U≤k(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2)) ∧ F¬φ1)]>1−p
We know from the Until subformula that (¬φ1∧¬φ2) and hence ¬φ1 will be
realised within finite time. Therefore we can omit the condition F¬φ1 and
arrive at
[φ1 W≤k φ2]≥p = · · · = ¬[¬φ2 U≤k ¬(φ1 ∨ φ2)]>1−p .
The second equation follows analogously.
In our context it is important to note that there are various normal forms
possible for PCTL formulae. We present Greater-Than normal form and
Greater-Than negation normal form.
Definition 31 (Greater-Than normal form)
The following subset of PCTL constitutes the Greater-Than normal form
(GTNF):
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | [α]./p
α ::= Xφ | φU≤k ψ | φW≤k ψ
where q ∈ AP, p ∈ [0, 1], ./ ∈ {≥, >} and k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. 
Lemma 4
Each PCTL formula φ is semantically equivalent to a PCTL formula in
Greater-Than normal form. The Greater-Than normal form of φ can be
obtained by replacing all occurrences of the form [α]<p in φ with ¬[α]≥p,
and by replacing all occurrences of [α]≤p in φ with ¬[α]>p.  
Alternatively one could also replace formulae [α]<p by [¬α]>1−p and [α]≤p
by [¬α]≥1−p and then recursively process ¬α (which is in general not a valid
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subformula in PCTL but in PCTL* [26]) according to the rules for LTL
negation normal form.
For Markov decision processes and 3-valued Markov chains the above
lemma on Greater-Than normal form is in general not true, because of the
best-case respectively worst-case semantics for PCTL defined via schedulers
for Markov decision processes respectively the optimistic and pessimistic
PCTL semantics for 3-valued Markov chains.
Example 25
The Greater-Than normal form (GTNF) of the formula
[[X[qU r]<1/3]≤1/2 U r]>1/4
is
[¬[X¬[qU r]≥2/3]>1/2 U r]>1/4 .
The two formulae are semantically equivalent; the latter formula uses only
the comparison operators ≥ and >. 
Furthermore each PCTL formula φ is semantically equivalent (over con-
crete Markov chains) to a PCTL formula in the following Greater-Than
negation normal form.
Definition 32 (Greater-Than negation normal form)
The following subset of PCTL constitutes the Greater-Than negation normal
form (GTNNF):
φ, ψ ::= q | ¬q | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | [α]./p
α ::= Xφ | φU≤k ψ | φW≤k ψ
where q ∈ AP, p ∈ [0, 1], ./ ∈ {≥, >} and k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. 
Lemma 5
Every formula φ of PCTL that is not in GTNNF can be transformed to
a formula in GTNNF, equivalent in the 2-valued semantics over Markov
chains, by
72
1. replacing each subformula of the form [α]<p and [α]≤p by ¬[α]≥p and
¬[α]>p respectively; and then
2. pushing negations inwards according to the following recursive rules:
nnf(q) = q
nnf(¬q) = ¬q
nnf(¬¬φ) = φ
nnf(φ ∧ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∧ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∧ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∨ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf(φ ∨ ψ) = nnf(φ) ∨ nnf(ψ)
nnf(¬(φ ∨ ψ)) = nnf(¬φ) ∧ nnf(¬ψ)
nnf([Xφ]./p) = [X nnf(φ)]./p
nnf(¬[Xφ]./p) = [X nnf(¬φ)]./1−p
nnf([φU≤k ψ]./p) = [nnf(φ) U≤k nnf(ψ)]./p
nnf([¬(φU≤k ψ)]./p) = [nnf(¬ψ) W≤k nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./1−p
nnf([φW≤k ψ]./p) = [nnf(φ) W≤k nnf(ψ)]./p
nnf([¬(φW≤k ψ)]./p) = [nnf(¬ψ) U≤k nnf(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./1−p
where ./ is defined such that:
> equals ≥
≥ equals >  
The second step – pushing negations inwards – is possible without break-
ing the syntactical restrictions of PCTL, only because our definition includes
both weak Until and strong Until. An intermediate step in PCTL* explains
the transformations:
¬[Xφ]>p ≡ [¬Xφ]≥1−p ≡ [X¬φ]≥1−p
¬[φU≤k ψ]>p ≡ [¬(φU≤k ψ)]≥1−p ≡ [(¬ψ) W≤k(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]≥1−p
¬[φW≤k ψ]>p ≡ [¬(φW≤k ψ)]≥1−p ≡ [(¬ψ) U≤k(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]≥1−p
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Swapping the roles of ≥ and > in the above equivalences yields the dualities
for the remaining combinations of temporal operators and threshold types.
The negations ¬φ and ¬ψ above are then recursively processed in the same
manner as before.
Example 26
The Greater-Than negation normal form (GTNNF) of the formula
[[X[qU r]<1/3]≤1/2 U r]>1/4
is derived from its Greater-Than normal form (GTNF) as follows:
[[¬X¬[qU r]≥2/3]≥1/2 U r]>1/4
≡ [[¬X¬[qU r]≥2/3]>1/2 U r]>1/4
≡ [[X¬¬[qU r]≥2/3]≥1−1/2 U r]>1/4
≡ [[X[qU r]≥2/3]≥1/2 U r]>1/4 . 
Alternatively, one could achieve a normal form which contains only one
type of Until, i.e. U or W, by using negation of arbitrary formulae or all four
comparison operators or both:
[φUψ]./p = ¬[(¬ψ) W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./p
= [(¬ψ) W(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./1−p
[φWψ]./p = ¬[(¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./p
= [(¬ψ) U(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ)]./1−p
Another important fragment of PCTL is qualitative PCTL which is PCTL
restricted to thresholds of the form > 0 and ≥ 1. To distinguish the un-
restricted logic PCTL from the qualitative fragment we sometimes call the
former full or quantitative PCTL.
There are still some important open questions about PCTL, in particular
over infinite models. Some difficulties become already apparent for surpris-
ingly small subsets of PCTL. Tomás Brázdil, Vojtech Forejt, Jan Kretínský
and Antonín Kucera recently showed that already qualitative PCTL does
not have the finite model property and that “there are even qualitative PCTL
74
formulae which have only infinite-state models” [30]. An example from [30]
which can only have infinite models is
G>0(¬q ∧ F>0 q)
in our notation of PCTL.
In the same paper Brázdil et al. show that satisfiability of qualitative
PCTL is a decidable though EXPTIME-complete problem. Although the
qualitative PCTL fragment does not have the finite model property, the
authors show that for every satisfiable formulae φ from this fragment there
exists a so called marked graph which is a “finite description of a model” for
φ. Furthermore they show that if a quantitative PCTL formula is satisfiable,
then it also has a model whose branching degree is bounded by (a function
of) the length of the formula [30].
More than twenty years earlier, Sergiu Hart and Micha Sharir already
showed the absence of finite model property for two logics which very closely
resemble qualitative PCTL [89]. Further they prove that satisfiability of
these logics over certain classes of models, namely finite state Markov chains
and Markov chains with transition probabilities bounded away from 0, is
decidable via a tableau method [89].
The decidability of satisfiability for full PCTL is still an open research
problem. Brázdil et al. conjecture the problem to be decidable [30].
The model-checking problem for PCTL over (finite-state) Markov chains
is decidable in polynomial time [88]. Model checking PCTL* is decidable
in PSPACE (i.e. exponential in the length of the formula and polynomial
in the size of the model) over Markov chains and certain generalisations of
Markov chains [14, 26].
In contrast to the modal µ-calculus, PCTL allows only very restricted
fixpoint operations. While the µ-calculus is closed under arbitrary least and
greatest fixpoints, there is no such natural closure for PCTL. In this sense
PCTL is similar to CTL which also contains only a few selected fixpoint
operators, i.e. the unbounded Untils. The automata presented in Chapter 6
might be a first step toward a probabilistic logics which contains PCTL and
is as naturally closed under fixpoint recursions as the modal µ-calculus is.
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2.6 Probabilistic simulation and bisimulation
As for Kripke structures we are interested in abstraction (respectively re-
finement) and equivalence relations between Markov chains. Of particular
importance for this thesis are probabilistic bisimulation which was first de-
fined by Kim Larsen and Arne Skou [131], and probabilistic simulation which
was defined for probabilistic specifications by Kim Larsen and Bengt Jonsson
[108].
Definition 33 (Probabilistic bisimulation)
Let M = (S,P, L) and N = (T,P, L) be pointed Markov chains. An equiv-
alence relation R ⊆ S × T is called probabilistic bisimulation iff whenever
(s, t) ∈ R then
• L(s) = L(t) and
• P (s, piS(Q)) = P (t, piT (Q)) for all equivalence classes Q in (S × T )/R
where piS and piT are the projections from S × T onto S and T respectively.
We say s and t are bisimilar, denoted s ∼ t, iff there exists a probabilistic
bisimulation R such that (s, t) ∈ R.
Two pointed Markov chains M and N are bisimilar if their respective
initial states are bisimilar. 
Intuitively, bisimilar states s and t agree on their labels and have the same
transition probability to equivalence classes of R for some suitable projection
of such equivalence classes onto S and T .
Jonsson and Larsen introduced a framework to describe probabilistic spec-
ifications and probabilistic processes – the latter being a special case of the
former [108]. In the same article they define probabilistic simulation which
captures refinement between probabilistic specifications as well as satisfac-
tion between processes and specifications. We adopt their probabilistic sim-
ulation to our notation and restrict the definition to the special case of
Markov chains as probabilistic processes.
Definition 34 (Probabilistic simulation)
LetM = (S,P, L) and N = (T,P, L) be concrete Markov chains. A relation
Q ⊆ S × T is called probabilistic simulation if whenever (s, t) ∈ Q then:
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1. L(s) = L(t).
2. There is a weight function ρ: S −→ (T −→ [0, 1]) which yields a
probability distribution ρ(s) for each s ∈ S such that
a)
∑
s′∈S(P (s, s
′) · ρ(s′)(t′)) = P (t, t′) for all t′ ∈ T ;
b) (s′, t′) ∈ Q whenever ρ(s′)(t′) > 0 .
We say t simulates s, denoted by t  s, if there is a probabilistic simulation
Q such that (s, t) ∈ Q. We say N simulates M , denoted N  M , if the
initial state of N simulates the initial state of M . 
Larsen and Jonsson give the following intuition for the weight function ρ
in [108]:
Intuitively, the function ρ gives for each transition from s to s′
a way of distributing the probability of this transition onto the
transitions from t: the transition from t to t′ receives the fraction
ρ(s′)(t′). The first condition on ρ checks that for any particular
probability distribution that conforms with σ(s), the fractions
add up correctly.
For probabilistic processes, e.g. for concrete Markov chains, rather than
probabilistic specifications this probabilistic simulation is an equivalence re-
lation and actually a probabilistic bisimulation in the sense of Definition 33
[22, 108]. Nevertheless “probabilistic simulation” rather than “probabilistic
bisimulation” is often used in the existing literature for the above relation
even in the context of probabilistic processes.
Example 27
LetM and N be Markov chains as illustrated in Figure 2.17 and Figure 2.18
respectively. Then N simulates M . 
We extend probabilistic simulation to 3-valued Markov chains by changing
the condition on the labelling functions. Intuitively, simulation respects the
partial order on the truth values.
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Figure 2.18: A Markov chain N .
Definition 35 (Probabilistic simulation)
LetM = (S,P, L) and N = (T,P, L) be 3-valued Markov chains. A relation
Q ⊆ S × T is called probabilistic simulation if whenever (s, t) ∈ Q then
1. L(t, q) ≤ L(s, q) for all q ∈ AP.
2. There is a weight function ρ: S −→ (T −→ [0, 1]) which yields a
probability distribution ρ(s) for each s ∈ S such that
a)
∑
s′∈S(P (s, s
′) · ρ(s′)(t′)) = P (t, t′) for all t′ ∈ T ;
b) (s′, t′) ∈ Q whenever ρ(s′)(t′) > 0 .
We say t simulates s, denoted by t  s, if there is a probabilistic simulation
Q such that (s, t) ∈ Q. Markov chain N simulates M , denoted N  M , if
the initial state of N simulates the initial state of M . 
For PCTL formulae in Greater-Than negation normal form and proba-
bilistic simulation we can now secure a soundness result:
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Lemma 6
LetM and N be 3-valued Markov chains and N M . Then for all formulae
φ in GTNNF we have
• N p φ implies M p φ; and
• M o φ implies N o φ.  
Proof
The proof is a structural induction on φ, using standard fixed-point and
duality arguments for weak and strong Until formulae. 
For concrete Markov chains, probabilistic bisimulation (and thus our prob-
abilistic simulation) fully characterises PCTL [20, 22, 66, 131]. We quote
the corresponding Theorem 10.67 from [20]: For a Markov chain M , the
following statements are equivalent:
• s1 and s2 are bisimilar;
• s1 and s2 are PCTL*-equivalent, i.e. fulfill the same PCTL* formulae;
• s1 and s2 are PCTL-equivalent, i.e. fulfill the same PCTL formulae.
2.7 Unfoldings
In this section we define and discuss unfoldings of Markov chains. The
partial completeness result in Chapter 4 builds on these unfoldings. We
start with full unfoldings.
Definition 36 ((Full) Unfolding)
Let M = (S,P, L) be a 3-valued Markov chain. The full unfolding of M
at s0 is the Markov chain M s0full = (Sfull,P
′, L′) where Sfull is the set of
nonempty sequences σ over S; P ′ the transition probability
P ′(s0 . . . sn, s0 . . . snsn+1) := P (sn, sn+1)
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Figure 2.19: A Markov chain B.
and L′ the labelling function
L′(σ · s, q) := L(s, q) .
We restrict the set Sfull to the set of sequences reachable from s0 with positive
probability. 
If M is a concrete Markov chain, so is M s0full. Also, M and M
s0
full are
bisimilar.
Example 28
Let B be the Markov chain illustrated in Figure 2.19. Its full unfolding
B⊥full is the Markov chain given by the infinite, binary tree with uniform
distribution over the two successors of each node. 
We now formalise finite unfoldings.
Definition 37 (Finite Unfolding)
1. Let M = (S,P, L) be a 3-valued Markov chain. For i ∈ N and s0 ∈ S,
the finite unfolding M s0i = (Si,Pi, Li) is a Markov chain where Si is
the set of nonempty sequences over S of length at most i, plus a desig-
nated sink state tsink. As for full unfoldings the transition probabilities
are defined as
Pi(s0 . . . sn, s0 . . . snsn+1) := P (sn, sn+1) ,
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for n < i− 1, and
Pi(s0 . . . si−1, tsink) = 1
for all sequences of length i, and additionally
Pi(tsink, tsink) = 1 .
Again, Li(σ · s) = L(s), and Li(tsink, q) = ? for all q ∈ AP. We restrict
Si to sequences reachable from s0 with positive probability.
2. For j ∈ N, the finite unfolding M s0i is further restricted to maximal
branching degree j as follows. Finite unfolding M s0i,j = (Si,j ,Pi,j , Li,j)
is a Markov chain where Si,j = Si and Li,j = Li. For each s ∈ Si,
let t1, t2, . . . be an enumeration of {tk ∈ Si | Pi(s, tk) > 0} such that
Pi(s, tk) ≥ Pi(s, tk+1) for all k ∈ N. We then define Pi,j by setting
Pi,j(s, tk) = Pi(s, tk) for k ≤ j and Pi,j(s, tsink) = 1 −
∑j
k=1 Pi(s, tk).
Again we restrict Si,j to sequences reachable from s0 with positive
probability. 
Example 29
The unfolding M s03,3 for the labelled Markov chain M of Figure 2.20 is de-
picted in Figure 2.21. 
Finite unfoldings give rise to simulations.
Lemma 7
For all 3-valued Markov chainsM with initial state s0 and i, j ∈ N, the finite
unfolding M s0i,j simulates M , i.e. M
s0
i,j M .  
Proof
We show that the relation
H = {(s, σ · s) | s ∈ S, σ ∈ S∗} ∪ {(s, tsink) | s ∈ S}
is a simulation relation.
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Figure 2.20: A Markov chain M satisfying [qU r]≥1 and [qW r]≥1.
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Figure 2.21: The finite unfolding M s03,3.
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First, for all σ ∈ S∗, s ∈ S and q ∈ AP we have L(s, q) = L(σ · s, q).
Since L(tsink, q) = ? for all q ∈ AP we clearly have L(tsink, q) ≤ L(s, q) for
all s ∈ S.
We now define the weight function ρs: S × S −→ [0, 1]:
• ρs(s′, tsink) = 1 if there is no sequence σ such that σ · s′ is in M s0i,j
(which equivalently means |s0 . . . s′| > i for every such sequence in M
or s′ = tk′ with k′ > j for the ordering of the successor states tk of a
state s in M s0i as described in Definition 37).
• ρs(s′, tsink) = 0 for all other s′ ∈ S.
• ρs(s′, σ) = 1 if σ = σ′ · s · s′.
• ρs(s′, σ) = 0 for all other sequences.
Then the condition
∑
s′∈S(P (s, s
′) · ρs(s′, σ′)) = P (σ, σ′) for all σ′ ∈ M s0i,j
collapses to P (s, s′) = P (σ, σ′) for σ = σ′′ · s and σ′ = σ′′ · s · s′ and∑
s′∈S P (s, s
′) = 1 = P (σ, tsink) for all other states. Both equations are
obviously true by the construction of M s0i,j .
Finally, we need to check the co-inductive condition for simulation: When-
ever ρs(s′, tsink) > 0 we have (s′, tsink) ∈ H; whenever ρs(s′, σ′) > 0, then
σ′ = σ′′ · s · s′ and hence (s′, σ′) = (s′, σ′′ · s · s′) ∈ H. 
Example 30
The infinite-state Markov chain M depicted in Figure 2.20 is simulated by
the finite-state model M s03,3 in Figure 2.21, i.e. M
s0
3,3 M . 
2.8 Summary of chapter
In this chapter we provided relevant background on models, modal logics
and simulation relations.
The chapter started with a brief introduction of non-probabilistic model-
checking frameworks. It introduced Kripke structures and labelled transition
systems as standard non-probabilistic models. We then discussed linear-
time and branching-time logics, e.g. LTL, CTL, the modal µ-calculus and
some important fragments of these logics. With regard to non-probabilistic
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abstraction relations, we discussed simulation and bisimulation, and how
these relations preserve formulae from certain fragments of the previously
introduced logics.
We then turned to probabilistic model-checking frameworks with Markov
chains and Markov decision processes as models and with PCTL as proba-
bilistic logic. Discrete-time Markov chains and PCTL were identified as the
main focus of this thesis. We defined probabilistic simulation and bisimula-
tion and discussed – as in the non-probabilistic setting – how these relations
preserve formulae of PCTL. In preparation of our partial completeness result
in Chapter 4, we introduced the concept of finite unfoldings of discrete-time
Markov chains.
Furthermore, this chapter introduced useful normal forms for formulae of
non-probabilistic and probabilistic logics, and defined 3-valued extensions
of the standard models in both the non-probabilistic and the probabilistic
setting.
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3 Background on Automata and
Games
In this chapter we provide some background on automata and games which
is relevant for the game-based PCTL semantics developed in Chapter 5,
and for the class of probabilistic automata that we develop in Chapter 6 to
achieve a complete abstraction framework for full PCTL.
Automata are widely used in computer science. The concept of automata,
in its current interpretation, was established by Michael Rabin and Dana
Scott [156], and Richard Büchi [33]. Since their groundbreaking work in
the 1960s a multitude of different automata and supporting formalisms have
been developed [168, 84] and automata theory is still a rich and active field
of research. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to the core concepts needed
in this thesis. In particular we introduce
• non-deterministic word automata [156];
• probabilistic automata [157]; and
• alternating tree automata [158].
In their simplest form, called word automata, automata accept or reject
finite words. Thus, each word automaton A defines a language L(A) of finite
words. With suitable acceptance conditions word automata are generalised
to accept or reject infinite words, thus defining a language L(A) of infinite
words. Analogously, tree automata A accept or reject trees, thus defining
tree languages L(A). Tree automata, too, can be defined for finite and
infinite trees as input.
Probabilistic automata A have inputs as above, i.e. words and trees re-
spectively. A probabilistic automaton maps an input x to a probability of
acceptance. This gives rise to probabilistic languages Lµ(A) which consist of
all those inputs which are accepted with a probability greater than the fixed
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threshold µ. The inputs of a probabilistic automaton are not probabilistic
in themselves; the probabilities are induced purely by the automaton. Our
p-automata, introduced in Chapter 6, are very different in that respect, as
they determine a language L(A) of probabilistic inputs. A p-automaton
maps a probabilistic input, i.e. a Markov chain, to a Boolean decision of ac-
ceptance or rejection. Thus, p-automata are more like tree automata than
probabilistic automata: they accept Markov chains, but do not induce a
probability of accepting or rejecting an input.
In this thesis we think of automata as (at least intuitively) similar to
labelled transition systems. In particular we follow standard conventions in
the literature and use action labels for automata, as opposed to state labels
which we use for Kripke structures and Markov chains.
A very natural formalism for handling key notions of automata are games.
For example, deciding whether an input is accepted or rejected by an au-
tomaton can be determined by establishing who wins a corresponding 2-
player game. In this chapter we introduce two notions of games which are
needed in this thesis:
• Hintikka Games capture the semantics of a logic in an operational
fashion [94]. We define a Hintikka game for PCTL in Chapter 5.
• (Stochastic) Parity Games are a powerful general framework [37, 38,
179]. We use parity games and stochastic parity games to capture
acceptance and simulation of p-automata in Chapter 6.
Other games which occur in the context of automata and logics, but which
are beyond the scope of this thesis, are e.g. Ehrenfeucht-Frässé Games [170,
169, 67] and model-checking games [167, 129].
3.1 Word automata
We start with deterministic word automata.
Definition 38 (Deterministic Word Automaton)
A deterministic word automaton over a finite, non-empty alphabet Σ is a
tuple A = (S, δ, s0, F ) where
• S is a finite set of states;
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• δ: S × Σ −→ S a total transition function;
• s0 ∈ S a designated initial state; and
• F ⊆ S a designated set of accepting states. 
The domain of the transition function δ can be lifted to S × Σ∗, i.e. to
finite words x over Σ, by applying δ for each letter ai in x = a0a1 . . . an at
the state si which is determined by the previous application of δ starting
from s0. We write
δ(s0, x) := δ(. . . (δ(δ(s0, a0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=s1
, a1) . . . ), an)
for the lifted function δ: S × Σ∗ −→ S.
A word x ∈ Σ∗ is accepted by a deterministic word automaton A if and
only if δ(s0, x) ∈ F .
A deterministic word automaton A = (S, δ, s0, F ) contains a graph GA
with vertices S and edges (s, s′) ∈ S × S whenever δ(s, σ) = s′ for some
σ ∈ Σ. In graphical representations we mark accepting states F ⊆ S with
double outlines and write σ on edge (s, s′) if δ(s, σ) = s′.
Example 31
Figure 3.1 depicts a deterministic word automaton A over alphabet Σ =
{a, b, c} with initial state s0 and a single accepting state s3, i.e. F = {s3}.
Definition 39 (Language)
The language L(A) of automaton A is the set of all words accepted by A.
The language L(A) of an automaton A is such an important concept in
automata theory, that some automata terminology refers to set-theoretic
concepts – implicitly applied to the set of all inputs accepted by A. For
example:
• Automaton A is called the complement of automaton A if L(A) is the
set-theoretical complement of L(A).
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Figure 3.1: A deterministic word automaton A over alphabet Σ = {a, b, c}.
Initial state s0 is marked with an incoming arrow; accepting
state s3 is marked with double outlines; letters σ ∈ Σ annotate
edges.
• The intersection of automaton A and B is the automaton C that
accepts the intersection of their languages, i.e. L(C) = L(A) ∩ L(B).
Example 32
Automaton A of Figure 3.1 accepts all words over alphabet Σ = {a, b, c}
which start with a finite prefix of a or b and end with one or more c. Its
language is
L(A) = {aa∗cc∗} ∪ {bb∗cc∗} .
The words consisting of only a’s or only b’s are not in the language of A as
neither s1 nor s2 is accepting. 
The definition of word automata extends naturally to infinite words over
Σ. The acceptance of infinite words x is, of course, not defined by the
last state which the automaton A reaches in consuming the input word x.
Instead, acceptance is defined by some other acceptance condition. Here we
introduce Büchi acceptance conditions which essentially require a designated
set F ⊆ S to be visited infinitely often in consuming the word x.
Definition 40 (Deterministic Büchi Automaton)
A deterministic Büchi automaton A over an alphabet Σ is a tuple A =
(S, δ, s0, F ) where
• S is a finite set of states;
88
• δ: S × Σ −→ S a transition function;
• s0 ∈ S a designated initial state; and
• F ⊆ S a designated set of accepting states. 
The definition of deterministic Büchi automaton is the same as the defi-
nition of deterministic word automaton. The two types of automata differ
only in the interpretation of the set of accepting states, which for Büchi
automata allows infinite runs.
Definition 41 (Run)
For a word x ∈ Σω and an deterministic automaton A let the run pix be
the sequence of states s0s1 . . . which is visited when A consumes x. Let
Inf(pix) ⊆ S be the set of states which occur infinitely often in the run pix.
For deterministic automaton A every word x yields a unique run pix, and we
sometimes write Inf(x) instead of Inf(pix). 
Definition 42 (Büchi acceptance condition)
A infinite word x = a0a1a2 · · · ∈ Σω is accepted by a deterministic Büchi
automaton A if and only if Inf(x) ∩ F 6= ∅. Or, equivalently (since S is
finite):
for all i ∈ N there exists j ≥ i such that sj := δ(s0, a0 . . . aj) ∈ F .
We call this requirement a Büchi acceptance condition. 
Accepting states of a Büchi automaton are sometimes called fair. In this
sense we then call all other states unfair.
We do not assume all input words, respectively runs, of an automaton to
be necessarily infinite, as we did for the paths of labelled transition systems
and Kripke structures respectively. Therefore an acceptance conditions ac-
tually requires two clauses, i.e. one for finite runs and one for infinite runs.
The clause for finite runs is usually rather simple, such as
• all finite runs are rejecting; or
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Figure 3.2: A deterministic Büchi automaton A over alphabet
Σ = {a, b, c}.
• finite run pi = s0s1 . . . sn is accepting iff its last state sn satisfies some
condition, e.g. sn ∈ F .
Thus acceptance of finite runs is relatively straightfoward and we often focus
on the acceptance of infinite runs.
Example 33
Figure 3.2 depicts a deterministic Büchi automaton A over alphabet Σ =
{a, b, c} with initial state s0 and a single accepting state, F = {s3}. It
accepts all infinite words over Σ which have a finite prefix of either a or b;
contain infinitely many c; and contain only a and c after the first occurrence
of c:
L(A) = {aa∗(cc∗a∗)ω} ∪ {bb∗(cc∗a∗)ω} .
The words bω and (a∗c∗)∗aω are not accepted by A because neither s1 nor
s2 is an accepting state. 
A co-Büchi automaton is a Büchi automaton as above, where the accep-
tance condition for a word x = a0a1a2 · · · ∈ Σω is replaced by a co-Büchi
acceptance condition:
there exists i ∈ N such that for all j ≥ i
we have sj := δ(s0, a0 . . . aj) ∈ F .
A word x ∈ Σω is accepted by a co-Büchi automaton A if and only if there
exists i ∈ N such that A – after consuming a finite prefix x[0, . . . , i− 1] of x
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Figure 3.3: A deterministic Büchi automaton B over alphabet
Σ = {a, b, c}.
– visits only states in F when consuming the remainder xi of x.1 In other
words, eventually the run enters F and stays there.
Example 34
We interpret F = {s1, s2} of automaton B illustrated in Figure 3.3 first as
Büchi acceptance condition, then as co-Büchi acceptance condition. With
Büchi acceptance condition B accepts all infinite words over Σ = {a, b, c}
which do not end in an aω suffix. With co-Büchi acceptance condition B
accepts all infinite words over Σ which contain a only in a finite prefix. For
example (abc)ω is in the language of B with Büchi acceptance condition but
not with co-Büchi acceptance condition. 
There are other acceptance conditions, such as Rabin, Müller, Streett and
Parity. More details on these acceptance conditions can be found, for exam-
ple, in [84] and [168]. Here we only introduce parity conditions as the most
general type of acceptance condition used in this thesis.
Definition 43 (Parity condition)
For an automaton A with set of states S, a parity condition F is a function
F : S −→ N
which assigns parity2 F (s) to states s. An infinite run pi of A is accepting
according to parity condition F if and only if the largest parity which occurs
1For an infinite run on an input x, Büchi and co-Büchi acceptance are essentially deter-
mined by a finite prefix of the run or independent of all such finite prefixes, respectively.
This duality is similar to the duality of safety and liveness discussed on page 47.
2Sometimes also called priority by other authors.
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infinitely often on pi, formally
sup{F (s) | s ∈ Inf(pi)}
is even. 
Definition 44
For a paths pi of an automaton A with parity function F , let
lim sup(pi) := sup
s∈Inf(pi)
F (s)
be the highest parity which occurs infinitely often on pi. 
Alternatively it is also possible to use the smallest occurring value, i.e.
inf{F (s) | s ∈ Inf(pi)} to define acceptance. One then replaces lim sup with
lim inf accordingly. Both variants are commonly found in the literature.
Many other acceptance conditions can be expressed as parity condition.
For example the accepting behaviour of a Büchi automaton with accepting
set of states E can be expressed by a parity condition F which assigns
F (s) = 2 to all s ∈ E and F (s) = 1 to all other states.
Another important extension of deterministic automata are the so-called
non-deterministic automata. In a non-deterministic automaton transition
function δ is replaced by
δ: S × Σ −→ 2S
yielding a set of successor states δ(s, σ) from which a successor of s is chosen
non-deterministically.
Definition 45 (Non-deterministic Büchi Automaton)
A non-deterministic Büchi automaton over alphabet Σ is a tuple A =
(S, δ, s0, F ) where
• S is a finite set of states;
• δ: S × Σ −→ 2S a transition function;
• s0 ∈ S a designated initial state; and
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• F ⊆ S a designated set of accepting states. 
Acceptance for non-deterministic automata A depends on a more general
notion of run. Essentially a run is a path in S given by an infinite sequence
of non-deterministic choices from sets of successor states δ(si, ai).
Definition 46 (Run)
Let A = (S, δ, s0, F ) be a non-deterministic automaton over alphabet Σ. A
run ρ of A on input x = a0a1 · · · ∈ Σω is an infinite sequence of states
s0s1 . . . starting from the initial state s0, such that si+1 ∈ δ(si, ai) for all
i ≥ 0. 
A run ρ = s0s1 . . . of automaton A is accepting if it is accepted according
to the acceptance condition of A when interpreted as path in A. For example,
a run ρ = s0s1 . . . of a non-deterministic Büchi automata A = (S, δ, s0, F )
is accepting if Inf(s0s1 . . . ) ∩ F 6= ∅.
Definition 47
A word x ∈ Σω is accepted by non-deterministic Büchi automaton A if and
only if there exists an accepting run of A on x. 
Note that the existence of one accepting run is enough; not all possible
runs need to be accepting.
Example 35
Figure 3.4 illustrates a non-deterministic Büchi automaton C over alphabet
Σ = {a, b}. It is non-deterministic as s1 has two outgoing transitions for
letter a and s2 has two outgoing transitions for letter b. It accepts all infinite
words over Σ = {a, b} which start with an even number of a, and contain
infinitely many b, and if there are further appearances of a these a appear
in sequences of odd length:
(aa)∗aab∗(b((aa∗)a)∗b∗)ω
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Figure 3.4: A non-deterministic Büchi automaton C over alphabet
Σ = {a, b}.
An accepting run for such a word is of the form
(s1s0)∗s1s2s∗2(s1(s0s1)
∗s2s∗2)
ω
which visits accepting state s2 infinitely often. Other words are not accepted,
e.g. every run for a word which starts with an odd number of a will either
be in s2 when it needs to consume another a, or will be in s0 when it needs
to consume the first b. In both cases the next letter can not be consumed
and the run is rejecting.
Even for words which have the right form there can be rejecting runs, e.g.
when the wrong transition is chosen from s1 or s2 the run will lead to a
situation where no further letter can be consumed. Such rejecting runs pose
no problem as the existence of one accepting run is enough for C to accept
the word. 
Of course, deterministic Büchi automata are a special case of the more
general non-deterministic Büchi automata; and (non-deterministic) word au-
tomata can be seen as Büchi automata with a suitable extension of finite
words. Büchi automata themselves are a special case of the more general
automata with parity acceptance condition [84].
A labelled transition system T = (S,R, Act) with initial state s0 can
be seen as non-deterministic Büchi automaton A = (S,R, s0, S), where all
states S are accepting. Similarly a Kripke structure K = (S,R,L) with ini-
tial state s0 can also be converted into a non-deterministic Büchi automaton.
Example 36
The language L = (a∗b∗)∗aω of words over {ab} which end on an infinite
suffix of a is not recognisable by any deterministic Büchi automaton [168].
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Figure 3.5: A non-deterministic Büchi automaton A over alphabet
Σ = {a, b} that recognises the language L = (a∗b∗)∗aω.
Nevertheless L is recognised by the non-deterministic Büchi automaton of
Figure 3.5. 
3.2 Probabilistic automata
Probabilistic automata were introduced by Michael Rabin [157]. These au-
tomata associate probabilities with input words. A word x is accepted by
automaton A if its associated probability exceeds a given threshold µ. The
language of A for threshold µ consists of all words which are assigned prob-
ability at least µ.
Definition 48 (Probabilistic Automata)
A probabilistic automaton over alphabet Σ is a tuple A = (S, δ, s0, F ) where
• S is a finite set of states;
• δ: S×Σ×S −→ [0, 1] a function which assigns transition probabilities
such that ∑
t∈S
δ(s, σ, t) = 1
for every (s, σ) ∈ S × Σ;
• s0 ∈ S a designated initial state; and
• F ⊆ S a designated set of accepting states. 
For simplicity of presentation we only consider the acceptance of finite
words x ∈ Σ∗. For probabilistic automata A, consuming a word x of length
n defines a probabilistic tree of height n. An input word x ∈ Σ∗ is accepted
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by A with probability p, where p is the aggregated probability of A reaching
accepting states s ∈ F when consuming x. The language Lµ(A) of a prob-
abilistic automaton A consists of all words which are accepted by A with
probability at least µ.
Example 37
Figure 3.6 illustrates a probabilistic automatonA over alphabet Σ = {a, b, c}.
We group the probabilistic transitions (s, α, ·) from a state s which read the
same letter α by using dashed lines and filled dots as we did for Markov
decision processes in Section 2.4.
The automaton reads words x ∈ Σ∗ of the form
(a∗b∗)∗ac∗
and the probability assigned to word x is(
1
2
)k
where k is the number of a in x. All other words are accepted with prob-
ability 0. The language L0.06(A) then is the set of all words over Σ of the
form (a∗b∗)∗ac∗ which contain at most four a. As (12)
4 = 0.0625 only these
words, when consumed by A, are assigned a probability which exceeds the
threshold 0.06 for this language.
Other thresholds yield different languages. For example, words in L0.5(A)
may contain only one a, and thus must contain exactly one. 
A Markov chain M = (S,P, L) can be understood as probabilistic au-
tomaton with F = S which assigns a probability to a (finite) sequence of
states.
Conceptually probabilistic automata are very different from the Büchi
automata introduced above, as the “reply” of A for an input word x is not
Boolean any more, i.e. it is not just “accept” or “reject” but a value in
[0, 1]. Further, the language of A is not fully intrinsic to A but dependent
on a threshold µ. Thus, potentially there are infinitely many languages
Lµ(A) associated with a single automaton A. Probabilistic automata are
also more expressive than standard automata, i.e. for every non-deterministic
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Figure 3.6: A probabilistic automaton A over alphabet Σ = {a, b, c}.
automaton there exists a probabilistic automaton which accepts the same
language but there exist probabilistic automata whose language can not be
recognised by a non-deterministic automaton [157].3
Example 38
The automaton C of Figure 3.7 has only three distinct languages Lµ over
Σ = {a, b}:
• The empty language, i.e. Lµ = {} for µ > 12 ;
• Words starting with a, i.e. Lµ = a(a∗b∗)∗ for 12 ≥ µ > 13 ;
• All words, i.e. Lµ = (a∗b∗)∗ for 13 ≥ µ.
Automaton D of Figure 3.8 has infinitely many distinct languages Lµk .
It reads all words x over Σ = {a, b} and assigns a probability to each word
which is proportional to its length. The probability of D accepting a word
x of length k is
µk :=
k∑
i=1
(
1
10
)i(
9
10
)(i−1) .
Thus, such thresholds µk define infinitely many distinct languages Lµk , each
of which contains the words of length at least k. These languages are ordered
by set inclusion Lµ1 ⊂ Lµ2 ⊂ Lµ3 . . . . 
3Thus, the language of a probabilistic automaton is not in general a regular language.
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Figure 3.7: A probabilistic automaton C over alphabet Σ = {a, b}.
9
10
s0
1
a b
a
1
10
1
10
s1
b
9
10
Figure 3.8: A probabilistic automaton D over alphabet Σ = {a}.
98
As we have already described for Markov chains in Section 2.4, the transi-
tion probabilities in a probabilistic automaton can be extended from a prob-
ability distribution over finite words to a distribution over infinite words [16].
As in the case of non-probabilistic automata, the set of final states F in the
definition of probabilistic automata can be replaced by more general accep-
tance conditions [16]. We omit a detailed discussion of those extensions as
they are not relevant for the work in this thesis.
3.3 Alternating tree automata
Word automata and probabilistic automata both consume words as input.
They can be generalised to tree automata [158] which accept trees rather
than words. Alternating tree automata then are a further generalisation
of tree automata which allows for easy complementation of automata at
the price of more complex decision problems [49, 36]. Complementation
of automata and languages here are related in that the complement A of
automaton A has as its language L(A) the set-theoretic complement of the
language of A:
L(A) = Σω \ L(A)
Such a complementation is particularly of interest when one uses automata
as representatives for logical formulae [179, 84], or for model checking [124,
178, 25]. Since model checking is one of the main motivations of this thesis,
and the correspondence between automata and logical formulae plays a cru-
cial role in our technical results in Chapter 6, we introduce alternating tree
automata directly without discussing (standard) tree automata and their
tree languages first.
Pointed Kripke structures can be understood as trees simply by “unfold-
ing” them from their initial state. Hence alternating tree automata are also
acceptors of Kripke structures – much like our p-automata in Chapter 6 are
acceptors of Markov chains. Conversely a tree can be seen as (infinite-state)
Kripke structure. Thus we use both terms interchangeably for the inputs of
alternating tree automata.
Our presentation of alternating tree automata in this chapter follows the
notations of [84, Chapter 9] and [179].
The automata in the previous sections had simple transitions from states
99
to states, e.g. given as transition relation δ ⊆ S × S, or they had the choice
from a set of such transitions. In contrast, the more general transitions of
tree automata and alternating tree automata are given by so called transition
conditions.
Definition 49 (Transition conditions)
For a set Q we define transition conditions as follows:
φ ::= tt | ff | φ ∨ φ | φ ∧ φ | (2, q) | (3, q) (3.1)
where q ∈ Q. 
The subset of the transition conditions without (2, q) and (3, q) are the
positive Boolean formulae B+(Q) over Q. In this sense we refer to the
transition conditions of equation (3.1) as B+({2,3} ×Q).
In this thesis we abbreviate the notation for 2 and 3 as follows:
q2 := (q,2)
q3 := (q,3)
This notation is slightly unusual – other authors use 2q and 3q instead of
q2 and q3 respectively – but it aids the presentation of our p-automata in
Chapter 6.
Definition 50 (Alternating Tree Automaton)
An alternating tree automata over alphabet Σ is a tuple A = (Q, δ, ϕin, F )
where
• Q is a finite set of states;
• δ: Q × Σ −→ B+({2,3} × Q) a transition function from automaton
states reading letters to transition conditions;
• ϕin ∈ B+({2,3} ×Q) a designated initial condition; and
• F : Q −→ N a parity condition. 
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At first the notion of transition condition in alternating tree automata
looks very different from the transition relation of the word automata which
we introduced in the previous sections. Our word automata look very much
like labelled transition systems, while the transition condition of alternating
tree automata essentially are logical formulae.
To get used to this perspective of “transitions as formulae” it is instructive
to look at non-deterministic word automata in the transition condition no-
tation: Restricting the transition conditions of an alternating tree automata
to disjunctions yields non-deterministic word automata. Intuitively, a non-
deterministic transition δ(s, a) = {s′, s′′} reads “when reading a at s the
automaton A moves to s′ or to s′′”. Disjunction and conjunction together
yield tree automata, where the conjunction handles the branching of input
trees. To get a first approximative intuition, one could imagine that a tree
automaton A in a state s with conjunctive transition condition s′ ∧ s′′, con-
sumes a node of a (binary) tree by moving to automaton states s′ and s′′
which consume the next node in the left and right successor of the tree node
respectively. (This intuition is not quite right though, as it would imply
that the automaton distinguishs between directions “left” and “right”, and
that e.g. s′ ∧ s′′ would thus be different from s′′ ∧ s′.) Another intuition for
conjunctions in tree automata, which is used frequently in the literature, is
that automaton A splits into two copies A′ and A′′ which then continue to
consume the input tree simultaneously.
Alternating tree automata also have the modalities 2 and 3 in their tran-
sition conditions which are essentially universal and existential quantifiers,
and which play a crucial role in the correspondence between alternating tree
automata and the modal µ-calculus.
Before we give formal definitions of runs and acceptance for alternating
tree automata, here some intuitive examples adopted from [179].
Example 39
Let A = ({q}, δ, q, F ) be an alternating tree automaton with only one state,
where
• δ(q, ·) = q2;
• F (q) = 1.
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The single state q has parity 1 and its transition condition is q2. Intuitively
the transition condition δ(q, ·) = q2 says that whenever A in q reads a state
s of a Kripke structure, then all successors s′ of s will also be processed by
q.
Therefore any paths pi of a Kripke structure can be read by A, and A will
remain in q while reading pi. Every infinite run of A clearly contains only
parity 1 infinitely often and thus is rejecting. Thus A accepts exactly these
Kripke structures K which have only finite paths, as these paths end on a
state s with empty successor set.4 
Example 40
Let B = ({q}, δ, q, F ) be an alternating tree automaton with only one state,
where
• δ(q, a) = tt;
• δ(q,¬a) = q3;
• F (q) = 1.
The single state q has parity 1 and thus all infinite runs are rejecting. Intu-
itively δ(q, ·) = q3 says that whenever A in q reads a state s, then at least
one successor s′ of s will be processed by q. Therefore B accepts these Kripke
structures K in which a state s which satisfies a is reachable in finitely many
steps.
The automaton B corresponds to the µ-calculus formula µq.(a ∨3q). 
While runs of word automata were sequences of (automata) states, the
runs of alternating tree automata are trees labelled with pairs of automata
states and states of a Kripke structure.
For a pair (q, s) of an automata state q and a Kripke structure state s
the transition condition δ(q, L(s)) can be understood as “In q reading the
labelling of s the automaton moves to δ(q, L(s))”, which in turn enforces
conditions on the successors of s.
4In particular A does not accept serial Kripke structures. We include the example
nevertheless, as it is intuitive and insightful enough, although we assumed all Kripke
structures in this thesis to be serial.
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Definition 51 (Run of an alternating tree automaton)
Let A = (Q, δ, ϕin, F ) be an alternating tree automaton and K = (S,−→, L)
be a Kripke structure. A run R = (V,E, λ) of A on K is a tree with
• vertices V ;
• edges E ⊆ V × V ; and
• labelling function λ: V −→ Q× S.
For vertex v with λ(v) = (q, s) let pi1(v) and pi2(v) be the projection on the
first and second component of λ(v) respectively.
The root of R is labelled (qin, sin) for the initial states of A and K re-
spectively. Every vertex v with λ(v) = (q, s) satisfies the corresponding
transition condition τ = δ(q, L(s)) of A. Satisfaction of transition condition
τ is denoted v  τ and defined as follows:
v  tt for all v ∈ R
v 2 ff for all v ∈ R
v  q3 iff there exists v′ ∈ SuccR(v) such that
pi1(v′) = q and pi2(v′) ∈ SuccK(pi2(v))
v  q2 iff for all s ∈ SuccK(pi2(v)) there exists v′ ∈ SuccR(v) such that
λ(v′) = (q, s)
v  φ ∨ ψ iff v  φ or v  ψ
v  φ ∧ φ iff v  φ and v  ψ 
A run R is accepting if and only if all infinite paths v0v1 . . . in R are
accepting as determined by the parity acceptance condition F of A on
pi1(v0)pi1(v1) . . . . A Kripke structure K is accepted by automaton A if there
exists an accepting run R of A on K. This notion of acceptance can be
phrased as a parity game, and indeed it can be useful to define acceptance
directly as a parity game [84, Chapter 9]. In Chapter 6 we similarly define
acceptance for p-automata as a two-player game.
With the notion of accepting run in place we now re-visit Example 40, and
look at an accepting run of the automaton B for a concrete Kripke structure.
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Figure 3.9: A Kripke structure M over alphabet Σ = {a, b}.
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Figure 3.10: An accepting run of B on M .
Example 41
Let B the automaton of Example 40 and let M be the Kripke structure
depicted in Figure 3.9. Automaton B accepts M . To simplify presentation
we identity vertices v of a run with their label λ(v) = (q, s). The shortest
accepting run is
(q, s0), (q, s2) .
Another accepting run is shown in Figure 3.10. There are also rejecting
runs, e.g.
(q, s0), (q, s0), (q, s0), . . .
but as for non-deterministic word automata the existence of one accepting
run is sufficient for M to be accepted by B. 
The language L(A) of an alternating tree automaton A consists of all
Kripke structures whose infinite unfoldings are accepted by A.
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Example 42
Let B be the automaton of Example 40. Its language is the set of all Kripke
structures K in which a state s which satisfies a is reachable in finitely many
steps from the initial state of K. 
As preparation for the evaluation of our p-automata we state some classi-
cal decision problems of automata theory and their complexity for alternat-
ing tree automata. Let K be the set of all Kripke structures.
Membership Given alternating tree automaton A and Kripke structure K,
does A accept K, i.e. K ∈ L(A)? Membership is decidable in UP ∩
co-UP [179].
Non-emptiness Given alternating tree automaton A, is its language empty,
i.e. L(A) = {}? Deciding Non-emptiness is EXPTIME-complete [49,
124].
Universality Given alternating tree automaton A, does it accept every input,
i.e. L(A) = K? As alternating tree automata can be complemented in
linear time [49], Universality is equivalent to Non-emptiness. Thus it
is also EXPTIME-complete [49].
Language inclusion Given alternating tree automata A and B, is the lan-
guage of A subset of the language of B, i.e. L(A) ⊆ L(B)? Language
inclusion can be reduced to complementation, intersection and non-
emptiness. Therefore it is also EXPTIME-complete [49].
Further explanations of the formalism and the intuition of alternating
tree automata can be found for example in [179]; for a detailed discussion
including the complexity of relevant decision problems see [49, Chapter 7]
and [84, Chapter 9]. As mentioned above, there is a close connection be-
tween alternating tree automata and formulae of certain (branching time)
logics: e.g. alternating tree automata and the modal µ-calculus are equally
expressive [71, 148, 179, 84]. In particular every formula φ of the modal
µ-calculus gives rise to an alternating tree automaton A that accepts ex-
actly those Kripke structures that satisfy the formula φ. See [179] for the
conversion between formulae and automata and for a detailed discussion of
the correspondence between the two formalisms. Here we only sketch one
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direction of the correspondence: translating a formula into an alternating
tree automaton.
Every formula φ of the modal µ-calculus gives rise to an alternating tree
automaton Aφ such that
L(Aφ) = {K ∈ K | K  φ} .
Let φ be in positive normal form, then Aφ = (Q, δ, [φ], F ) can be defined as
follows:
• For each subformula ψ of φ (including φ itself) Q contains a state [ψ].
• The initial state of Aφ is [φ].
• The transition function δ is as follows:
δ([ff], ·) = ff
δ([tt], ·) = tt
δ([q], ·) = q if q ∈ free(φ)
δ([q], ·) = [ηq.ψ] if q /∈ free(φ)
δ([ψ ∧ χ], ·) = [ψ] ∧ [χ]
δ([ψ ∨ χ], ·) = [ψ] ∨ [χ]
δ([3ψ], ·) = [ψ]3
δ([2ψ], ·) = [ψ]2
δ([ηq.ψ], ·) = [ψ]
where free(φ) is the set of free propositional variables in φ, and η ∈
{µ, ν} as determined by the structure of φ.
• The parity F ([ψ]) is essentially the alternation depth Ω(ψ) [179, 29]
of the subformulae ψ of φ, shifted to an even number if the outermost
fixpoint operator of φ is a greatest fixpoint and shifted to an odd
number if the outermost fixpoint operator is a least fixpoint. See [179]
for details on this construction.
For a formulae φ the construction sketched above yields an automaton
Aφ which accepts exactly those Kripke structures that satisfy φ. For the
correctness of this construction see e.g. [179].
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In Chapter 6 we embed PCTL formulae into our p-automata but there
is no one-to-one correspondence between formulae and automata as in the
above case of the modal µ-calculus and alternating tree automata. In fact,
we show that our automata are strictly more expressive than PCTL. Thus,
PCTL corresponds to a proper subset of p-automata as, e. g., CTL does
for alternating tree automata. It is presently not known whether there is a
logic that plays the role for p-automata that the modal µ-calculus plays for
alternating tree automata. That is to say, there is currently no canonical,
probabilistic fixed-point logic that contains PCTL as a fragment. The ques-
tion of whether such a suitable probabilistic logic exists is not addressed in
this thesis and left as future work.
3.4 Hintikka games
Hintikka games provide an operational definition of truth, in contrast with
Alfred Tarski’s definition of truth as a predicate [94].5 Hintikka games can
be used to define the semantics of a logic in an operational fashion.
A Tarskian notion of truth is a formally defined predicate |= between
models and formulae of first-order logic, where “property φ is true in model
M ” is defined as “predicate M |= φ holds”. For example, if M is the set of
natural numbers {0, 1, . . . } and φ is ¬∃x ((x ∗ x < x + 1) ∧ (x > 1)), then
M |= φ holds since all natural numbers are either at most 1 or their square
is bigger than their successor number.
We introduce Hintikka games by example, i.e. by sketching a Hintikka
game for first-order logic. We keep this example fairly brief and omit a
formal definition of the game moves etc. For model M and formula φ, a
Hintikka game G(M,φ) involves two players, Verifier V (who wants to prove
that M satisfies φ) and Refuter R (who wants to prove that M does not
satisfy φ). Game G(M,φ) has configurations which are triples of form
〈M [~x 7→ ~a], ψ, C〉
where [~x 7→ ~a] binds a set of variables xi to natural numbers ai, C is either
5Roughly at the same time as the work by Hintikka, but independently and in a different
context, a definition of truth via dialogue games was developed by Paul Lorenzen and
Kuno Lorenz [135, 136]. A more general overview on dialogue games in logics can be
found in [159].
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Refuter R or Verifier V, and ψ is either φ or a strict sub-formula of φ. The
initial configuration is 〈M,φ, V〉, saying that V claims that φ is true in M .
Game G(M,φ) generates a game tree whose paths are plays – finite sequences
of configurations. Below, we write C for the player other than C, i.e. V = R,
R = V and C = C.
For sake of illustration, consider the game for our example. The formula
φ = ¬∃x ((x∗x < x+ 1)∧ (x > 1)) is a negation, so the initial configuration
has 〈M,ψ0, R〉 as sole next configuration with ψ0 = ∃x ((x∗x < x+1)∧(x >
1)). Thus, we just swap the player – if C claims ¬ψ then C claims ψ – and
remove the negation symbol when processing a negation. At configuration
〈M,ψ0, R〉, the formula is an existential one and so the player that claims
its truth (here R) can choose a natural number, say 5, and bind it to x,
resulting in the next configuration 〈M [x 7→ 5], ψ1, R〉, where ψ1 is (x ∗ x <
x+ 1) ∧ (x > 1). In particular, configuration 〈M,ψ0, R〉 has infinitely many
next configurations, one for each natural number a bound to x. Now that
formula ψ1 is a conjunction claimed to be true by R, and so his opponent V
can choose a conjunct.
If V chooses conjunct x > 1, the next configuration is 〈M [x 7→ 5], x > 1, R〉.
Formula x > 1 is atomic and x is bound to 5 so we simply evaluate this to
5 > 1, which is true. Refuter has won this play. But if V chooses x∗x < x+1,
the next configuration is 〈M [x 7→ 5], x ∗ x < x+ 1, R〉 and now Verifier wins
since 5 ∗ 5 = 25 ≮ 6 = 5 + 1.
This yields a winning strategy for V: if player V always chooses x∗x < x+1
whenever a is greater than 1, and chooses x > 1 whenever a is at most 1,
she wins all plays in the game tree of G(M,φ). The existence of a winning
strategy for V establishes that φ is true in M .
To summarise, negation in a configuration 〈M,¬ψ, C〉 determines a swap
of players and the removal of the negation with next configuration 〈M,ψ, C〉.
Existential quantifiers in a configuration 〈M,∃xψ, C〉 require binding its
quantified variable x to an element a of the model, chosen by player C,
with next configuration 〈M [x 7→ a], ψ, C〉. Conjunction in a configuration
〈M,ψ1 ∧ ψ2, C〉 means that player C chooses a conjunct ψi for the next con-
figuration 〈M,ψi, C〉. Atomic configurations 〈M,a, C〉 are simply evaluated,
using the binding information of the model: player C wins if a is true in M ,
otherwise player C wins.
Strategies for both players are objects σ that allow them to make necessary
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choices for determining continuation plays. For example, Verifier needs to
make choices for existential quantifiers in configurations of form 〈M, ∃xψ, V〉,
and for conjunctions in configurations of form 〈M,ψ1 ∧ ψ2, R〉. A strategy
σ is winning for a player if all plays played according to the choices offered
by strategy σ are won by that player. Since all plays for first-order logic are
finite, classical game theory guarantees that games G(M,φ) are determined:
exactly one of the two players has a winning strategy for that game.
In ordinary set theory ZF the assumption of the Axiom of Choice is equiv-
alent to the following principle
(Correspondence) “Verifier wins game G(M,φ) if, and only if,
predicate M |= φ holds.”
holds. So one gets an operational account of truth in first-order logic from
the Axiom of Choice.
3.5 Stochastic parity games
In this section we introduce parity games and stochastic parity games. Again
we restrict ourselves to only those concepts which are relevant for this thesis,
e.g. we define only pure memoryless strategies as they are sufficient for our
needs.
Definition 52 ((Stochastic) Parity Game)
A stochastic parity game is a tuple G = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), δ, α) where
• (V,E) is a directed graph with non-empty set V ;
• (V0, V1, Vp) is a partition of V ;6
• the set V0 is the set of Player 0 configurations;
• V1 is the set of Player 1 configurations; and
• Vp is the set of probabilistic configurations.
• α: V −→ [0 . . . k] a parity condition which associates a priority α(v)
in [0 . . . k] := {0, . . . , k} with each configuration v.
6One or two sets Vi of the partition may be empty.
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A stochastic parity game is simply a parity game if Vp = ∅. The function δ
associates with every v ∈ Vp a distribution δ(v) over E(v) = {v′ | (v, v′) ∈
E}. We assume that (v, v′) ∈ E iff δ(v)(v′) 6= 0 and write δ(v, v′) instead of
δ(v)(v′). 
If one or two sets in the partition (V0, V1, Vp) are empty the stochastic
parity game G = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), δ, α) collapses to well known special
cases, i.e. one-player game, two-player game, one-player stochastic game,
stochastic process. Markov chains can be thought of as stochastic parity
games where V0 = V1 = ∅.
Definition 53 (Play)
A play of a stochastic parity game G = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), δ, α) is a maxi-
mal path in (V,E), i.e. an infinite path or one that reaches a dead end. 
We write Ω for the set of all plays, and Ωv for the set of plays that
start in location v. A play is winning for Player 0 if it is finite and ends
in a Player 1 configuration (meaning that this Player 1 configuration has
no successor configuration in E) or it is infinite and lim sup(α(vi)) is even.
Otherwise, it is winning for Player 1.
Definition 54 (Strategy)
A (pure memoryless) strategy for Player 0 is a partial function σ: V0 −→ V
that chooses a successor for every configuration in V0, i.e. (v, σ(v)) ∈ E.
A play v0, v1, . . . is consistent with strategy σ if whenever vi ∈ V0 we have
vi+1 = σ(vi). 
Strategies for Player 1 are defined analogously. We denote by Σ and Π
the set of all strategies for Player 0 and Player 1, respectively.
Fixing strategies σ and pi for Player 0 and Player 1 respectively removes
all non-probabilistic, non-deterministic choice from game
G = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), δ, α) .
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This removal determines a Markov chain M whose paths are plays in G
consistent with σ and pi. Thus, for fixed initial location and strategies σ ∈ Σ
and pi ∈ Π for the players, the game specialises to a Markov chain Mσ,pis
for which the probabilities of events are uniquely defined, where events are
measurable sets of plays in the game (respectively measurable sets of paths
in the corresponding Markov chain). We define valσ,pi0 (v) to be the measure
of plays winning for Player 0 in Mσ,piv and valσ,pi1 (v) = 1 − valσ,pi0 (v). We
define
val0(v) = sup
σ∈Σ
inf
pi∈Π
valσ,pi0 (v)
and
val1(v) = sup
pi∈Π
inf
σ∈Σ
valσ,pi1 (v) .
Strategies that achieves these values are called optimal.
Definition 55 (Strongly Connected Component)
For (directed) graph G = (V,E), a strongly connected component (SCC) is a
subgraph (S,E′) of G, in which there exists a paths from every vertex s ∈ S
to every other vertex s′ ∈ S.
A maximal strongly connected component is a SCC of which no proper
subset is strongly connected.
Reachability in the directed graph G = (V,E) induces a partial order on
its maximal strongly connected components:
S ≤ S′
iff there exists s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ and a paths from s to s′ in E. The
maximal elements of this partial order are called bottom strongly connected
component (BSCC). 
Definition 56 (Weak Game)
A stochastic parity game G = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), δ, α) is called a weak
stochastic game if for every maximal, strongly connected component (SCC)
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V ′ ⊆ V either
V ′ ⊆ α or V ′ ∩ α = {} .
If Vp = {}, we call G simply a weak game. 
Markov chains can be thought of as stochastic weak games where V0 =
V1 = {} and α = V .
We state an important result on optimal strategies for stochastic weak
games [50, 160]:
Theorem 1
Let G = ((V, ·), . . . ) be a stochastic weak game and v ∈ V . Then val0(v) +
val1(v) = 1. If G is finite, val0(v) is computable in NP∩co-NP; and optimal
strategies exist for both players. If G is a weak game, val0(v) is in {0, 1} and
linear-time computable.  
One can generalise these results to the setting in which some configurations
have pre-seeded game values (in [0, 1] for stochastic weak games, and in {0, 1}
for weak games). One possibility for such a generalisation of stochastic weak
games is to replace every node v with pre-seeded value val0(v) ∈ [0, 1] by
a probabilistic node v′ which has one transition of probability val0(v) to a
sink state with value 1, and one transition of probability 1−val0(v) to a sink
state with value 0. We use such a generalisation of stochastic weak games
in Chapter 6.
3.6 Summary of chapter
This chapter presented relevant background on automata and games, which
is used in the main part of this thesis. We use the concepts from this
background chapter for our Hintikka games in Chapter 5 and for our p-
automata in Chapter 6.
The chapter introduced three important types of automata, i.e. word au-
tomata, (alternating) tree automata and probabilistic automata. These au-
tomata define languages according to their acceptance condition. Accep-
tance conditions, such as Büchi or parity conditions, are based on the notion
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of a run of an automata and can be conveniently expressed as two-player
games. The chapter also discussed the close relation between alternating
tree automata and the modal µ-calculus as we use similar techniques for the
construction of our p-automata in Chapter 6.
The chapter then introduced relevant game formalisms. Hintikka games
are used to define the semantics of a logic in an operational fashion as a two-
player game. Parity games and stochastic parity games are used to capture,
e.g., acceptance of automata, or simulation and bisimulation relations.
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4 Completeness for a Fragment of
PCTL
With the technical background from the previous two chapters in place we
now turn back to the completeness question which we stated rather infor-
mally in Section 1.3:
We call an abstraction framework – a class of abstract models,
their abstract semantics, and an abstraction via some kind of
simulation relation – complete for a formula φ iff for all concrete
models M that satisfy φ there is a finite-state abstract model
A such that A abstracts M and A satisfies φ in the abstract
semantics, denoted as A M and A  φ respectively.
We briefly state existing completeness results for linear-time logics and
branching-time logics in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 formalises the specific in-
stance of the completeness question, namely completeness for PCTL over
Markov chains, which we are concerned with in this thesis. In Section 4.3
we present a first attempt to address completeness for PCTL. This attempt
achieves only partial success for a fragment of PCTL, which shows the lim-
itation of “conventional” approaches in the probabilistic context and thus
motivates the approach via automata and games taken in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.1 Existing results
In this thesis we are concerned with qualitative, probabilistic model checking.
Previous work on complete abstractions was mostly done in the context of
non-probabilistic model checking [31, 117, 61, 58, 59, 73, 74]. In particular,
the completeness question for qualitative, non-probabilistic model checking
of linear-time and branching-time logics have been successfully answered and
we summarise the corresponding completeness results in the sections below.
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Quantitative model checking is very different from qualitative model check-
ing, both in an probabilistic and non-probabilistic setting. Completeness
results there are still an open research question. Actually not even the defi-
nition of completeness for quantitative model checking is straight-forward or
even unique. In quantitative model checking the answer to a query M  φ
is in general not Boolean but a real value, such as a cost or performance
measure, or a probability. For a probabilistic answer domain quantitative
model checking would yield answers of the form (M  φ) ∈ [0, 1]. Soundness
and completeness then need to be defined as relations between real values.
Soundness, for example, could mean that the abstract model yields lower
bounds on the probabilities in the concrete model:
(A |= φ) ≤ (M |= φ) whenever A ≺M
But quantitative soundness could also be defined differently as a non-Boolean
answer domain obviously allows for various alternative definitions. Thus
it also not clear in general how to define quantitative completeness. In
this thesis we focus on qualitative probabilistic model checking and do not
address the completeness problem for quantitative model checking.
4.1.1 Completeness for Linear-time Temporal Logic
For linear-time temporal logic (LTL) soundness and completeness of ab-
straction can be achieved. Yonit Kesten and Amir Pnueli show in [117] that
abstraction of infinite Kripke structures by finite-state Kripke structures
with fairness constraints via augmented abstractions is sound and complete
for LTL. They propose a complete abstraction framework which they call
verification by finitary abstraction (VFA) and verification by augmented fini-
tary abstraction. The augmentation with a progress monitor is needed to
preserve liveness properties in the abstraction. The idea of progress monitors
or ranking monitors is to make fairness explicit in the concrete system. The
monitors are added to the concrete system as finitary parallel components.
Those components are carried over into the abstractions where they enable
model checks for liveness properties. Although their existence is proved,
finding an “adequate augmentation”, i.e. the progress monitors, still requires
“ingenuity and deep understanding of the analyzed system” [117].
The notion of fairness is a crucial point in Kesten and Pnueli’s complete-
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ness result for LTL. As the standard notion of fairness can not be transferred
to Markov chains, the techniques used to achieve completeness for LTL over
Kripke structures can not be lifted to LTL over Markov chains [175, 52].
Nevertheless, p-automata – the abstraction framework developed in Chapter
6 of this thesis – can express regular path properties and thus in particu-
lar LTL formulae with enveloping probabilistic thresholds. Our p-automata
framework is thus not only complete for PCTL but also for probabilistic
interpretations of LTL over Markov chains. This is in some sense similar to
the alternating tree automata framework which – as described in the next
section – achieves completeness not only for branching time but for the whole
modal µ-calculus and thus also for LTL.
4.1.2 Completeness for Branching-time Temporal Logic
Dennis Dams and Kedar Namjoshi show in [58] that completeness for branch-
ing time can not be achieved by using the same methods as for linear time.
More complex abstraction frameworks with more expressive abstract models
are needed.
Dams and Namjoshi present such a complete abstraction framework for
branching time in [58]. The same article [58] also inspired our incomplete-
ness examples in Section 4.3.2. Dams and Namjoshi’s abstraction framework
builds around focused transition systems (FTS) as abstract models. These
models use a focusing and de-focusing mechanism to achieve finitary abstract
models. Through their focus and de-focus mechanism focused transition sys-
tems become alternating in their nature, which allows for a finite represen-
tation of potentially unbounded fixpoints. In the satisfaction game and the
simulation game for focused transition systems this alternation essentially
means that for all configurations with focus and de-focus transitions, the
players choose alternatingly sets and elements of these sets.
Some weaknesses of focused transition systems are pointed out by Harald
Fecher and Michael Huth in [73]. They propose and discuss disjunctive
modal transition systems (DMTS) [73], hypermixed Kripke structures and
ranked predicate abstraction [74] as complete abstraction frameworks with
advantages over FTS. In particular they argue that it should be easier to
construct finite DMTS from given concrete models, and that DMTS would
thus be better suited for practical applications.
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Expanding on the alternating structure of focused transition systems,
Dams and Namjoshi present a complete abstraction framework for the full µ-
calculus based on alternating tree automata in [59]. Their automata frame-
work makes the presentation very elegant and offers a unified view on various
other abstraction frameworks. The article [59] solves the completeness ques-
tion for the µ-calculus and thus of course also for branching-time logics CTL
and CTL* which are subsets of the µ-calculus. The article illustrates that
automata and games are a useful means which can unify verification and ab-
straction in the same formal framework. In this sense Dams and Namjoshi’s
work inspired our automata-based approach in Chapter 6.
4.2 Our setting: Markov chains and PCTL
With discrete-time Markov chains as concrete models and PCTL as our logic
of choice, we now define the specific completeness problem which forms the
core of this thesis. This notion of completeness is relative to a class of
abstract models A, an abstract PCTL semantics α, and the abstraction
between concrete and abstract models A  M . We refer to this triad of
abstract models, abstract semantics and abstraction as “abstraction frame-
work” subsequently.
A first example of such an abstraction framework for discrete-time Markov
chains is (i) finite Markov chains as abstract models; (ii) standard PCTL
semantics  as abstract semantics; and (iii) probabilistic simulation as ab-
straction. In this example the abstract semantics coincides with the concrete
semantics and the abstract models are a sub-class of the concrete models. It
is in fact often desirable to design an abstraction framework such that one
or more component of the abstraction frameworks relates rather naturally
to the concrete models and their semantics.
Definition 57 (Completeness)
An abstraction framework (A,α,) is complete for a PCTL formula φ iff
for every Markov chains M that satisfy φ there is a model A ∈ A such that
A  M and A α φ. The abstraction framework is complete for a set of
PCTL formulae Γ if it is complete for each φ ∈ Γ. 
117
Assumption 5
All abstraction frameworks in this thesis are such that the class of abstract
models A is implicitly restricted to contain only finite-state structures. 
Completeness for φ thus means that all Markov chains that satisfy φ
(M  φ) have a finite-state abstraction that also satisfies φ in the abstract
semantics α. In this chapter we choose the following abstraction framework:
• abstract models A are 3-valued Markov chains;
• abstract semantics α is the pessimistic semantics p of Definition 30;
and
• abstraction  is probabilistic simulation of Definition 35.
We choose p as abstract semantics since it is, unlike o, sound for verifica-
tions (see Section 2.5).
4.3 Completeness for a fragment of PCTL via
3-valued unfoldings
Our first attempt to solve the completeness question for PCTL uses 3-valued
abstractions, which are a well established method of abstraction for model
checking. With 3-valued Markov chains as abstract models we achieve com-
pleteness for a sizeable fragment of PCTL but not for the full logic as we
show by giving some concrete counterexamples.
Another approach which – from a model-checking perspective – could also
have been a good candidate for a first attempt at our completeness problem,
is to use Markov decision processes as abstract models. Markov decision
processes incorporate non-determinism into the abstract model, which is
somehow similar to hyper-transitions, which are used in the abstract models
of some complete abstraction frameworks for non-probabilistic logics with
[77, 74]. However work by Mark Kattenbelt and Michael Huth [112, 111]
showed that abstraction by Markov decision processes is incomplete even
for formulae for which the 3-valued abstractions presented in this chapter
yields completeness. Thus we do not pursue abstraction by Markov decision
processes in this thesis.
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4.3.1 Complete fragment of PCTL
We now present a complete fragment of PCTL. The fragment consists of
PCTL formulae with certain combinations of negation polarity and threshold
type. The technical details of this definition, and its characterisation via a
normal form are formalised below. We then show that for this fragment the
desired finite abstractions can be obtained by unfolding the infinite model
up to a bounded height and width.
We achieve completeness for this PCTL fragment by using (finite) unfold-
ings of Markov chains as defined in Section 2.7. Here we use finite unfoldings
as abstractions, which obviously is a most important reduction of the state
space if the concrete Markov chain has infinitely many states. If the concrete
Markov chain is already finite-state, its finite unfoldings will in general not
be smaller but might actually have a larger state space as its construction
may introduce dubliate states through the unfolding of loops.
Ideally, one would like to have an abstraction which always decreases the
size of the state space, e.g. which reduces infinite models to finite ones and
finite models to models with fewer states. Alternatively the abstraction
could leave models which are already finite-state unchanged, and thus not
increase the size of the state space. Finite unfoldings do not have these
properties and there is certainly potential for optimising the size of a finite
unfolding, e.g. by taking the bisimulation quotient of its state space.
Although our motivation is abstraction as state space reduction, we do
not pursue such an optimisation here. Our primary concern in this thesis
is finitary completeness, i.e. the reduction of infinite-state models to finite-
state models. Any further reduction (or even an increase) of the size of
finite-state models is thus only of secondary interest with regard to this
research question.
First we show that Next and Strong Until with > p bounds have “finite”
unfoldings of Markov chains as witnesses.
Lemma 8
Let M be a 3-valued Markov chain, q, r ∈ AP be propositions, and M p
[α]>p for α ∈ {X q, qU r}. There exist i0, j0 ∈ N with M s0i,j p [α]>p for all
i ≥ i0 and j ≥ j0.  
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Proof
Let α be X q. By assumption M p [X q]>p. If s0 has finitely many succes-
sors, the claim is obviously true. Otherwise, let t1, t2, . . . be the successors of
s0 ordered such that P(s0, tl) ≥ P(s0, tl+1) for every l ≥ 1. Let tm1 , tm2 , . . .
be the sub-sequence of those states ti with ti pM q. Then M p [X q]>p im-
plies
∑∞
l=1P(s0, tml) > p. Thus there is some l0 with
∑l0
l=1P(s0, tml) > p.
Let j0 = ml0 . For every i ≥ 1 and j ≥ j0 it is then easily seen that
M s0i,j p [X q]>p.
Now let α be qU r. Consider first the case that M is finitely branching.
It is simple to see that for all i ≥ 0 we have
Probp
M
s0
i
(s0, qU r) ≤ ProbpMs0i+1(s0, qU r)
and that
lim
i→∞
Probp
M
s0
i
(s0, qU r) = Prob
p
M (s0, qU r) .
Hence, for some i0 we have that Prob
p
M
s0
i0
(s0, qU r) > p and for every i ≥ i0
we have M s0i p [qU r]>p.
In the case that M has infinite branching the proof is similar. As before,
there is some i0 such that M s0i0 
p [qU r]>p. We notice that for every j ∈ N
we have
Probp
M
s0
i0,j
(s0, qU r) ≤ ProbpMs0i0,j+1
(s0, qU r)
and that
lim
j→∞
Probp
M
s0
i0,j
(s0, qU r) = Prob
p
M
s0
i0
(s0, qU r) .
Hence, for some j0 we have Prob
p
M
s0
i0,j0
(s0, qU r) > p and the claim follows.
In a similar fashion we show that weak Until and Next with ≥ p bounds
have finite counter-examples.
Corollary 1
Let M 2o [α]≥p for α ∈ {X q, qW r} and a 3-valued Markov chain M .
Then there exist i0 and j0 such that for all i ≥ i0 and j ≥ j0 we have
M s0i,j 2o [α]≥p.  
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Proof
For α ≡ X q this follows from [Xϕ]>p ≡ ¬[X¬ϕ]≥1−p over 2-valued Markov
chains and from the duality of the optimistic and pessimistic semantics in 3-
valued Markov chains. For α ≡ qW r, we similarly exploit that [ϕ1 Wϕ2]≥p
is equivalent to ¬[¬ϕ2 U(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2)]>1−p over 2-valued Markov chains and
again use the duality of the optimistic and pessimistic semantics. 
For the abstraction via finite unfoldings we have to carefully distinguish
between formulae with > and ≥ threshold respectively. To this end we now
introduce a finite-state approximation lemma (Lemma 9) for the validity of
Until formulae with non-strict (i.e. ≥) probability thresholds at states of
labelled Markov chains. As we are dealing with discrete-time Markov chains
M (which have countable branching and countable sets of states) we know
that if a state s of M satisfies φ = [qU r]>p, then it is sufficient to explore
M from s up to a finite depth in order to witness s  φ. The lemma then
says, that a state s of M satisfies a formula φ = [qU r]≥p if and only if it
satisfies φ′ = [qU r]>p− 1
n
for each n > 0, which again is witnessed by a finite-
depth exploration of M . (This lemma will also be crucial in Chapter 5 to
prove that our game semantics for PCTL captures exactly the denotational
semantics as defined in Section 2.5.)
Lemma 9 (Finite-state approximation)
Let M be a labelled Markov chain (S,P, L), let q, r ∈ AP, and p ∈ [0, 1].
Then s ∈ J[qU r]≥pKM iff for all n ∈ N there are k, l ∈ N such that s ∈J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
Msk,l
, where M sk,l is a finite unfolding.  
Proof
Consider first the case that M is finite-branching. Recall that Path(s, qU r)
denotes the set of paths beginning in s that satisfy qU r. Let
Pathi(s, qU r) = Path(s, (qU≤i r) ∧
∧
0≤j<i
¬(qU≤j r)) , (4.1)
i.e. the paths in which q holds until location i where r holds and r does not
hold in locations smaller than i. We set Path0(s, qU r) to be Path(s, qU≤0 r).
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• For the “if” part, assume that for all n ∈ N there is k ≥ 0 such that
s ∈ J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
Msk
. Then, s ∈ J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
M
by the monotonicity
of the denotational semantics for “Greater-Than” thresholds. Thus,
s ∈ ⋂n∈N J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
M
= J[qU r]≥pKM .
• For the “only if” part, let s ∈ J[qU r]≥pKM and n ∈ N. It suffices to
find some k ≥ 0 with s ∈ J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
Msk
. As Pathi(s, qU r) is of form
Path(s, α) for a path formula α, that set of paths is measurable. For
all i 6= j note that sets Pathi(s, qU r) and Pathj(s, qU r) are disjoint.
Since
Path(s, qU r) =
⋃
i≥0
Pathi(s, qU r)
and as the latter is a disjoint union, we know that
ProbM (s,Path(s, qU r)) =
∑
i≥0
ProbM (s,Pathi(s, qU r))
By definition of convergence for that infinite sum, for every n ∈ N
there exists k ≥ 0 such that
k∑
i=0
ProbM (s,Pathi(s, qU r)) ≥ ProbM (s,Path(s, qU r))− 1
n
.
As
∑k
i=1 ProbM (s,Pathi(s, qU r)) equals ProbMsk (s, qU r) we obtain
s ∈ J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
Msk
and we are done.
As M is finitely branching, there exists l such that l is an upper bound on
the branching degree for all states in M sk . It follows that ProbMsk (s, qU r) =
ProbMsk,l(s, qU r).
In the case that M has infinite branching the proof is similar. We have
to be more careful in noticing that every path set Pathi(s, qU r) is still
measurable and have to be careful in the way in which we sum up the
probability of the set Path(s, qU r). But this works out since all involved
infinite sums are absolute convergent, which establishes that for some k we
have s ∈ J[qU r]>p− 1
n
K
Msk
. The existence of M sk,l as required follows from
convergence of ProbMsk,l(s, qU r) to ProbMsk (s, qU r) in l . 
Lemma 9 has a dual version, required in the proof of Theorem 4 in Chap-
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ter 5:
Corollary 2
For a labelled Markov chain M = (S,P, L), q, r ∈ AP, and p ∈ [0, 1]
we have s 6∈ J[qW r]>pKM iff for all n ∈ N there are k, l ∈ N with s 6∈J[qW r]≥p+ 1
n
K
Msk,l
.  
Proof
This follows from Lemma 9 and the duality of weak and strong Until. We
have
s 6∈ J[qW r]>pKM iff s ∈ J[¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)]≥1−pKM ,
since (semantically) ¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r) is the negation of qW r by (2.2) on
page 40. By Lemma 9, s ∈ J[¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)]≥1−pKM holds iff for every
n ∈ N there is k, l ∈ N with s ∈ J[¬rU(¬q ∧ ¬r)]>1−p− 1
n
K
Msk,l
, i.e. s 6∈J[qW r]≥p+ 1
n
K
Msk,l
. 
Example 43
Consider the labelled Markov chain M in Figure 4.1 and its finite unfolding
M s02 in Figure 4.2. Probability ProbM (s0, qU r) =
1
2 is attained by paths of
increasing length as the value of the infinite sum
∑∞
j=1(
1
3)
j . However, for
every n ∈ N there exists some i ∈ N such that∑ij=1(13)j > 12 − 1n and where
that finite sum is attainable in a finite unfolding of M . For example, for
M s02 in Figure 4.2 the probability of qU r at s0 is
4
9 so for every n < 18 we
have s0 ∈ J[qU r]> 1
2
− 1
n
K
M
s0
2
. In M s04 the probability of qU r at s0 is
13
27 and
so for every n < 54 we have s0 ∈ J[pU q]> 1
2
− 1
n
K
M
s0
4
. Lemma 9 promises that
for every labelled Markov chain there is a similar approximation. 
We state and prove the main result of this chapter, the completeness
of PCTL>, which is defined below. The GTNNF, i.e. the normal form
according to Definition 32, of PCTL> allows only [U]>p and [X]>p type
operators. That is, it disallows weak Until and the comparison ≥ p, which
justifies the name PCTL>.
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Figure 4.1: A labelled Markov chain M with s0 ∈ J[qU r]≥ 1
2
K
M
.
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Figure 4.2: The finite unfolding M s02 of the labelled Markov chain of
Figure 4.1 up to depth 2 for AP = {q, r}.
124
Definition 58 (PCTL>)
The fragment PCTL> of PCTL is given as all φpos as follows
φpos ::= q | ¬q | φpos ∧ φpos | φpos ∨ φpos | ¬φneg | [αpos]>p | [αneg]<p
φneg ::= q | ¬q | φneg ∧ φneg | φneg ∨ φneg | ¬φpos | [αneg]≥p | [αpos]≤p
αpos ::= Xφpos | φpos U≤k φpos
αneg ::= Xφneg | φneg W≤k φneg
where q ∈ AP, k ∈ N ∪ {∞} and p ∈ [0, 1]. 
Although any finite-state abstraction would be sufficient for completeness
we show a stronger result: the abstraction can be chosen as finite unfolding.
Theorem 2 (Completeness of PCTL>)
Let M be a 3-valued Markov chain with initial state s0, φ a formula in
PCTL>, and M  φ. Then there exist i, j such that the finite unfolding M s0i,j
of M pessimistically satisfies φ, i.e. M s0i,j p φ.  
The finite unfolding is also an abstraction of the Markov chain since M 
M s0i,j by the definition of finite unfolding.
Proof
We strengthen the claim with a dual claim for formulae in the negative part
of PCTL> and for the optimistic semantics: For φ in the negative part φneg
of PCTL>, if s 2M φ then there exist i, j such that M si,j 2o φ. We show this
extended claim by structural induction on φ, simultaneously for all states s.
• Let φ be q. If s M q then for every i ≥ 0 and j ≥ 0 we haveM si,j p q.
Dually, if s 2M q then for every i ≥ 0 and j ≥ 0 we have M si,j 2o q.
• For the Boolean connectives φ1 ∧ φ2 and φ1 ∨ φ2 and a state s, we
take as bounds the maximum of the bounds ik and jk for subformulae
φk obtained by induction for state s. These bounds work for the dual
case as well.
• For a negation ϕ = ¬ψneg and a state s, if s M ¬ψneg, then s 2M ψneg.
By induction, there are i and j withM si,j 2o ψneg. ThusM si,j p ¬ψneg.
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Dually, for a negation ϕ = ¬ψpos and a state s, if s 2M ¬ψpos, then
s M ψpos. By induction, there are i and j with M si,j p ψpos, so
M si,j 2o ¬ψpos.
• We now consider the path modalities X, U, and W.
– For formula ϕ = [Xψpos]>p and a state s such that s M ϕ, we
treat ψpos as a proposition that labels the states of M . By (the
proof of) Lemma 8, there is some j′0 such that for every i ≥ 1
and j ≥ j′0 we have M si,j p ϕ. Now we no longer treat the ψi as
atoms: Let t1, . . . , tj0 be the first j′0 successors of s. For tk there
exists ik0 and jk0 such that if tk M ψpos we have M
tk
ik0 ,j
k
0
p ψpos.
Let i0 = 1 + maxk(ik0) and j0 = max(j′0,maxk(jk0 )). It follows
that M si0,j0 
p ϕ.
– Let ϕ = [Xψneg]≥p with s 2M ϕ. The proof is similar to the one
in the previous item and uses Corollary 1.
– For ϕ = [ψ1 Uψ2]>p, with ψ1 and ψ2 in the positive fragment
φpos, and a state s with s M [ψ1 Uψ2]>p, we initially treat ψ1
and ψ2 as propositions that label the states of M . By Lemma 8
there are i′0 and j′0 such that for every i ≥ i′0 and j ≥ j′0 we
have M si,j p [ψ1 Uψ2]>p. Now we no longer treat the ψi as
atoms: Let t1, . . . , tm be all the states appearing in M si′0,j′0 . For
α ∈ {1, 2} and every tk there exists ik,α0 and jk,α0 such that if
tk M ψα we have M tk
ik,α0 ,j
k,α
0
p ψα. Let i0 = i′0 + maxk,α(i
k,α
0 )
and j0 = max(j′0,maxk,α(j
k,α
0 )) (see Figure 4.3). It follows that
M si0,j0 
p ϕ.
– The proof for ϕ = [ψ1 Wψ2]≥p, with ψ1 and ψ2 in the fragment
φneg, and a state s such that s 2M [ψ1 Uψ2]≥p is similar to the
one in the previous item and uses Corollary 1.
– Formula [αneg]<p is equivalent to ¬[αneg]≥1−p of form ¬ϕpos. For-
mula [αpos]≤p is equivalent to ¬[αpos]>1−p of form ¬ϕneg. Thus
this case follows by induction. For example, for state s, we have
e.g. M si0,j0 
p [αneg]<p iff M si0,j0 
p ¬[αneg]≥1−p iff M si0,j0 2o
[αneg]≥1−p. 
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Height required to satisfy subformula.
Height following Lemma 8.
Figure 4.3: Intuitively an unfolding for a sub-formula can be attached to
every inner state of the unfolding of the formula. The resulting
maximal height is still finite.
4.3.2 Incompleteness of PCTL
We show that 3-valued abstractions are incomplete for full PCTL by giving
several counterexamples which consist of a concrete Markov chain M and a
PCTL formula ϕ such that no finite-state model A can exist, which simulates
M and for which A p ϕ. These examples are strongly inspired by Dams
and Namjoshi’s work on completeness for Kripke structures and the modal
µ-calculus [58].
As these incompleteness results are driven by the structure of formulae
φ rather than by a specific notion of 3-valued abstraction, we say “φ is
incomplete” instead of “3-valued abstractions are incomplete with regard to
φ”.
Lemma 10
Not all formulae of form [φUψ]≥p and [φWψ]≥p are complete.  
Proof
We consider [qU r]≥1 and [qW r]≥1. Let M be the Markov chain illustrated
in Figure 2.20 on page 82: The initial state s0 is labelled q and is infinitely
branching with P(s0, si,1) > 0 for all i ≥ 1; its i-th successor si,1 has prob-
ability 1
2i
, all other transition probabilities are 1; the i-th path s0si,1 . . . si,i
consists of i− 1 states labelled q and ends in an absorbing state si,i labelled
r. The Markov chain M obviously satisfies [qU r]≥1 and [qW r]≥1.
Now assume there is a finite-state model A with n > 0 states and initial
state a0, such that A p ϕ and A M . Since A is finite-state there exists a
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state a1 in A (a successor of a0) which simulates infinitely many successors
sij ,1 (j > 0) of s0 inM . Of these states sij ,1 there must be a state sn0,1 which
is the starting point of a path sn0,1 . . . sn0,n0 with n0 > n+ 1 states labelled
q before reaching its absorbing r state. By the definition of simulation this
path must be matched by a path a1 . . . an0 in A such that aj  sn0,j for all
1 ≤ j ≤ n0. Since A is of finite size n there must be a state aj′ repeating
along this path, and thus there is a loop in A. As the states sn0,1 . . . sn0,n0−1
are labelled q, all states of the path a1 . . . an0 , and on the loop in this path,
must be labelled q or q?. Similarly, as the states sn0,1 . . . sn0,n0−1 are not
labelled r, for all states aj of the loop we get L(ai, r) = ff or L(ai, r) = ?.
Now, since A p ϕ by assumption, the states aj must actually be labelled
with q. (Otherwise, let α ∈ {qU r, qW r}. If one state ai0 in the loop were
labelled q?, and so Aai0 2p q, there would be a finite prefix a0a1 . . . ai0 , and
thus a measurable cylinder path set with positive probability which does not
pessimistically satisfy α. Thus ProbM (a0, α) < 1, contradicting A |=p ϕ.)
But now we have an overall contradiction: no model that contains a loop
of states labelled q can simulate M because this would imply (by the weight
function of a probabilistic simulation) that M contains an infinite path of
states labelled q, which the given M clearly does not. Hence there cannot
be a finite-state model A such that A p ϕ and A  M . Further, any such
A would satisfy [qW ff]>0 which M clearly does not. 
Lemma 11
Not all formulae of form [[φUψ]>p W ρ]>p′ are complete.  
Proof
Let ϕ be [[qU r]>0 W ff]>0 and M be as in Figure 4.4. It is simple to see
that M  ϕ. Suppose there is a finite-state model A such that A  M and
A p ϕ. Let a be the initial state of A such that a  s0. As A p ϕ, there is
a bottom strongly connected component in A such that every state in this
SCC satisfies pessimistically [qU r]>0. By a pigeon-hole principle, we can
find a state a′ in this SCC that is labelled by r and is simulated by states si
for infinitely many i. Consider a cycle from a′ to itself. This cycle has some
fixed length n. As for every i > 0 the distance from si to si+1 is i+ 1, this
is a contradiction. 
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s1,1 s1 s2,2
q r q
s2,1
q r
s2 si,i si,i−1 si,1 si
q q q
Figure 4.4: A concrete Markov chain M that satisfies [[qU r]>0 W ff]>0.
We note that sub-formula [qU r]>0 of the lemma above, is not in and of
itself incomplete but belongs to the complete fragment PCTL>.
We can use the concrete Markov chain M from Figure 2.20 on page 82
and a similar proof structure to show the incompleteness of [Xφ]≥p.
Lemma 12
Not all formulae of form [X φ]≥p are complete.  
Proof
We consider ϕ = [X [qU r]>0]≥1 and the Markov chain M from Figure 2.20
on page 82 which satisfies ϕ. Again, assume there is a finite-state model A
with n states and initial state a0, such that A p ϕ and A M .
Since A is finite-state there exists a state a1 in A (a successor of a0) which
simulates infinitely many successors si,1 of s0 in M . Since A  ϕ the state
a1 needs to satisfy [qU r]>0. Hence there must be a path pi = a1 . . . ak where
the states a1, . . . , ak−1 are labelled q and ak is labelled r. If this path were
loop-free, then every one of the infinitely many states si,1 would be a starting
point of a path which reaches an r state after at most k steps. This is a
contradiction to the definition of M . Thus pi must contain a loop of states
labelled q. But this would force M to contain an infinite path si,1 . . . where
all states are labelled q. Again we have a contradiction because M does not
contain such a path. 
Incompleteness of formulae of the form [X [φUψ]>p]≥p′ requires infinite
branching, as in the Markov chain in Figure 2.20. For finitely branching
Markov chains this type of formula is complete, because then only a finite
number of successor states needs to be considered, on each of which sub-
formula [φUψ]>p can be finitely verified. Formula of type [φUψ]≥1 and
[φWψ]≥1 are still incomplete even for finitely branching models (which can
be shown with slightly different Until formulae in the proofs). We sum-
marise:
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Corollary 3
Full PCTL is incomplete for the abstraction framework considered in this
chapter.  
Our incompleteness proofs above work for every 3-valued finite-state ab-
straction with pessimistic semantics and a simulation notion as abstraction
that satisfies
1. L(t, q) ≤ L(s, q) for all q ∈ AP
2. P(s, s′) > 0 implies P(t, t′) > 0 for some t′ with s′  t′
3. P(t, t′) > 0 implies P(s, s′) > 0 for some s′ with s′  t′
whenever t  s. In their bi-directionality, these three conditions are reminis-
cent of Larsen and Skou’s probabilistic 2/3-bisimulation [131] and of Dams
and Namjoshi’s notion of (mixed) reverse simulation for labelled transition
systems [58]: conditions (1) and (2) together constrain the abstract model in
terms of the concrete model (and are necessary but not sufficient for sound
abstraction as in Lemma 6); conditions (1) and (3) constrain the concrete
model in terms of the abstract one (and are necessary for securing our in-
completeness results).
4.3.3 Maximality of PCTL>
In Section 4.3.1 we define a benign PCTL fragment PCTL> and show that
it is complete. Section 4.3.2 then shows that full PCTL can not be complete
with regard to 3-valued Markov chains as abstract models. We now use these
incompleteness results for full PCTL to show that the complete fragment
PCTL> is maximal for 3-valued Markov chains; i.e. every static extension
of PCTL> is incomplete.
Theorem 3
Consider a PCTL fragment κ that contains one of the following combinations
of PCTL operators:
(i) [φWψ]≥p; or
(ii) [φUψ]≥p; or
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(iii) [Xφ]≥p and [φUψ]>p; or
(iv) [φWψ]>p and [φUψ]>p.
Then κ is incomplete.  
Proof
The first three items follow from Lemmas 10 and 12. The last item follows
from Lemma 11. 
4.4 Summary of chapter
In this chapter we formalised the completeness question which we set out to
solve in this thesis.
First we mentioned existing completeness results for non-probabilistic log-
ics and highlighted contributions which inspired the work in this thesis. In
particular completeness was previously achieved for linear time and branch-
ing time. An abstraction formwork based on alternating tree-automata
achieved completeness for the full modal µ-calculus and inspired some of
the automata-based techniques used in this thesis.
The chapter then presented a first result, which achieves completeness for
a fragment PCTL> of PCTL via 3-valued unfoldings, a pessimistic PCTL
semantics, and probabilistic simulation. We showed that full PCTL is incom-
plete with regard to this abstraction framework and that PCTL> is maximal.
Thus, this chapter showed that to achieve completeness beyond PCTL> re-
quires a richer abstraction framework, such as automata and games.
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5 A Game Semantics for PCTL
In this chapter we develop an operational semantics for the probabilistic
branching-time logic PCTL. We define a Hintikka game, as introduced in
Section 3.4, which captures the semantics of PCTL as a two-player game.
The game is played by two adversarial players who want to prove, respec-
tively refute, the truth of a PCTL formula φ on a Markov chain M . The
game is played on configurations which are formed from states s of M and
subformulae of the disputed query φ. The winning player is determined by
certain (co-)Büchi acceptance conditions.
This operational definition of semantics for PCTL helps us to gain a deeper
understanding of the problems which have to be solved in order to find a
complete abstraction framework for full PCTL.
Assumption 6
In this chapter we assume every PCTL formula to be in Greater-Than normal
form (GTNF). By Lemma 4 this assumption causes no loss of generality. 
5.1 Game semantics
LetM = (S,P, L) be a labelled Markov chain over a countable set of atomic
propositions AP. For each state s ∈ S and PCTL formula φ we define a
2-person Hintikka game GM (s, φ). As already mentioned, these games are
played between two players V (the Verifier) and R (the Refuter). After having
defined these games and their winning conditions, we show that the game
GM (s, φ) is won by player V iff s ∈ JφKM ; and won by player R iff s 6∈ JφKM . In
particular, each game GM (s, φ) is determined, i.e. exactly one of the players
V and R wins that game.
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The game GM (s, φ) has as set of configurations
CfM (s, φ) = {〈s′, ψ, C〉 | s′ ∈ S, ψ ∈ cl(φ), C ∈ {R, V}}
where we define the set of PCTL formulae cl(φ), the closure of φ, further
below. Plays in game GM (s, φ) are finite or infinite sequences of elements in
CfM (s, φ) starting in the distinguished initial configuration 〈s, φ, V〉. A play
is generated by game moves, specified in detail below.
Our game semantics treats Boolean connectives in the same manner as
Hintikka games for first-order logic (here we take the point of view of Ver-
ifier): proving truth of formula φ at state s amounts to winning the game
from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉.
• To prove a conjunction we allow Refuter to choose which branch of
the conjunction to challenge.
• To prove a disjunction we allow Verifier to choose which branch of the
disjunction to prove.
• To handle negation, the game continues in the same state but with the
unnegated formula and a swap of the role of players, thus attempting
to show that Refuter cannot win from the unnegated formula.
In games for branching-time logics, such as CTL or the µ-calculus, the
universal quantification in ∀X is resolved by Refuter’s choice of a successor
state and the existential quantification in ∃X is resolved by Verifier supplying
one successor state [179]. This is familiar from the treatment of quantifiers
in Hintikka games for first-order logic. For PCTL, however, things are more
complicated. The next operator [Xφ]./p includes a promised probability
./ p, e.g. “at least p” or “more than p”. Verifier now resolves this “probabilis-
tic quantification” by showing how to re-distribute the required probability
between the successors of the current state.
In qualitative games, Until operators are resolved by using the logical
equivalence
qU r ≡ r ∨ (q ∧ X(qU r)) (5.1)
and similarly for weak Until operators. The problem in adopting this for
PCTL is in the possibility of deferring promises forever. For games in qual-
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itative settings this is typically handled by fairness, but for PCTL fairness
is not strong enough:
Example 44
PCTL formula [qU r]≥0.5 holds at state s0 in the labelled Markov chain
shown in Figure 4.1 on page 124. In order to prove this we have to appeal to
the entire infinite sum
∑∞
i=1(
1
3)
i. Any fairness constraint forcing a transition
from s0 into {s1, s2} would cut that infinite sum down to a finite one, failing
to prove the formula for state s0.
However, allowing to defer the satisfaction of the strong Until indefi-
nitely is unsound. The PCTL formula [qU r]>0.5 does not hold at s0 but
if Verifier is allowed to defer her promises forever, she could supply the
promise 13 immediately and promise more than
1
6 in the future, and thus –
by deferring the promise indefinitely – Verifier could unsoundly win game
GM (s0, [qU r]>0.5). 
To address this problem we add a special -move as well as acceptance
conditions for infinite plays:
• If the probability is at least p, player V should be able to prove that it
is greater than p−  for every  > 0.
• On the other hand, if the probability is strictly less than p then there
exists an  for which it is at most p− .
Thus, player R chooses the  and player V proves in finite time (appealing
to Lemma 9) that she can get as close as needed to the threshold. The same
intuition (but dual) works for weak Until, when the weak Until formula in
question does not hold.
We next define the notion of the closure cl(φ) of a PCTL formula φ. This
closure contains all PCTL formulae that can occur in game configurations
reached from a configuration of the form 〈s, φ, C〉.
Definition 59 (Closure cl(φ))
The closure cl(φ) of a PCTL formula φ is the union of two sets of PCTL
formulae.
134
The first set cl1(φ) is the actual set of PCTL subformulae of φ, including
φ itself.
The second set cl2(φ) consists of all formulae [α]./p′ such that either
(a) α is ψ1 Uψ2, ./ is >, and for some p ∈ [0, 1] and ./′ ∈ {>,≥} we have
[α]./′p ∈ cl1(φ);
(b) α is ψ1 Wψ2, ./ is ≥, and for some p ∈ [0, 1] and ./′ ∈ {>,≥} we have
[α]./′p ∈ cl1(φ);
(c) α is ψ1 U≤k
′
ψ2 and for some p ∈ [0, 1] and a finite k > k′ we have
[ψ1 U≥k ψ2]./p ∈ cl1(φ);
(d) α is ψ1 W≤k
′
ψ2 and for some p ∈ [0, 1] and a finite k > k′ we have
[ψ1 U≥k ψ2]./p ∈ cl1(φ). 
The second set cl2(φ) allows us to replace any probability thresholds p
with other values p′ ∈ [0, 1] and finite time bounds with smaller ones, but
to allow this in such a manner that it is consistent with the above intuition
behind -moves:
• strong Until formulae with non-strict thresholds may change to strong
Until formulae with strict thresholds;
• weak Until formulae with strict thresholds may change to weak Until
formulae with non-strict thresholds; and
• the finite time bounds in bounded Untils should be allowed to decrease.
The difference between the Until and weak Untils stems from their duality:
the negation of a weak Until formula is a (strong) Until formula and vice-
versa as seen, e.g., in (2.2) on page 40. Thus, a weak Until formula with
strict threshold is the negation of a (strong) Until formula with non-strict
threshold. When Refuter is trying to disprove a weak Until formula with
strict threshold, Refuter is in fact trying to prove the dual (strong) Until
formula with non-strict threshold.
Example 45
Consider the following formula:
φ = [(r ∧ [X[(p ∧ ¬r) W(q ∧ ¬r)]≥1]>0) W ff]>0 (5.2)
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Intuitively, φ says there is an infinite path labelled by r such that every state
on this path has a successor for which pW q holds on (almost) all paths and r
does not hold along the paths that witness pW q. Let α = (p∧¬r) W(q∧¬r),
β = X[α]>0, and γ = (r ∧ [β]>0) W ff. The closure of φ is:
cl(φ) =

φ, [γ]≥b,ff, (r ∧ [β]>0),
[β]>0, [α]≥b, (p ∧ ¬r),
p,¬r, r, (q ∧ ¬r), q
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ b ∈ [0, 1]

As γ appears in φ with a strict threshold, it is in the closure of φ with its
original threshold as well as with all possible non-strict thresholds. As α
appears in φ with a non-strict threshold, it appears in the closure of φ only
with non-strict thresholds.
Similarly, for formula φ = [qU r]≥ 1
2
we have
cl(φ) = {φ, q, r, [qU r]>b | b ∈ [0, 1]} . (5.3)
As φ is a strong Until with non-strict threshold it is part of cl1(φ) and for
every possible threshold b its strict counterpart [qU r]>b is in cl2(φ). 
Subsequently, we write C for the player other than C, i.e. V = R and R = V.
The possible moves of game GM (s0, φ) are defined through the moves of
games GM (s, ψ) by structural induction on ψ ∈ cl(φ), simultaneously for all
s ∈ S.
M1. At configurations 〈s, [α]>1, C〉, player C wins
M2. At configurations 〈s, [α]≥0, C〉, player C wins
We may therefore assume that in subsequent moves configurations of the
form 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 never satisfy that ./ p equals ≥ 0 or > 1.
M3. At configurations 〈s, q, C〉:
– player C wins if s ∈ L(q)
– player C wins if s 6∈ L(q)
M4. At configuration 〈s,¬ψ, C〉, the next configuration is 〈s, ψ, C〉
136
So move M4 removes the negation from the formula but also swaps the role
of players.
M5. At configuration 〈s, ψ1 ∧ ψ2, C〉, player C chooses as next configuration ei-
ther 〈s, ψ1, C〉 or 〈s, ψ2, C〉
At configuration 〈s, ψ1 ∨ ψ2, C〉, player C chooses as next configuration ei-
ther 〈s, ψ1, C〉 or 〈s, ψ2, C〉
For conjunctions player C chooses a conjunct and the game continues with
that conjunct instead of the conjunction. Similarily, for disjunctions player
C chooses a disjunct to continue the game.
M6. At configuration 〈s, [Xψ]./p, C〉, player C chooses a subset Y ⊆ S satisfy-
ing P (s, Y ) ./ p; then player C chooses some s′ ∈ Y :
– if P (s, s′) = 0, player C wins
– otherwise, P (s, s′) > 0 and the next configuration is 〈s′, ψ, C〉
Move M6 is well defined. There is a non-empty set Y with P (s, Y ) ./ p as
p ∈ [0, 1], P (s, ·) has mass one, and ./ p is neither equal to > 1 nor to ≥ 0.
M7. At configuration 〈s, [ψ1 Uψ2]≥p, C〉, player C chooses some n ∈ N such
that p− 1n ≥ 0 with resulting next configuration 〈s, [ψ1 Uψ2]>p− 1n , C〉
In move M7 such a choice is possible since p cannot be 0. The intuition is
that [p, 1] =
⋂
n∈N(p − 1n , 1] so this behaves like a universal quantification
over n ∈ N.
M8. Dually, at configuration 〈s, [ψ1 Wψ2]>p, C〉, player C chooses n ∈ N such
that p+ 1n ≤ 1 with resulting next configuration 〈s, [ψ1 Wψ2]≥p+ 1n , C〉
In move M8 such a choice is possible since p < 1. The intuition is that a weak
Until with a > threshold is the dual of a strong Until with a ≥ threshold
(based on (2.2)), so it is like an existential quantification over n ∈ N.
M9. At configuration 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 where either α is ψ1 Uψ2 and ./ is >; or α is
ψ1 Wψ2 and ./ is ≥
– player C is able to move to next configuration 〈s, ψ2, C〉
– if player C did not move, player C is able to move to next configuration
〈s, ψ1, C〉
– if neither player moved above, the play must proceed as follows:
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Player C chooses a sub-distribution d : S → [0, 1] such that
∑
s′∈S
d(s′) ≥ p (5.4)
∀s′ ∈ S : d(s′) ≤ P (s, s′) (5.5)
Next, player C chooses some state s′ ∈ S with d(s′) > 0 and the
next configuration is 〈s′, [α]./d(s′)·P (s,s′)−1 , C〉.
In move M9, sub-distribution d has positive mass, is bounded pointwise
by the probability distribution P (s, ·), and specifies the re-distribution of
promise ./ p into promised probabilities at successor states. Since d(s′) > 0,
we also have d(s′) · P (s, s′)−1 ∈ [0, 1] in move M9 by (5.5).
M10. At configuration 〈s, [α]>p, C〉 where α is either ψ1 U≤k ψ2 or ψ1 W≤k ψ2
with k ∈ N:
– if k = 0 and α is ψ1 U≤k ψ2, the next configuration is 〈s, ψ2, C〉
– if k = 0 and α is ψ1 W≤k ψ2, player C chooses as next configuration
either 〈s, ψ1, C〉 or 〈s, ψ2, C〉
– if k > 0, the moves are defined as in M9 above; except when the last
item of M9 applies, in which case the counter k in α is decreased to
k − 1 for that next configuration 〈s′, [α]./d(s′)·P (s,s′)−1 , C〉
In move M10, a bounded Until with bound 0 has to realise ψ2 right away;
and a bounded weak Until with bound zero has to realise at least one of ψ1
or ψ2 right away.
A finite play is won as explained in M1-M10 above. In most moves, the
play either ends or moves to configurations where the formula is a proper sub-
formula in the closure. In a configuration with strong Until with non-strict
threshold or weak Until with strict threshold the next configuration changes
from non-strict to strict threshold or vice versa. In a configuration with
strong Until with strict threshold or weak Until with non-strict threshold
the next configuration has the same path formula and threshold type, or
moves to a proper sub-formula.
It follows that every infinite play ends with an infinite suffix of configura-
tions that are
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A1. all of the form 〈si, [ψ1 Wψ2]≥pi , C〉 or
A2. all of the form 〈si, [ψ1 Uψ2]>pi , C〉
Configurations of these suffixes are either labelled by strong Until with
strict threshold or weak Until with non-strict threshold, where the states
and the exact probability threshold may still change, but where neither the
player C nor the sub-formulae ψ1 and ψ2 change.
Definition 60 (Acceptance conditions)
Player V wins all infinite plays with an infinite suffix either of type A1 above
with C = V, or of type A2 above with C = R. Player R wins all other infinite
plays: those with an infinite suffix either of type A1 when C = R, or of type
A2 when C = V. 
These winning conditions are Büchi acceptance conditions, and so our
games are known to be determined [140]. We use the notion of strategy
for player C informally. Such strategies contain, for each configuration of a
game, at most one set of choices as required by the applicable move from
M1-M10.
Example 46
Consider the game GM (s0, [qU r]≥0.5), where M is as in Figure 4.1 on page
124, and let α = qU r. The initial configuration is 〈s0, [α]≥0.5, V〉. In
the first move player R chooses an n ∈ N and the next configuration is
〈s0, [α]>0.5− 1
n
, V〉. Then, as long as the play Γ0Γ1 . . . remains in configu-
rations Γi of the form 〈s0, [α]>pi , V〉, player V is going to choose the sub-
distribution d with constant values d(s2) = 0 and d(s1) = 13 − 12n , and
dynamic value d(s0) = pi − d(s1). A simple calculation shows that as long
as player R chooses s0 as the next state (clearly, if she chooses s1 she is go-
ing to lose as s1 ∈ L(r)) the promised probability > pi is going to decrease
139
according to the following sequence:
p0 = 0.5− 1
n
,
p1 = 0.5− 32n ,
p2 = 0.5− 62n ,
p3 = 0.5− 152n ,
and in general
pi = 0.5− 3
i + 3
4n
for i ∈ N .
When pi decreases below 13 (and there is some i ∈ N for which this hap-
pens), player V still chooses d with d(s2) = 0 as above but now chooses
d(s1) = pi and d(s0) = 0, thereby forcing player R to move to s1 and lose.
This describes a winning strategy for player V in game GM (s0, [qU r]≥0.5).
Example 47
Although the choice of d in Example 46 may seem arbitrary, it meshes well
with the use of Lemma 9. Consider again the game GM (s0, [α]≥ 1
2
) from
Example 46. Suppose that in the first move player R chooses 9 ∈ N, and
the next configuration is 〈s0, [α]> 7
18
, V〉. Since for M s02 in Figure 4.2 on page
124, ProbMs02 (s0, α) =
4
9 >
7
18 , player V can use M
s0
2 to guide her choices.
In M s02 we have ProbMs02 (s0s1, α) = 1 and ProbM
s0
2
(s0s0, α) = 13 . Player V
uses the gap of 118 and re-distributes it between the successors of s0. She
can choose, for example, d(s1) = 13 − 154 and d(s0) = 19 − 154 . The next
possible configurations are then 〈s1, [α]> 17
18
, V〉 and 〈s0, [α]> 5
18
, V〉. Player V
identifies the resulting states with those obtained inM s02 , here s0s1 and s0s0
respectively. As s0s1 ∈ JrKMs02 the first is clearly a winning configuration.
From 〈s0, [α]> 5
18
, V〉 and the corresponding location s0s0 in M s02 , player V
notices that ProbMs02 (s0s0s1, α) = 1 and chooses d(s1) =
5
18 . The next
configuration is 〈s1, [α]> 15
18
, V〉 (with corresponding s0s0s1 in M s02 ) and won
by supplying r. 
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Definition 61
1. A strategy σ for player C in game GM (s, φ) is winning from a configura-
tion Γ in that game iff player C wins all plays beginning in configuration
Γ when player C plays according to her strategy σ – regardless of how
player C plays.
2. Player C wins game GM (s, φ) iff player C has a strategy that is winning
from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉. 
We can now formalise the main theorem of this chapter, i.e. that the
denotational semantics of PCTL is captured exactly by the existence of
winning strategies in games GM (s, φ).
Theorem 4 (Equivalence of game and semantics)
Let M = (S,P, L) be a labelled Markov chain over AP, s ∈ S, and φ a PCTL
formula. Then we have:
1. s ∈ JφKM iff player V wins game GM (s, φ); and
2. s 6∈ JφKM iff player R wins game GM (s, φ).
In particular, game GM (s, φ) is determined.  
Proof
Given PCTL formula φ, we show the two claims by structural induction on
the PCTL formulae ψ in the closure of φ, simultaneously on all states of M .
Since exactly one of s ∈ JψKM and s 6∈ JψKM holds, it suffices to show both
items in Theorem 4 for such a ψ in their “only if” versions, which we do by
splitting ψ into six cases:
Case 1. The cases when ψ equals tt or ff are trivial. For example, no state
satisfies ff and all plays beginning in 〈s,ff, V〉 are won by player R. So we
may implicitly assume in subsequent cases that ./ p equals neither > 1 nor
≥ 0.
Case 2. The cases when ψ equals q, ¬ψ1, ψ1 ∧ ψ2 and ψ1 ∨ ψ2 are proved
as in the case of Hintikka games for propositional logic. We illustrate this
for the case of conjunction and player V:
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• Let s ∈ Jψ1 ∧ ψ2KM . Then s ∈ JψiKM for i = 1, 2. By induction, there
is a winning strategy wi for player V from configuration 〈s, ψi, V〉 for
i = 1, 2. Consider the strategy w for player V which composes her
strategies w1 and w2 as follows: at configuration 〈s, ψ, V〉, player R has
to choose as next configuration some 〈s, ψi, V〉 with i = 1, 2. But then
player V simply responds according to her winning strategy wi. This
describes a winning strategy w for player V from configuration 〈s, ψ, V〉.
• Let s 6∈ Jψ1 ∧ ψ2KM . Then there is some j ∈ {1, 2} such that s 6∈JψjKM . By induction, there is a winning strategy wj for player R from
configuration 〈s, ψj , V〉. Consider the strategy w for player R which
composes his strategy wj with an initial choice as follows: at configu-
ration 〈s, ψ, V〉, player R simply chooses 〈s, ψj , V〉 as next configuration
and then plays according to her winning strategy wj . This describes
a winning strategy w for player R from configuration 〈s, ψ, V〉.
Case 3. The case when ψ equals [Xψ1]./p, where ./ ∈ {≥, >}:
• Let s ∈ J[Xψ1]./pKM . Let Y be the set of states s′ such that P (s, s′) > 0
and s′ ∈ Jψ1KM . From the latter and induction we infer that player V
has a winning strategy ws′ for the configuration 〈s′, ψ1, V〉, for all s′ ∈
Y . We construct from all of these ws′ a winning strategy w for player
V from configuration 〈s, [Xψ1]./p, V〉 as follows: Since s ∈ J[Xψ1]./pKM ,
we know that P (s, Y ) ./ p holds and that Y is non-empty as ./ p is not
≥ 0. So at configuration 〈s, [Xψ1]./p, V〉 player V chooses this set Y .
Now no matter what next configuration 〈s′, ψ1, V〉 player R chooses, we
have s′ ∈ Y and so player V plays according to her winning strategy ws′ .
In particular, w is a winning strategy for player V from configuration
〈s, [Xψ1]./p, V〉
• Let s 6∈ J[Xψ1]./pKM . Player Vmust choose a set Y such that P (s, Y ) ./
p. In making this choice, player V would – by induction – lose from
configuration 〈s, [Xψ1]./p, V〉 if Y contained some s′ with s′ 6∈ Jψ1KM
(for then player R could respond with configuration 〈s′, ψ1, V〉 and win
the resulting game). Dually, player V can only increase her chances of
winning from configuration 〈s, [Xψ1]./p, V〉 if she adds to Y all states
s′ with s′ ∈ Jψ1KM and P (s, s′) > 0. Finally, player V has no incentive
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to add an s′ ∈ Jψ1KM to Y if P (s, s′) = 0: this does not contribute to
P (s, Y ) ./ p and only exposes player V to a threat of player R to move
to s′. To summarise, if player V has a winning strategy from that
configuration, then she also has a winning strategy from that same
configuration where she chooses Y as in the previous item. But then
s 6∈ J[Xψ1]./pKM means that P (s, Y ) ./ p is false. So player V can only
choose a set Y for which player R can respond with a winning strategy.
Case 4. The cases when φ equals [α]≥p where α is ψ1 Uψ2:
• Let s ∈ JφKM . Then ProbM (s, α) ≥ p and so for each n ∈ N with p−
1
n ≥ 0 we have ProbM (s, α) > p− 1n and s ∈ J[α]>p− 1n KM . By induction,
player V has a winning strategy wn from configuration 〈s, [α]>p− 1
n
, V〉,
for each such n ∈ N. Player V can synthesise from these countably
many strategies a winning strategy w from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉 as
follows: if player R chooses n ∈ N, then the next configuration is
〈s, [α]>p− 1
n
, V〉 and player V plays according to wn.
• Let s 6∈ JφKM . Then ProbM (s, α) < p. Thus, there is some n0 ∈ N
with ProbM (s, α) ≤ p− 1n0 < 1. But then ProbM (s, α) ≯ p− 1n0 implies
s 6∈ J[α]>p− 1
n0
K
M
. By induction, player R has a winning strategy wn0
from configuration 〈s, [α]>p− 1
n0
, V〉. So player R gets a winning strategy
w from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉 by first choosing that n0 and then playing
according to wn0 .
Case 5. The cases when φ equals [α]>p where α is ψ1 Wψ2:
• Let s ∈ JφKM . Then ProbM (s, α) > p. Thus, there is some n0 ∈ N
with p + 1n0 ≤ 1 and ProbM (s, α) ≥ p + 1n0 . But then ProbM (s, α) ≥
p+ 1n0 implies s ∈ J[α]≥p+ 1n0 KM . By induction, player V has a winning
strategy wn0 from configuration 〈s, [α]≥p+ 1
n0
, V〉. So player V gets a
winning strategy w from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉 by first choosing that
n0 and then playing according to wn0 .
• Let s 6∈ JφKM . Then ProbM (s, α) ≤ p. Thus, for every n ∈ N with
p + 1n ≤ 1 we have ProbM (s, α) < p + 1n . By induction, player R
has a winning strategy wn from configuration 〈s, [α]>p+ 1
n
, V〉, for each
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n ∈ N with p + 1n ≤ 1. Player R can synthesise from these countable
strategies a winning strategy from configuration 〈s, φ, V〉 as follows: if
player V chooses n ∈ N, then the next configuration is 〈s, [α]>p+ 1
n
, V〉
and player R plays according to wn.
Case 6. The cases when φ equals [α]./p where either
(a) α is ψ1 Uψ2 and ./ is >
(b) α is ψ1 Wψ2 and ./ is ≥ or
(c) α is ψ1 U≤k ψ2 or ψ1 W≤k ψ2 with k ∈ N and ./ is either > or ≥:
• Let s ∈ JφKM .
The formula α is logically equivalent to ψ2∨(ψ1∧Xα) and in case that
α is bounded the bound decreases by 1. It follows that it is either the
case that s ∈ Jψ2KM or s ∈ Jψ1 ∧ [Xα]./pKM . In the first case, player
V chooses to move to configuration 〈s, ψ2, V〉 and by induction she has
a winning strategy from this configuration. In the second case, by
induction there is a winning strategy for player V from configuration
〈s, ψ1, V〉, so if player R chooses to go to this configuration, player V
wins. If player R does not move to ψ1, then M9 demands that player
V chooses a sub-distribution d : S → [0, 1] satisfying (5.4) and (5.5).
By assumption s ∈ J[Xα]./pKM . Let T be the set of states t such
that ProbM (t, α) > 0 and P (s, t) > 0. Player V chooses d such that
d(s′) = 0 for all s′ ∈ S \ T .
So it suffices to specify d on set T . For that, let p′ =
∑
t∈T P (s, t) ·
ProbM (t, α).
– Consider the case that ./ is >. By assumption p′ > p. In the case
that p = 0, V chooses some state t ∈ T such that ProbM (t, α) > 0,
V sets d(t) = ProbM (t, α) · P (s, t), and d(t′) = 0 for all t′ 6= t. In
the case that p > 0, let δ be p′−p. We are going to distribute this
gap δ between all the states in T according to the distribution
P (s, ·). That is, for all t ∈ T
d(t) = max(0, (ProbM (t, α)− δ)P (s, t))
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In case that ProbM (t, α) ≤ δ we thus have d(t) = 0 (and so
effectively remove t from set T above). As
p′ =
∑
t∈S
ProbM (t, α)P (s, t) and p > 0
there must be at least one state t such that ProbM (t, α) ≥ p′ and
hence ProbM (t, α) − δ > 0, implying d(t) > 0. It follows that∑
t∈T d(t) ≥ p′ − δ ≥ p.
– Consider the case that ./ is ≥. By assumption p′ ≥ p. Let δ be
p′ − p. For all t ∈ T , let
d(t) = max(0,ProbM (t, α)− δ · P (s, t)) .
Again, if ProbM (t, α) ≤ δ we set d(t) = 0.
This completes the specification of sub-distribution d chosen by
player V.
Now regardless of the choice of player R, the next configuration is
〈t, [α]./p′ , V〉 such that t ∈ J[α]./p′KM . So player V maintains the truth
value of the configuration. Notice that also the distance from the
promised threshold p′ and the real probability is maintained.
Case (a): For (strong) Until, we appeal to Lemma 9. We treat sub-
formulae ψ1 and ψ2 as propositions (respectively, the q and r in that
lemma) and annotate states of M by ψ1 and ψ2. Let
p′ = ProbM (s, ψ1 Uψ2) . (5.6)
By assumption p′ > p. In particular, s ∈ J[ψ1 Uψ2]≥p′KM . Let n ∈ N
be such that p′ > p′− 1n > p. By Lemma 9 (applied to p′ instead of p),
there are k, l ≥ 0 with s ∈ J[ψ1 Uψ2]>p′− 1
n
K
Msk,l
and so the probability
of ψ1 Uψ2 in M sk,l at s is greater than p. Player V’s strategy is to
consider this system M sk,l. She chooses sub-distributions d : S → [0, 1]
according to the probabilities ProbMsk,l(t, α) (instead of ProbM (t, α)
but as explained above). By definition of M sk,l there can be only finite
sequences of configurations of the form 〈s′, [α]>p, V〉, and so player V
wins (cf. Example 47).
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Case (b): For weak Until ψ1 Wψ2, all infinite plays have a suffix of
configurations of form 〈s′, [ψ1 Wψ2]≥p, V〉 and are thus winning for
player V. Finite plays again reach configurations of the form 〈s′, ψi, V〉
for i ∈ {1, 2}, where induction applies directly.
Case (c): For bounded operators, as the bound decreases, in a finite
number of steps the play moves to configurations of the form 〈s′, ψi, V〉
for i ∈ {1, 2}, where induction applies directly, and in the desired
manner.
• Let s 6∈ JφKM .
It follows that ProbM (s, α) ≤ p in case that ./ is >; and ProbM (s, α) <
p in case that ./ is ≥. As above, α is logically equivalent to ψ2 ∨ (ψ1 ∧
Xα) and in case that α is bounded the bound decreases by 1. It follows
that s 6∈ Jψ2KM and hence there is a winning strategy for player R from
configuration 〈s, ψ2, V〉. Also, it is either the case that s 6∈ Jψ1KM or
s 6∈ J[Xα]./pKM . In the first case player R has a winning strategy from
configuration 〈s, ψ1, V〉 and chooses this configuration. In the second
case, player V chooses a sub-distribution d : S → [0, 1] such that (5.4)
and (5.5) hold.
We claim that there is some s′ ∈ S with d(s′) > 0 and ProbM (s′, α) 6./
d(s′)P (s, s′)−1. Proof by contradiction: otherwise, ProbM (s′, α) ./
d(s′) for all s′ with d(s′) > 0 implies that∑
s′|d(s′)>0
ProbM (s′, α) ./
∑
s′∈S
d(s′) ≥ p
by (5.4). But this renders
∑
s′|d(s′)>0
ProbM (s′, α) ./ p
which directly contradicts s 6∈ J[Xα]./pKM .
Thus, player R can choose such an s′ and maintain the play in configu-
rations of the form 〈s′, [α]./p′ , V〉 such that s′ 6∈ J[α]./p′KM . Notice that
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player R can choose a successor s′ such that
p′ − ProbM (s′, α) ≥ p− ProbM (s, α) ,
i.e. the gap between the promise and the actual probability does not
decrease.
We now study the consequences of this capability of player R for the
different forms of path formula α in this case:
Case (a): For weak Until formulae, we appeal to Corollary 2. As before,
we treat ψ1 and ψ2 as propositions and annotate states of M by them.
Let p′ = ProbM (s, ψ1 Wψ2). By assumption p′ ≤ p. In particular,
s /∈ J[ψ1 Wψ2]>p′KM . Let n ∈ N be such that p′ < p + 1n < p. By
Corollary 2 there are k, l ≥ 0 with s /∈ J[ψ1 Wψ2]≥p′+ 1
n
K
Msk,l
and so the
probability of ψ1 Wψ2 inM sk,l at s is less than p. Player R’s strategy is
to consider this system M sk,l. Let d : S → [0, 1] be the sub-distribution
chosen by player V. As s /∈ J[ψ1 Wψ2]≥pKMsk,l , there is some s′ ∈ S
such that
s′ /∈ J[ψ1 Wψ2]≥d(s′)P (s,t)−1KMsk,l .
So player R chooses this s′. By definition ofM sk,l there can be only finite
sequences of configurations of the form 〈s′, [α]≥p, V〉, and so player R
wins. This is dual to the strategy depicted for V in Example 47.
Case (b): For (strong) Until formulae, infinite plays of configurations
of the form 〈s′, [ψ1 Uψ2]./p, V〉 are winning for player R by the winning
conditions for infinite plays. Any finite play reduces to configurations
of the form 〈s′, ψi, V〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, where induction applies directly,
and in the desired manner.
Case (c): For bounded operators, as the bound decreases, in a finite
number of steps the play moves to configurations of the form 〈s′, ψi, V〉
for i ∈ {1, 2} and so player R wins by induction.

Game GM (s, φ) is defined such that its initial configuration 〈s, φ, V〉 is
owned by player V. We can define a dual game with the same moves but
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with initial configuration 〈s, φ, R〉. Theorem 4 and its proof then remain
valid if we swap the role of players in both.
Example 48
Consider game GM (s0, [qU r]> 1
2
), where M is as in Figure 4.1 on page 124,
and let α = qU r. From configuration 〈s0, [α]> 1
2
, V〉, player V will not move
to 〈s0, r, V〉 as she would then lose. For the same reason, player R will not
move to 〈s0, q, V〉. So if both players play strategies that are ‘optimal’ for
them, player V has to choose a sub-distribution d at the initial configuration.
If d(s2) > 0, player V loses as player R can then choose s2. So d(s2) = 0
for any ‘optimal’ strategy of player V. But both d(s1) and d(s0) have to
be positive since otherwise the mass of d can be at most 13 by (5.5), which
would violate (5.4). Since player V plays an ‘optimal’ strategy, d(s1) 6= 13 ,
as otherwise player R could choose as next configuration 〈s1, [α]>( 1
3
)·( 1
3
)−1 , V〉
and would then win by move M1. By (5.5) there is therefore  > 0 such that
d(s1) = 13−. In particular, player R will not choose s1 as she would lose the
next configuration 〈s1, [α]>1−3, V〉 (since s1 ∈ L(r)). So player R chooses s0
and the next configuration is 〈s0, [α]>3d(s0), V〉. By (5.4), 3d(s0) must be at
least 12 + 3 and so player V promises more in > 3d(s0) than she promised
in the previous configuration.
At configuration 〈s0, [α]>3d(s0), V〉, player V avoids losing only by choosing
a sub-distribution d that maps s0 to 0 and all other states to positive mass
as before, and for the same reasons. Similarly, d(s1) < 13 has to hold. So
although a new sub-distribution d with a new value of  may be chosen, the
next configuration is still of the same type 〈s0, [α]>p′ , V〉 with p′ > 12 . Thus,
either the play is finite and so lost for player V as described above; or the
play is infinite and so lost for player V by the acceptance conditions A1 on
infinite plays.
We conclude that player R wins that game. A winning strategy for her
from the initial configuration only needs to be specified for move M9:
• player R will never choose a configuration of form 〈s0, q, V〉, should such
an opportunity arise;
• whenever player V chooses sub-distribution d with d(s2) > 0, player R
will choose s2;
• otherwise, it must be the case that both d(s1) and d(s2) are positive;
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– if d(s1) ≥ 13 , player R chooses s1;
– if d(s1) < 13 , player R chooses s0. 
5.2 Winning strategies
We show that when a player can win game GM (s, φ) she can use winning
strategies that are of a very specific type. In addition to being memoryless in
the classical sense, they choose very structured distributions when re-visiting
a state in a configuration with a strong or weak Until operator.
As before we use the notion of strategy informally. A strategy is memo-
ryless if its choices depend solely on the current configuration, not on the
finite history of configurations that preceded the current one in a play.
In our games, there can be configurations of type 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 for the
same state s and the same path formula α (e.g., ψ1 Uψ2) but with different
thresholds ./ p. We show that it is enough to consider winning strategies
which induce thresholds that change monotonically, as defined below. Sub-
sequently, for sub-distributions d, d′ : S → [0, 1], we write
• d ≤ d′ iff for all s ∈ S we have d′(s) ≤ d(s)
• d′ < d iff d′ ≤ d and d′(s) < d(s) for some s ∈ S
First we define locally monotone strategies, i.e. strategies in which the choice
of sub-distribution d at configuration 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 is monotone in ./ p regard-
less of the history of a play.
Definition 62 (Locally Monotone Strategies)
A strategy σ for player C in game GM (s, φ) is locally monotone iff for any two
configurations 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 and 〈s, [α]./p′ , C〉 that occur in plays consistent
with σ (but not necessarily in the same play) where d and d′ are the sub-
distributions chosen according to σ at these two configurations respectively,
then p ≥ p′ implies d ≥ d′ and p > p′ implies d > d′. 
We introduce a second notion of monotonicity: A cyclically monotone
strategy is monotone on cyclic paths within single plays; its player can force
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a decrease or increase of the thresholds depending on the path formula and
on whether it is a V or R configuration.
Definition 63 (Cyclically Monotone Strategies)
A strategy σ for player C in game GM (s, φ) is cyclically monotone iff for any
two configurations 〈s, [α]./p, C′〉 and 〈s, [α]./p′ , C′〉 that occur in this order on
some play consistent with σ, then
• α = ψ1 Uψ2 and C = C′ imply p′ < p,
• α = ψ1 Wψ2 and C = C′ imply p′ ≤ p,
• α = ψ1 Uψ2 and C = C′ imply p′ ≥ p,
• α = ψ1 Wψ2 and C = C′ imply p′ > p. 
The existence of winning strategies implies the existence of winning strate-
gies that are locally monotone and cyclically monotone.
Theorem 5 (Monotonicity of winning strategies)
For every game GM (s, φ), there exists a winning strategy for player C iff
there exists a memoryless winning strategy for player C that is also locally
monotone and cyclically monotone.  
Proof
Assuming that there exists some winning strategy for player C in game
GM (s, φ), it suffices to show that a slight modification of the winning strat-
egy synthesised in the proof of Theorem 4 is memoryless, locally monotone,
and cyclically monotone. That slightly modified strategy will clearly be
memoryless by construction. We now describe this modified winning strat-
egy and first prove its local monotonicity, by induction as in the proof of
Theorem 4. Then we prove that it is cyclically monotone.
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Modified winning strategy and its local monotonicity. The only
configurations where player C needs to make choices are
〈s, [α]./p, C′〉 ;
〈s, ψ1 ∨ ψ2, C〉 ; and
〈s, ψ1 ∧ ψ2, C〉 .
With the latter two, we restrict C’s strategy to choose ψ1 whenever possible
and only when that is impossible to choose ψ2. This is a memoryless choice
similar to what one could do in Hintikka games for first-order logic. We show
that the way configurations of the form 〈s, [α]./p, C′〉 are handled induces a
memoryless and monotone strategy.
First we prove three cases which are fairly straightforward.
1. For configurations where α = Xψ, the strategy defined in the proof of
Theorem 4 chooses the set of successors according to the state s, and
is clearly memoryless.
2. For configurations where C = C′ and either α = ψ1 Uψ2 and ./ = ≥
or α = ψ1 Wψ2 and ./ = >, then player C has to choose a value n.
By choosing the minimal possible n she ensures that the strategy is
memoryless.
3. For configurations 〈s, ψ1 ∨ ψ2, C〉 and 〈s, ψ1 ∧ ψ2, C〉: Whenever the
play moves to configurations of the form 〈s′, ψi, V〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, the
strategy is memoryless, locally monotone, and cyclically monotone by
induction.
We now start with proving local monotonicity for moves that may choose
sub-distributions.
1. For configurations where
α = ψ1 Wψ2 ,
α = ψ1 W≤k ψ2 , or
α = ψ1 U≤k ψ2 ,
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and C = C′ we claim that the strategy composed in the proof of Theorem 4 is
locally monotone by induction. Intuitively, this can be seen by the strategy
using the gap δ between the probability of the formula and the required
threshold. The strategy partitions this gap between all successors, so if the
same state is visited with different thresholds the partition of the gap implies
that the chosen distribution decreases.
Let p′ = ProbM (s, α) and δi = p′−pi for i ∈ {1, 2}. According to the proof
of Theorem 4 in configuration 〈s, [α]./pi , C〉 player C chooses the distribution
di(t) = max(0, (ProbM (t, α)− δi)P (s, t)) .
It follows that if p1 ≥ p2 then for every t ∈ S we have d1(t) ≥ d2(t). If
follows that if p1 = p2 then d1 = d2. Consider the case that p1 > p2. Then
p1 > 0 and for some t we have d1(t) > 0 and d1(t) = ProbM (t, α) − δ1. As
δ1 < δ2 and d2(t) = ProbM (t, α)− δ2 it follows that d1(t) > d2(t).
2. For the case where
α = ψ1 Uψ2 and C = C′ ,
the strategy as defined in the proof of Theorem 4 is not locally monotone.
(Basically, the strategy in that proof is synthesised according to some finite
unfoldingMn where n can be chosen differently for every game configuration
so that the resulting choice of sub-distributions does not necessarily yield a
locally monotone strategy.)
We modify this construction as follows: For every configuration of the form
〈s, [ψ1 Uψ2]>p, C〉 the sub-distribution d is chosen according to the minimal
k such that some fraction of ProbMsk (s, α) is greater than p. The exact defi-
nition of this fraction is given below. Furthermore, we use the gap between
ProbMsk (s, α) and ProbMsk−1(s, α) to ensure local (and later cyclic) mono-
tonicity. The definition of the sub-distribution d and the proof itself are
quite technical.
Consider the configuration 〈s, [α]>p, C〉. We assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that s /∈ Jψ2KM . We measure the exact probability to satisfy α within
152
i steps. For every t ∈ S let
nt0 = ProbMt0(t, α)
nti = ProbMti (t, α)− ProbMti−1(t, α)
Consider the following increasing sequence:
N t0 =
nt0
2
N ti = N
t
i−1 +
i∑
j=0
1
2i+1−j
ntj (i > 0)
That is, N t1 =
3
4n
t
0+
1
2n
t
1, N t2 =
7
8n
t
0+
3
4n
t
1+
1
2n
t
2, N t3 =
15
16n
t
0+
7
8n
t
1+
3
4n
t
2+
1
2n
t
1,
and so on. Notice that
lim
i→∞
N ti = ProbMtk(t, α)
Let i0 be the minimal such that∑
t∈S
N ti0P (s, t) > p
By abuse of notation for i ≥ 0, we denote
N si+1 =
∑
t∈S
N tiP (s, t)
That is, N si is the sum of the different N
t
i−1 normalised by the probability
to get from s to t. To simplify notations, for i < 0 and for all t we set
N ti = N
s
i+1 = 0 .
The value N ti0P (s, t) is going to be the basis for defining d(t). Notice that it
must be the case thatN si0 ≤ p and thatN ti0−N ti0−1 > 0. In order to maintain
local monotonicity we distribute the gap between the required threshold p
and N si0 between all the states t where N
t
i0+1
> 0. We have to be extremely
careful with the states s for which N si0 = p. For these states, we take a
constant fraction of N ti0 − N ti0−1 and distribute it among the successors of
t. We then have to scale the distribution d for all states s for which this
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constant fraction surpasses the required threshold.
We set d(t) as follows:
d(t) =
(
N ti0−1 +
(
1
4
+
3
4
p−N si0
N si0+1 −N si0
)(
N ti0 −N ti0−1
))
P (s, t) .
It is simple to see that
∑
t∈S d(t) > p. Indeed,
∑
t∈S d(t) is the sum of
the following three expressions:
∑
t∈S
N ti0−1P (s, t) = N
s
i0
∑
t∈S
N ti0 −N ti0−1
4
P (s, t) =
N si0+1 −N si0
4∑
t∈S
3
4
p−N si0
N si0+1 −N si0
(N ti0 −N ti0−1)P (s, t) =
3
4
(p−N si0)
As N si0+1 > p the result follows.
Furthermore, when going to some successor t of s the choice of i0 for s
implies that for the choice of the sub-distribution d for t some value i′0 <
i0 is going to be used. Thus, the sequence of configurations of the form
〈t′, [α]>p′ , C〉 is finite and player C is winning.
We show that this definition of the sub-distribution d implies local mono-
tonicity. Consider two configurations 〈s, [α]>p1 , C〉 and 〈s, [α]>p2 , C〉. Let d1
and d2 be the sub-distributions chosen by σ in these configurations and let
i10 and i20 be the values used to define d1 and d2, respectively. By definition
dj(t) is in the open interval
(N t
ij0−1
P (s, t), N t
ij0
P (s, t))
for j ∈ {1, 2}. By definition if p1 = p2 then i10 = i20 and it follows that
d1 = d2. Similarly, if p1 > p2 then i10 ≥ i20. If i10 > i20 the strictness of
d1 > d2 follows from the strictness of the sequence N ti . If i
1
0 = i
2
0 then
d1 > d2 as p1 > p2.
Cyclic monotonicity of modified winning strategy. We now turn
to cyclic monotonicity. Consider the two configurations 〈s, [α]./p1 , C′〉 and
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〈s, [α]./p2 , C′〉 that appear in this order in a play consistent with σ.
1. Consider the case where C = C′ and
α = ψ1 Wψ2 ,
α = ψ1 W≤k ψ2 , or
α = ψ1 U≤k ψ2 .
The strategy defined in the proof of Theorem 4 is already cyclically mono-
tone. Indeed, from configuration 〈s, [α]./p, C〉 where
ProbM (s, α)− p = δ
we pass to configuration 〈t, [α]./p′ , C〉 and we know that
ProbM (t, α)− p′ = δ
Hence, if configurations 〈s, [α]./p1 , C〉 and 〈s, [α]./p2 , C〉 appear in the same
play we have p1 ≥ p2.
2. Consider the case where
α = ψ1 Uψ2 and C = C′
and the strategy defined as above. Let i10 be the threshold used for choosing
the sub-distribution d in configuration 〈s, [α]>p1 , C〉. By construction values
smaller than i10 are going to be used to define the sub-distributions in suc-
cessor configurations. It follows that if configuration 〈s, [α]>p2 , C〉 is visited,
a value i20 < i10 is going to be used to define its sub-distribution. From the
strictness of the sequence N ti (and N
s
i ) and as N
s
ij0
≤ pj < N s
ij0+1
it follows
that p2 < p1.
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3. Consider the case where C = C′ and
α = ψ1 Uψ2 ;
α = ψ1 U≤k ; or
α = ψ1 W≤k ψ2 .
Let p′ = ProbM (s′, α) and δi = pi − p′ for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let d be the distri-
bution suggested by player C in configuration 〈s, [α]./p1 , C〉. By definition of
d we have
∑
t∈S d(t) ≥ p1. By assumption 〈s, [α]./p2 , C〉 is reachable from
〈s, [α]./p1 , C〉, so neither player chooses to go to configurations of the form
〈t, ψi, C〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}. If follows that
ProbM (s, α) =
∑
t∈S
P (s, t)ProbM (t, α)
We know that ∑
t∈S
d(t) ≥ p′ + δ1
Then, there must exist some t ∈ S such that
d(t) · P (s, t)−1 ≥ ProbM (t, α) + δ1
It follows that if player C chooses this state t the gap between the actual
probability and the threshold does not decrease. Thus p1 ≤ p2.
4. Consider the case where
α = ψ1 Wψ2 and C = C′ .
Then the proof is similar to the previous item. By assumption C wins from
〈s, [α]≥p1 , C〉 and hence s 6∈ J[α]≥p1KM . Let p′ = ProbM (s, α). As player
C wins from 〈s, [α]≥p1 , C〉 we conclude that p′ < p1. In particular, s /∈J[ψ1 Wψ2]>p′KM . Let n ∈ N be such that p′ < p + 1n < p. By Corollary 2
there are k, l ≥ 0 with s /∈ J[ψ1 Wψ2]≥p′+ 1
n
K
Msk,l
and so the probability of
ψ1 Wψ2 in M sk,l at s is less than p1. Player C is going to use system M
s
k,l to
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guide her decisions. As usual
ProbMsk,l(s, α) =
∑
t∈Sk,l
P (s, t)ProbMsk,l(t, α)
Let
p′′ = ProbMsk,l(s, α)
As mentioned p′′ < p1. Let δ1 = p1 − p′′ and let d be the distribution
suggested by player C in configuration 〈s, [α]≥p1 , C〉. By definition of d we
have ∑
t∈S
d(t) ≥ p1 = δ1 + p′′
Then, there must exist some t ∈ S such that
d(t) · P (s, t)−1 ≥ ProbMsk,l(t, α) + δ1
It follows that if player C chooses this state t the gap between the actual
probability in M sk,l and the threshold does not decrease. We show below in
Lemma 13 that when visiting the same state again in M sk,l the probability
of α increases. Hence, p2 > p1. 
Lemma 13
Let M be a labelled Markov chain, q and r in AP, α the path formula qW r,
and M sk,l given for some state s of M and k, l ∈ N. Let t and t′ be different
states in M sk,l that both correspond to some state s
′ of M such that
• there is a path from t to t′ in M sk,l, and
• q holds throughout the unique and finite path from the root of M sk,l
to t′.
If we have ProbMsk (t, α) < 1, then ProbMsk (t
′, α) > ProbMsk (t, α) follows. 
Proof
As ProbMsk (t, qW r) < 1 it follows that there is some “leaf” t
′′ in M sk,l that is
reachable from t inM sk,l such that the unique finite path from t to t
′′ inM sk,l
does not satisfy qW r. As M sk,l is an unwinding of M , it follows that the
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subtree reachable from t′ in M sk,l is contained in the subtree reachable from
t in M sk,l. Clearly, ProbMsk,l(t
′, α) ≥ ProbMsk,l(t, α). Indeed, if a path satisfies
qW r then every prefix of the path also satisfies qW r. We use proof by
contradiction to argue that there is a path from t that does not satisfy qW r
and does not pass through t′. Assume such a path does not exist. Then
every path beginning in t that does not satisfy qW r has to pass through
t′. However, both t and t′ correspond to state s′ in M . It follows that the
only option to falsify qW r in game GM (s′, α) is by “going in a loop” from
state s′ to itself. But by assumption all states on the path between t and t′
satisfy q, which yields a contradiction and thus concludes the proof. 
Example 49
The winning strategy for Refuter in Example 48 is locally monotone as
Refuter never encounters a pair of configurations that need to be checked
for local monotonicity. That strategy is also cyclically monotone: From
configuration 〈s0, [qU r]>p, V〉 the only possible cycles lead to configurations
〈s0, [qU r]>p′ , V〉. As explained already, Verifier is restricted to d(s2) = 0 and
d(s1) < 13 or she loses in the next step. Let p >
1
2 and  =
1
3 − d(s1). Then
d(s0) ≥ 16 + (p − 12) + . Thus, in the next configuration 〈s0, [qU r]>p′ , V〉
we have p′ ≥ 12 + 3(p − 12) + 3. As  > 0 and p − 12 > 0 we have p′ > p.
Finally, if p1, p2, . . . is the sequence of thresholds obtained in this manner,
then pi+2 − pi+1 > pi+1 − pi for all i ≥ 1. 
5.3 Summary of chapter
This chapter defined an operational semantics, i.e. a Hintikka game, for
PCTL over Markov chains. This game-based semantics was shown to be
equivalent to the standard semantics for PCTL, but is operational in nature.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: First, a game-based formula-
tion of the standard PCTL semantics is a useful result in its own rights as
it provides solid foundation for the computation of finitary evidence for the
truth and falsity of PCTL formulae, and for the application of techniques
from game theory to probabilistic verification. Second, a game-based se-
mantics provides suitable machinery for an automata-based model-checking
framework such as our p-automata in Chapter 6.
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6 Completeness for full PCTL via
p-Automata
We have seen in Chapter 4 that (3-valued) Markov chains and Larsen-Skou
simulation are not expressive enough to yield a complete abstraction frame-
work for full PCTL. On the positive side, we already achieved completeness
for a sizable fragment of PCTL via 3-valued unfoldings.
To achieve completeness for full PCTL, which is the primary objective of
this thesis, we need a richer formalism. As the work by Mark Kattenbelt
and Michael Huth [111] shows, the non-determinism of Markov decision
processes does not help to achieve a complete abstraction framework. In fact,
their game-based abstraction framework is already not complete for some
formulae of PCTL>, i.e. the fragment for which we achieved completeness
in Chapter 4.
A complete abstraction framework for non-probabilistic branching-time
logics was achieved through alternating tree automata [59]. These automata
provide the necessary expressiveness which is needed to solve the complete-
ness problem for branching time. As PCTL is a probabilistic branching-time
logic, this success of alternating tree automata suggests that an automata-
based approach might be suitable for the PCTL completeness problem, too.
In this chapter we develop a framework of automata-like acceptors of Markov
chains, called p-automata, which captures Markov chains and PCTL formu-
lae in the same formalism. These p-automata then indeed are a complete
abstraction framework for full PCTL as we will show in Section 6.4.
The p-automata framework that we develop in this chapter uses two-
player games to define core concepts such as acceptance and simulation.
These techniques draw on insights from the Hintikka game presented in
Chapter 5. In particular, for a p-automaton Aφ associated with a PCTL
formula φ as explained in Section 6.3.3, the acceptance game defined in
Section 6.2 which determines whether or not Markov chain M is accepted
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by A, closely resembles the Hintikka game of Section 5.1 which determines
whether or notM satisfies φ. In this sense the p-automata framework builds
on theoretical insights from the game-based PCTL semantics. Nevertheless,
the presentation of our p-automata framework in this chapter is fully self-
contained and does not require any technical material from Chapter 5.
6.1 p-Automata
Traditional probabilistic automata [157] map an input to a probability of
accepting it. Such an automaton A then gives rise to a mapping from inputs
to the probability of their acceptance, and thus to probabilistic languages
Lµ of inputs which are accepted with probability above a fixed threshold µ.
In contrast, our p-automata either accept or reject an entire Markov chain.
In particular, a p-automaton determines a language of Markov chains.
For this chapter we assume familiarity with basic notions of trees and
(alternating) tree automata as introduced in Chapter 3. To clarify the tech-
nical presentation in this chapter, automata have states, Markov chains have
locations, and games have configurations.
Definition 64 (Positive Boolean formulae)
For set T , let B+(T ) be the set of positive Boolean formulae generated from
elements t ∈ T , constants ff and tt, and disjunctions and conjunctions:
ϕ ::= t | ff | tt | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ (6.1)
Formulae in B+(T ) are finite even if T is not. 
Definition 65 (Term sets)
For set Q, we define term sets as follows. This uses n-ary operators ∗n and
∗∨n for every n ∈ N, which we write as ∗ and ∗∨ throughout as n will be clear
from context.
[[Q]]> = {[[q]]./p | q ∈ Q, ./ ∈ {≥, >}, p ∈ [0, 1]}
[[Q]]∗ = {∗(t1, . . . , tn) | n ∈ N, ∀i : ti ∈ [[Q]]>}
[[Q]]
∗∨ = {∗∨(t1, . . . , tn) | n ∈ N, ∀i : ti ∈ [[Q]]>}
[[Q]] = [[Q]]∗ ∪ [[Q]]∗∨ 
160
Intuitively, Q is the set of states of a p-automaton and the transition
structure of state q ∈ Q (given by φ ∈ B+(Q ∪ [[Q]]) as defined below)
models a probabilistic path set. So [[q]]./p holds in location s of a Markov
chain if the measure of paths that begin in s and satisfy q is ./ p.
The operator ∗ is a novel probabilistic separation operator and ∗∨ is its
dual: for example ∗([[q1]]>p1 , [[q2]]≥p2) means q1 and q2 hold with probability
greater than p1 and greater than or equal to p2, respectively; and that the
sets supplying these probabilities are disjoint. Dually, ∗∨([[q1]]≥p1 , [[q2]]≥p2)
means that either
(i) there is i ∈ {1, 2} such that qi holds with probability at least pi or
(ii) the intersection of q1 and q2 holds with probability at least max(p1 +
p2 − 1, 0).
So ∗ and ∗∨model a “disjoint and” and “intersecting or” operator, respectively.
We may write [[q]]./p for ∗([[q]]./p) and similarly for ∗∨.
The dual nature of ∗ and ∗∨ is used explicitly in the dualisation of p-
automata in Section 6.3.1.
With this first intuitive understanding of ∗ and ∗∨ and the definition of
term sets in place, we have that an element of Q ∪ [[Q]] is either a state of a
p-automaton, a ∗ composition of terms [[qi]]./pi , or a ∗∨ composition of such
terms. Before we turn to the formal definition of p-automata, we define a
closure operator for formulae in B+(Q ∪ [[Q]]).
Definition 66 (Closure clp)
Given ϕ ∈ B+(Q ∪ [[Q]]), its closure clp(ϕ) is the set of all subformulae of ϕ
according to (6.1) of Definition 64. In particular, ∗(t1, t2) ∈ clp(ϕ) does not
imply t1, t2 ∈ clp(ϕ). For a set Φ of formulae, let clp(Φ) =
⋃
ϕ∈Φ clp(ϕ). 
Next we define p-automata.
Definition 67 (p-Automata)
A p-automaton A is a tuple 〈Σ, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉, with
• Σ a finite input alphabet;
• Q a set of states (not necessarily finite);
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• δ : Q× Σ→ B+(Q ∪ [[Q]]) a transition function;
• ϕin ∈ B+(Q ∪ [[Q]]) an initial condition; and
• α ⊆ Q an acceptance condition. 
The terms φ ∈ [[Q]] of a p-automaton are comparable to the q2 transi-
tions of alternating tree automata, in the sense that e.g. term [[q]]./p asserts
that q holds for all successor locations with an aggregated probability ./ p.
To stress this universal but probabilistic quantification and to stay in line
with the notation of alternating tree automata, one could explicitly write
[[q]]2./p. Since p-automata do not have an analogue to the 3-modality such a
superscript 2 is superfluous, and thus omitted in this thesis.
Example 50
Let A = 〈2{a,b}, {q1, q2}, δ, [[q1]]≥0.5, {q2}〉 be a p-automaton where δ is de-
fined by
δ(q1, {a, b}) = δ(q1, {a}) = q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5
δ(q2, {b}) = δ(q2, {a, b}) = [[q2]]≥0.5
δ(q1, {}) = δ(q1, {b}) = δ(q2, {}) = δ(q2, {a}) = ff
Term [[q2]]≥0.5 represents the recursive property φ, that atomic proposition
b holds at the location presently read by q2, and that φ will hold with
probability at least 0.5 in the next locations.1 State q1 asserts that it is
possible to get to a location that satisfies [[q2]]≥0.5 along a path that satisfies
atomic proposition a.2 The initial condition [[q1]]≥0.5 means the set of paths
satisfying aUφ has probability at least 0.5. 
In this thesis we restrict our attention to a variant of p-automata which
we call uniform weak. This restriction simplifies the presentation and allows
1Informally, b holds at the location read by q2 because the transition of q2 reading b is
not ff, i.e. δ(q2, {b}) 6= ff. We call [[q2]]≥0.5 a recursive property since the transition of
q2 reading b contains [[q2]]≥0.5 as condition again.
2Again informally, q1 makes an assertion about a path, i.e. a sequence of locations in a
Markov chain; it asserts that every location on this path satisfies a, i.e. δ(q1, {a, b}) =
δ(q1, {a}) = q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5 6= ff, and that the successor of such a location satisfies
the property asserted by q1 or satisfies [[q2]]≥0.5. Eventually a location that satisfies
[[q2]]≥0.5 must be reached as q1 /∈ α is not accepting.
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Jq2K≥ 12
q1 q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥ 12
q2
b
u
b
[[q1]]≥ 12
Figure 6.1: Graph GA of automaton A from Example 50.
us to define acceptance and simulation in terms of existing game notions.
The development of appropriate games for general p-automata is beyond the
scope of this thesis and will be addressed in future work.
As in the case of alternating tree automata, e.g. [84], acceptance for p-
automata is decided by solving an infinite 2-player game, respectively a
series of such games. In order to be able to decide acceptance of input for
p-automata through the solution of weak stochastic games, we restrict the
cycles in the transition graph of p-automata. In doing so, we differentiate
states q′ appearing within a term in [[Q]] (bounded transition) from q′ ap-
pearing “free” in the transition of a state q (unbounded transition). In this
way, a p-automaton A = 〈Σ, Q, δ, . . .〉 determines a labelled, directed graph
GA = 〈Q′, E,Eb, Eu〉:
Q′ = Q ∪ clp(δ(Q,Σ))
E = {(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕi), (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ϕi) | ϕi ∈ Q′ \Q} ∪
{q, δ(q, σ) | q ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σ}
Eu = {(ϕ ∧ q, q), (q ∧ ϕ, q), (ϕ ∨ q, q), (q ∨ ϕ, q) | ϕ ∈ Q′, q ∈ Q}
Eb = {(ϕ, q) | ϕ ∈ [[Q]] and q ∈ gs(ϕ)}
where gs(ϕ) is the set of guarded states of ϕ: all q′ ∈ Q occurring in some
term in ϕ. Elements (ϕ, q) ∈ Eu are unbounded transitions. Elements
(ϕ, q′) ∈ Eb are bounded transitions. Elements of E are called simple transi-
tions. We mark (ϕ, q) ∈ Eb with ∗ (and respectively with a ∗∨) if there is some
p ∈ [0, 1] for which [[q′]]./p occurs in ϕ within the scope of a ∗ (respectively
∗∨) operator. Note that E, Eu, and Eb are pairwise disjoint.
Let ϕ A ϕ˜ iff there is a finite path from ϕ to ϕ˜ in E ∪ Eb ∪ Eu. For
ϕ ∈ Q∪ clp(δ(Q,Σ)), let ((ϕ)) denote the equivalence class of ϕ according to
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Figure 6.2: A Markov chain M .
pre-order A. We denote this equivalence relation A ∩ A−1 as ≡. Each
equivalence class ((ϕ)) of ≡ is a SCC in the directed graph GA.
Definition 68
A p-automaton A is called uniform if:
• For each cycle in GA, its set of transitions is either in E ∪ Eb or in
E ∪ Eu.
• For each cycle in 〈Q,E ∪ Eb〉, its set of markings is either {}, {∗} or
{∗∨}, and so cannot be {∗, ∗∨}.
• There are only finitely many equivalence classes ((ϕ)) with ϕ ∈ Q ∪
clp(δ(Q,Σ)).
A (not necessarily uniform) p-automaton A is called weak if for all q ∈ Q,
either ((q)) ∩Q ⊆ α or ((q)) ∩ α = {}. 
Then, A is uniform, if the full subgraph of every equivalence class of ≡
contains only one type of non-simple transition and at most one kind of
marking ∗ or ∗∨. Also, all states q′ ∈ Q or formulae ϕ occurring in δ(q, σ)
for some q ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ can be classified as unbounded, bounded with ∗,
bounded with ∗∨, or simple – according to SCC ((q)).
Example 51
Figure 6.1 depicts GA for A of Example 50. p-automaton A is uniform:
• ((q1)) = {q1, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5} and ((q2)) = {q2, [[q2]]≥0.5};
• in ((q1)) there are no bounded edges, in ((q2)) there are no unbounded
edges; and
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• GA has no markings for ∗ or ∗∨.
• The SCC (([[q1]]≥0.5)) = {[[q1]]≥0.5} is trivial, i.e. it contains only a single
state.
In addition, A is weak as α = {q2}. 
Intuitively, the cycles in the structure of a uniform p-automaton A take ei-
ther no bounded edges or no unbounded edges, and cycles that take bounded
edges do not have both markings ∗ and ∗∨. Subsequently, all p-automata are
uniform weak unless mentioned otherwise. Uniformity allows to define ac-
ceptance of an input for a p-automaton A through the solution of weak
stochastic games. But it is a more relaxed notion of uniformity that really
drives the proof of well-definedness: any chain in the partial order on SCCs
on the graph of a p-automaton has only finitely many alternations between
bounded and unbounded SCCs.
The requirement of weakness is made merely to simplify the presentation.
Using a parity condition instead would still allow us to decide acceptance of
an input for uniform p-automaton A, by solving stochastic parity games.
6.2 Acceptance games
Let MCAP be the set of all Markov chains over AP. For AP, p-automata
A = 〈2AP, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉 have MCAP as set of inputs. For M = (S, sin) ∈ MCAP,
we exploit the uniform structure of A to reduce the decision of whether A
accepts M to solving a sequence of weak games and stochastic weak games.
Intuitively, unbounded cycles in GA correspond to weak stochastic games
and bounded cycles to weak games. The weak acceptance of A implies that
these games are weak. Then the language of A is
L(A) = {M ∈ MCAP | A accepts M} .
Just as in the case of acceptance games for alternating tree automata, all
states of A and all sub-formulae appearing in its transitions form part of the
acceptance games.
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For A as above, let
T = Q ∪ clp(δ(Q, 2AP)) .
Finite partial order (T/≡,≤A) has set {((t)) | t ∈ T} ordered by
((t)) ≤A ((t˜)) iff t˜ A t .
For M as above, each non-trivial ((t)) (i.e., there is a cycle in the subgraph
of ((t)) in GA) determines a game
GM,((t)) = ((V,E), (V0, V1, Vp), κ, α˜)
The construction is such that (sin, ϕin) occurs as configuration in exactly
one of these games GM,((t)), and val(sin, ϕin) ∈ [0, 1]. Then
A accepts M iff val(sin, ϕin) = 1 .
We define these games as follows. Since A is uniform weak, each ((t)) is
of one of three types and each type determines (at least) one weak game or
weak stochastic game as detailed in the four cases below. All game values
already computed for games GM,((t˜)) of SCCs ((t˜)) higher up with respect to
≤A (i.e. by induction) are used as pre-seeded values in GM,((t)). Below, we
write val(s, ϕ) = ⊥ for configurations (s, ϕ) in GM,((t)) whose game value has
not been computed yet.
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Case 1: For an SCC ((t)) such that none of its transitions are in Eb, game
GM,((t)) is a stochastic weak game with
V = {(s, t˜) | s ∈ S and t˜ A t}
V0 = {(s, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ∈ V }
V1 = {(s, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ∈ V }
Vp = (S ×Q) ∩ V
κ(s, q)(s′, δ(q, L(s))) = P (s, s′)
α˜ = V iff some state (equally, all states)
q in ((t)) is in α
α˜ = {} otherwise
and
E = {((s, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2), (s, ϕi)) ∈ V × V | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((s, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2), (s, ϕi)) ∈ V × V | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((s, q), (s′, δ(q, L(s)))) ∈ V × V | P (s, s′) > 0} .
By Theorem 1, for every configuration c ∈ V we have val0(c) ∈ [0, 1]. We
set val(c) = val0(c).
Case 2: Let ((t)) be a non-trivial SCC none of whose transitions are in Eu
and none have ∗∨ markings. For each formula ϕ ∈ ((t)) ∩ [[Q]]∗ of the form
∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn) we define, for each s ∈ S, sets V s,ϕ0 , V s,ϕ1 , and Es,ϕ
further below. Then
Vi =
⋃
s,ϕ
V s,ϕi
E =
⋃
s,ϕ
Es,ϕ
Vp = {}
α˜ = V iff some state (equally, all states)
q in ((t)) is in α
α˜ = {} otherwise
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defines the weak game GM,((t)). It remains to define V
s,ϕ
0 , V
s,ϕ
1 , and E
s,ϕ,
for which we make use of values val(s, t˜) already defined for all s ∈ S and
all t˜ 6∈ ((t)) with ((t)) ≤A ((t˜)).
As Succ(s) and δ(qi, L(s)) are finite, so are
Rs,ϕ =
n⋃
i=1
{(s′, ϕ′) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ′ ∈ clp(δ(qi, L(s)))}
vals,ϕ = {0, 1, val(s′, ϕ′) | (s′, ϕ′) ∈ Rs,ϕ, val(s′, ϕ′) 6= ⊥}
Intuitively, Rs,ϕ is the set of configurations reachable from (s, ϕ) using
one transition of a state in ϕ. Thus, s′ are the successors of s and ϕ′ are
subformulae of δ(qi, L(s)). Set vals,ϕ includes 0, 1, and values of configura-
tions in Rs,ϕ. In game GM,((t)), a play proceeding from (s, ϕ) reaches either
a configuration whose value is in vals,ϕ or a configuration (s, ψ) for ψ ∈ ((t)).
Before we formally define sets V s,ϕ0 , V
s,ϕ
1 and E
s,ϕ, and functions F∗s,ϕ, we
first give an intuitive description of the game.
The intuition behind this weak game is as follows: Configuration (s, ϕ)
means that the transition of each qi holds with probability ./i pi where the
sets Xi measured by these probabilities are pairwise disjoint. In order to
check that, given configuration (s, ϕ), Player 0 chooses a function f ∈ F∗s,ϕ
(formally defined below) that associates with location s′ ∈ Succ(s) and state
qi the value Player 0 can achieve playing from (s′, δ(qi, L(s))). The play
continues with Player 1 choosing a successor s′ of s and a state qi, and the
play then reaches configuration (s′, δ(qi, L(s)), f(i, s′)). From such value-
annotated configurations, Player 0 and Player 1 choose successors according
to the usual resolution of ∨ and ∧:
• In a configuration for which the value v was already determined, ei-
ther f(i, s′) ./i v, i.e. Player 0 achieved the promised value and wins
immediately; or Player 0 failed to achieve the promised value and loses
immediately.
• Otherwise, the play ends up in another configuration of the form (s′, ϕ′)
for ϕ′ ∈ [[Q]]∗ and the play continues and ignores the value f(i, s′) (as
obviously f(i, s′) ≤ 1). If the play continues ad infinitum, the winner
is determined according to acceptance condition α˜.
It remains to define sets V s,ϕ0 , V
s,ϕ
1 , and E
s,ϕ below. For n ∈ N, let
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[n] = {1, . . . , n}.
V s,ϕ0 = {(s, ϕ)} ∪
{(s′, ϕ′, v) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ′ ∈ Rs,ϕ, val(s′, ϕ′) 6= ⊥, val(s′, ϕ′) < v} ∪
{(s′, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, v) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Rs,ϕ, val(s′, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = ⊥}
V s,ϕ1 = {(s, ϕ, f) | f ∈ F∗s,ϕ} ∪
{(s′, ϕ′, v) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ′ ∈ Rs,ϕ, vals′ϕ′ 6= ⊥, val(s′, ϕ′) ≥ v} ∪
{(s′, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, v) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Rs,ϕ, val(s′, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = ⊥}
Es,ϕ = {((s, ϕ), (s, ϕ, f)) | f ∈ F∗s,ϕ} ∪
{((s′, ϕ′, v), (s′, ϕ′)) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ′ ∈ [[Q]]val(s′, ϕ′) = ⊥} ∪
{((s, ϕ, f), (s′, δ(qi, L(s)), f(i, s′))) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), i ∈ [n], f(i, s′) > 0} ∪
{((s′, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, v), (s′, ϕi, v)) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ∈ Rs,ϕ, i ∈ {1, 2},
val(s′, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = ⊥} ∪
{((s′, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, v), (s′, ϕi, v)) | s′ ∈ Succ(s), ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ Rs,ϕ, i ∈ {1, 2},
val(s′, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = ⊥}
We now define the function space F∗s,ϕ that captures terms built from the
separation operator ∗. Throughout, let X → Y be the set of total functions
from set X to set Y . Let Fs,ϕ be [n]× Succ(s)→ vals,ϕ, the set of functions
from pairs consisting of ‘sub-stars’ of ϕ and successors of s to values in vals,ϕ.
Definition 69 (Disjoint function)
A function f ∈ Fs,ϕ is disjoint if there are {ai,s′ ∈ [0, 1] | i ∈ [n] and s′ ∈
Succ(s)} such that
(i)
∑
s′∈Succ(s) ai,s′f(i, s
′)P (s, s′) ./i pi for all i ∈ [n]; and
(ii)
∑
i∈[n] ai,s′ = 1 for all s
′ ∈ Succ(s).
We denote by F∗s,ϕ the set of disjoint functions. 
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Intuitively, a function f ∈ Fs,ϕ associates with q1, . . . , qn and s′ the value
that Player 0 can achieve from configuration (s′, δ(qi, L(s))). We call f
“disjoint”, as all the requirements from the different qi can be achieved using
a partition of the probability of all successors.
By Theorem 1, V partitions into winning regions W0 and W1 of configu-
rations for Player 0 and Player 1, respectively. We set val(c) = 1 for c ∈W0
and val(c) = 0 for c ∈W1.
Case 3: Finally, let ((t)) be an SCC such that none of its transitions is
in Eu and none has ∗ markings. For formulae ϕ ∈ ((t)) ∩ [[Q]]∗∨ of form
∗∨([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn) we reuse the definitions of Rs,ϕ, vals,ϕ, and Fs,ϕ.
Weak game GM,((t)) is defined as in Case 2. Sets V
s,ϕ
0 , V
s,ϕ
1 , and E
s,ϕ are as
before except that functions f do not range over F∗s,ϕ but now range over
the set of intersecting functions (the dual of F∗s,ϕ of Case 2).
Definition 70 (Intersecting function)
A function f ∈ Fs,ϕ is intersecting if for all sets {ai,s′ ∈ [0, 1] | i ∈
[n] and s′ ∈ Succ(s)} either
(i) there is i ∈ [n] with ∑s′∈Succ(s) ai,s′f(i, s′)P (s, s′) ./i pi; or
(ii) there is s′ ∈ Succ(s) with ∑i∈[n] ai,s′ 6= 1.
We denote F ∗∨s,ϕ the set of intersecting functions. 
As in Case 2, we say that wins for Player 0 have value 1, and wins for
Player 1 have value 0.
The intuition for this weak game is the same as that of the weak game in
Case 2, except that Player 0 chooses a function f that is in F ∗∨s,ϕ instead of
in F∗s,ϕ.
We point out that when n above is 1, i.e. in handling ϕ = [[q1]]./1p1 ,
the definition of ∗ and ∗∨ coincide as then there is no difference between
a universal and an existential choice. Indeed, there is then exactly one
option for choosing {a1,s′ | s′ ∈ Succ(s)}: the value a1,s′ has to be 1 for all
s′ ∈ Succ(s). This justifies dropping the ∗ or ∗∨ when applied to one operand.
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s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
,
8<:s0→1s1→0
s2→1
9=;
s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
,
8<:s0→1s1→1
s2→1
9=;
s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
,
8<:s0→0s1→1
s2→1
9=;
s2, [[q2]]≥ 12
, {s2→1}
s1, ff, 1
s0, ff, 1
s2, ff, 1
s2, [[q2]]≥ 12
s1, [[q2]]≥ 12
s1, [[q2]]≥ 12
,

s1→1
s2→0
ff
s1, [[q2]]≥ 12
,

s1→1
s2→1
ff
s1, [[q2]]≥ 12
,

s1→0
s2→1
ff
s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
,
8<:s0→1s1→1
s2→0
9=;
Figure 6.3: Case 3 of acceptance game.
Case 4: Trivial SCCs ((t)), for which (((t)), E ∪ Eb ∪ Eu) is cycle-free,
may satisfy more than one of the three cases above. This ambiguity is
unproblematic as game values inGM,((t)) are then determined via propagation
of pre-seeded game values.
Example 52
We verifyM ∈ L(A) for A from Example 50 andM from Figure 6.2 on page
164, where propositions that hold at location s are written within that loca-
tion – e.g. L(s0) = {a}. The weak game of SCC ((q2)), shown in Figure 6.3,
has only accepting configurations. So Player 0 wins only (s1, [[q2]]≥0.5) and
(s1, [[q2]]≥0.5, {s1→1, s2→0}) and loses all other configurations.
The stochastic weak game GM,((q1)) for the SCC ((q1)), shown in Fig-
ure 6.4, depicts stochastic configurations with a diamond and configura-
tions from other SCCs are put into hexagons (with the hexagon labelled
(s1, [[q2]]≥0.5) having value 1 and all others having value 0). As none of
the configurations are accepting, Player 0 can only win by reaching opti-
mal hexagons. Hexagon (s1, [[q2]]≥0.5) has value 1 and is the optimal choice
for Player 0 from configuration (s1, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5). Player 0 configuration
(s2, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5) has value 0. So the value for Player 0 of diamond config-
uration (s0, q1) is 0.5. Initial configuration (s0, [[q1]]≥0.5) makes up a trivial
bounded SCC (e.g. Case 2), so its value equals 1 as 13val(s0, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5) +
1
3val(s1, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5)+ 13val(s2, q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥0.5) is 0.5. Therefore,M ∈ L(A).
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1
3s0, q1
s2, q1
s1, q1
s1, ffs2, ff
s2
s1
s0
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥ 12
q2 ∨ [[q2]]≥ 12
q1 ∨ [[q2]]≥ 12
s1, [[q1]]≥ 12
s1, [[q1]]≥ 12
s0, [[q2]]≥ 12
Figure 6.4: Case 1 of acceptance game.
Theorem 6
Given a p-automaton A with alphabet 2AP, its language L(A) is well defined.
If A and M ∈ MCAP are finite with size |A| and |M | respectively, M ∈ L(A)
can be decided in EXPTIME with regard to |A|+ |M |.  
Proof
Well definedness of acceptance follows directly from Theorem 1. For finite
Markov chain M and finite p-automaton A we observe the following:
• The stochastic weak game arising from the combination of a Markov
chain M and an unbounded SCC can be solved in NP ∩ co-NP.
• The weak game arising from the combination of Markov chain M and
a bounded SCC can be solved in linear time but may have exponential
size due to the number of possible disjoint and intersecting functions f .
Thus, membership M ∈ L(A) is decidable by a sequence of weak games
and stochastic weak games, which can be solved in EXPTIME with regard
to |A|+ |M |. 
For finite Markov chains M and p-automaton A, checking acceptance
M ∈ L(A) is exponential in the branching degree of M and ∗ operators of
A, but not in the number of states or locations. If A has only trivial bounded
SCCs, checking M ∈ L(A) reduces to solving a linear number of linear sized
stochastic weak games.
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The EXPTIME complexity of the acceptance game is certainly a draw-
back for the practical application of p-automata for probabilistic verification.
The complexity of PCTL model checking for example is polynomial. But as
we show in Theorem 9 below, at least for a certain class of p-automata, i.e.
the ones which correspond to PCTL formulae, the complexity of p-automata
acceptance matches the complexity of PCTL model checking. There might
be other interesting classes of p-automata for which the EXPTIME com-
plexity of acceptance can be improved. In fact, we do not yet know whether
or not the EXPTIME bound is optimal even for the most general case of
p-automata.
6.3 Expressiveness of p-automata
To address the main research question of this thesis, i.e. the PCTL complete-
ness problem, p-automata need to fulfill certain expressiveness requirements.
In particular we would like to be able to phrase the completeness question
fully within the p-automata formalism. In this section we therefore show
the following properties of p-automata:
(i) the languages of p-automata are closed under Boolean operations;
(ii) the languages of p-automata are closed under bisimulation;
(iii) emptiness and containment of languages are inter-reducible;
(iv) every Markov chain determines a p-automaton whose language is the
bisimulation class of that Markov chain; and
(v) every PCTL formula determines a p-automaton whose language con-
sists of all Markov chains satisfying that formula.
6.3.1 Closure of languages
It is routine to see that p-automata are closed under union and intersection.
They are also closed under complementation: Given a p-automaton A =
〈Σ, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉, its dual is
dual(A) = 〈Σ, Q, δ, dual(ϕin), Q \ α〉
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with Q = {q | q ∈ Q} and δ(q, σ) = dual(δ(q, σ)), where dual(ϕ) is defined
as follows:
dual(∗∨(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ∗(dual(ϕ1), . . . , dual(ϕn))
dual(∗(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ∗∨(dual(ϕ1), . . . , dual(ϕn))
dual(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = dual(ϕ1) ∨ dual(ϕ2)
dual(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = dual(ϕ1) ∧ dual(ϕ2)
dual(q) = q
dual(q) = q
dual([[q]]./p) = [[q]]dual(./p)
dual(≥p) = >1− p
dual(>p) = ≥1− p
The structure of uniform weak p-automata ensures that dual(A) is also uni-
form weak. We identify q with q and so dual(dual(A)) = A follows. The class
of uniform weak p-automata is thus closed under dualisation, which is im-
portant for this thesis, as we restrict ourselves to uniform weak p-automata.
We now show that A and dual(A) are complements.
Theorem 7
Let A be a p-automaton A over 2AP. Then L(A) = MCAP \ L(dual(A)).  
The key part of the proof for that theorem is to show that, for every state
q of A and every location s of M , we have val(s, q) = 1 − val(s, q) for the
acceptance games.
Proof
We prove a stronger claim, namely that for every s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ clp(δ(Q),Σ)
we have
val(s, ϕ) = 1− val(s, dual(ϕ))
The proof is by induction on the structure of the automaton. Consider an
equivalence class ((t)) in A. Assume by induction that the claim holds for
all the SCCs in A that are greater than ((t)).
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• If ((t)) is a trivial SCC, the lemma follows from the dualisation and the
duality of min and max.
• Suppose that ((t)) is a nontrivial SCC and that all transitions in ((t))
are unbounded. Then, the lemma follows from the dualisation and the
determinacy of stochastic weak games.
• Suppose that ((t)) is a nontrivial SCC and that no transition in ((t)) is
in the scope of ∗∨. It follows that ((dual(t))) is also a nontrivial SCC
and that no transition in ((dual(t))) is in the scope of ∗.
Given a strategy for Player 0 in GM,((t)), we show how to construct
a strategy for Player 1 in GM,((dual(t))). The two strategies produce
plays that are always in the same locations of the Markov chain M
and same states of the automaton A (modulo dualisation t 7→ dual(t)).
For simplicity we denote GM,((t)) by G and GM,((dual(t))) by G.
Consider two matching configurations (s, ϕ) and (s, dual(ϕ)) in G and
G. Let ϕ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn), where n > 1. Consider the con-
figuration (s, dual(ϕ)). By playing for Player 1 in G we make Player 0
‘reveal’ her strategy in G and using her strategy we react to the moves
of Player 0 in G by constructing a strategy for Player 1 in G.
Consider two plays ending in (s, ϕ) and (s, dual(ϕ)). Let f : [n] ×
Succ(s) → vals,ϕ be the function chosen by Player 0 in G and let
f ′ : [n] × Succ(s) → vals,dual(ϕ) be the function chosen by Player 0 in
G. By definition there are {ai,s′} that witness the disjointness of f
and for every i we have∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · P (s, s′) · f(i, s′) ./i pi.
By using the same {ai,s′} stemming from the fact that f ′ is intersecting,
we get that there is some i such that∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · P (s, s′) · f ′(i, s′)dual(./i)1− pi.
It follows that there is an s′ ∈ Succ(s) such that f(i, s′) + f ′(i, s′) > 1.
It is now Player 1’s turn to move in both G and G. In G we make
Player 1 choose (s′, δ(qi, L(s)), f(i, s′)) and the strategy for Player 1
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in G is extended by (s′, dual(δ(qi, L(s))), f ′(i, s′)). We now proceed by
utilising the duality between ∨ and ∧ to use Player 0’s choices in G
to suggest moves for Player 1 in G and use Player 0’s strategy in G to
suggest how to extend the strategy for Player 1 in G.
Suppose that we reach configurations
(s′, ϕ′, f(i, s′)) and (s′, dual(ϕ′), f ′(i, s′))
such that
val(s′, ϕ′) 6= ⊥ and val(s′, dual(ϕ′)) 6= ⊥ .
Then, by assumption val(s′, ϕ′) = 1 − val(s′, dual(ϕ′)) and thus if
val(s′, ϕ′) ≥ f(s′) it must be the case that val(s′, dual(ϕ′)) < f ′(s′).
If we do not reach such configurations, the game proceeds to a new
configuration in S × [[Q]]. If the two plays are infinite, then by the
duality of α and Q \ α if Player 0 wins the play in G then Player 1
wins the play in G.
Showing that a win of Player 1 in G is translated to a win of Player 0
in G is similar, and so omitted.
• The case that ((t)) is a nontrivial SCC and that some transitions in
((q)) are in scope of ∗∨ is similar, and so omitted. 
Corollary 4
1. The set of languages accepted by p-automata over 2AP is closed under
Boolean operations.
2. Language containment of p-automata over 2AP reduces to language
emptiness of such p-automata, and vice versa.  
Proof
1. Showing that these languages are closed under intersections and unions
is trivial because the transition function includes conjunction and dis-
junction. By Theorem 7, these languages are closed under comple-
ments.
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2. Given two p-automata A1 and A2, we have
L(A1) ⊆ L(A2) iff L(A1) ∩ L(dual(A2)) = {} .
Therefore, checking language containment reduces to checking lan-
guage emptiness, as p-automata are closed under intersection. Con-
versely, we can construct a p-automaton E such that L(E) = {}. The
language of A is empty iff L(A) ⊆ L(E). 
Next we show that languages of p-automata are closed under bisimulation.
Lemma 14
For p-automaton A = 〈2AP, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉 and M1,M2 ∈ MCAP with M1 ∼M2:
M1 ∈ L(A) iff M2 ∈ L(A).  
To prove this, we use induction on the partial order on the SCCs in A to
show that for all t ∈ Q∪ [[Q]] and for all locations s1 in M1 and locations s2
in M2 with s1 ∼ s2 we have val(s1, t) = val(s2, t).
Proof
Let Mi = (Si,Pi, Li, sini ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, with the same set of labels AP. Let
A = 〈Σ, Q, δ, [[q0]]./p, α〉, where Σ = 2AP. Let ∼ ⊆ S1 × S2 be the maximal
bisimulation between M1 and M2.
We show that for every state q ∈ Q and locations s1 ∈ S1, and s2 ∈ S2
such that s1 ∼ s2, we have val(s1, q) = val(s2, q). We prove this claim by
induction on the partial order on the SCCs in A. Suppose that the claim
holds for all SCCs greater than ((q)) in the partial order. Consider the games
GM1,((q)) andGM2,((q)). Consider a winning strategy σ for Player 0 inGM1,((q)).
We show how this is also a winning strategy for Player 0 in GM2,((q)).
Consider a play in an unbounded SCC ((q)). We build by induction a play
in GM1,((q)) and a play in GM2,((q)) with the invariant that the plays end in
configurations of the form (s1, t) and (s2, t) such that s1 ∼ s2. Clearly, the
initial configuration in both games satisfies this invariant. We show how
to extend the play to maintain this invariant. If t is of the form ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
and Player 1 chooses ϕi in GM2,((q)), then we emulate the same choice in
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GM1,((q)). If t is of the form ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, then σ instructs Player 0 to choose ϕi
in GM1,((q)) and we emulate the same choice in GM2,((q)). If t is of the form q
′
for some state q′ ∈ Q then choices in (s1, q′) and (s2, q′) are resolved by the
stochastic player. As s1 ∼ s2 the successors of s1 and s2 can be partitioned
to equivalence classes such that for each equivalence class C1 in M1 and
C2 in M2 we have P1(s1, C1) = P2(s2, C2). Consider now the probability
measure of plays in GM1,((q)) and GM2,((q)) that are winning according to this
composed strategy. The plays can be partitioned according to bisimulation
equivalence classes and every choice has the same weight. It follows that the
probability measure of winning plays is identical in both games.
Consider a play in a bounded SCC ((q)) where no transition uses ∗∨. Dis-
junctions and conjunctions are handled as above. Consider a pair of config-
urations
(s1, t) and (s2, t)
where s1 ∼ s2 and t is of the form
∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn) .
Let f1 be the function chosen by Player 0 in GM1,((q)). As s1 ∼ s2, we can
find a function f2 such that for every s′2 we have f2(i, s′2) = f1(i, s′1) for some
s′1 ∼ s′2 that satisfies the requirement of the game. Next, Player 1 chooses
a state s′ ∈ Succ(s2) and a state qi. The same choice can be mimicked
in GM1,((q)). As s1 ∼ s2, it follows that L(s1) = L(s2) and the automaton
component in both configurations remains the same.
The treatment of a play in a bounded SCC ((q)) where some transitions
use ∗∨ is similar, and so omitted. 
6.3.2 Embedding of Markov chains
A Markov chain M = (S,P, L, sin) ∈ MCAP can be converted into a p-
automaton
AM = 〈2AP, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉
whose language L(AM ) is the set of Markov chains bisimilar to M . The
definition of AM implicitly appeals in ∗ expressions to an enumeration of
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each set Succ(s′):
Q = {(s, s′) ∈ S × S | P (s, s′) > 0}
δ((s, s′), L(s)) = ∗([[(s′, s′′)]]≥P (s′,s′′) | s′′ ∈ Succ(s′))
δ((s, s′), σ) = ff if σ 6= L(s)
ϕin = ∗([[(sin, s′)]]≥P (sin,s′) | P (sin, s) > 0)
α = Q
State (s, s′) represents the transition from s to s′. Labels are compared for
location s. Location s′ is used to require that there be successors of proba-
bility at least P (s, s′). This p-automaton AM has only bounded transitions
and uses only the ∗ operator. In particular, it is uniform weak.
Theorem 8
For any Markov chain M ∈ MCAP, the language L(AM ) is the bisimulation
equivalence class of M .  
By Lemma 14, one half of Theorem 8 follows from a proof that AM accepts
M . To show this, it suffices to demonstrate that Player 0 can infinitely often
reach configurations of the form (s, ∗([[(s, s′)]]≥P (s,s′))) with s′ ∈ Succ(s) for
all locations s in M . For the other half, we use proof by contradiction:
givenM ′ with initial state tin such thatM ′ 6∼M , we appeal to the partition
refinement algorithm to get a coarsest partition that witnesses sin 6∼ tin.
That witnessing information can then be transformed into a winning strategy
for Player 1 in the acceptance game for deciding M ′ ∈ L(AM ), and so
M ′ 6∈ L(AM ) follows.
Proof
1. By Lemma 14, we know that M ′ ∼ M implies M ′ ∈ L(AM ) as soon
as we have that M ∈ L(AM ). To simplify the proof of M ∈ L(AM ),
we assume that all locations of M are in one SCC. (The general case
follows by induction on the reachability order of SCCs.)
Consider a location s ∈ S and (s, s′) ∈ Q. Let ϕs = ∗([[(s, s′)]]≥P (s,s′) |
s′ ∈ Succ(s)). We show that from a configuration of the form (s, ϕs),
Player 0 has a strategy that keeps returning to configurations of this
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form. As α = Q, Player 0 can continue playing forever and wins. We
start from the configuration (s, ϕs). Let
ϕs = ∗([[(s, s1)]]≥P (s,s1), . . . , [[(s, sn)]]≥P (s,sn)) .
Then Player 0 chooses the function f : [n] × Succ(s) → {0, 1} such
that f(i, s′) = 1 iff si = s′. The trivial assignment ai,s′ = 1 iff
si = s′ shows that f is disjoint. Then, Player 1 chooses a succes-
sor (si, δ((s, si), L(s)), 1). As δ((s, si), L(s)) = ϕsi the claim follows
and Player 0 has a strategy to continue the play forever.
The initial configuration in the game is
∗([[(sin, s′)]]≥P (sin,s′) | s′ ∈ Succ(sin)) .
The same intuition as above shows that this is winning for Player 0 as
well.
2. Conversely, if M ′ 6∼ M we show that M ′ 6∈ L(AM ). Let M =
(S,P, L, sin) and M ′ = (T,P, L, tin). To simplify notations we as-
sume that S ∩ T = {} and use P and L for the probability matrix
and labelling function of both Markov chains. We use the partition
refinement algorithm that computes the bisimulation equivalence sets
for a Markov chain. Let
Ξ0 = {S′ ⊆ S ∪ T | ∀s, s′ ∈ S′ : L(s) = L(s′) and S′ is maximal} .
Clearly, Ξ0 is a partition of S ∪ T . Let Ξi+1 be the coarsest partition
of S ∪ T that refines Ξi and in addition for every G ∈ Ξi+1, for every
s, s′ ∈ G, and for every G′ ∈ Ξi we have P (s,G′) = P (s′, G′). It is
well known that if s 6∼ s′ there is some is,s′ such that s and s′ belong
to different sets in Ξis,s′ [60].
3
By assumption, sin 6∼ tin. Let i0 be minimal such that sin and tin are
in different sets in Ξi0 . Denote si0 = sin, ti0 = tin, ϕi0 = ϕin, and
3As our Markov chains have only finite branching, it is enough to consider is,s′ ∈ N.
Otherwise, we would need to use transfinite induction.
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ci0 = (ti0 , ϕi0). Consider the configuration cij = (tij , ϕij ), where
ϕij = ∗
s′∈Succ(sij )
[[(sij , s
′)]]≥P (sij ,s′)
and sij and tij are in different sets in Ξij . We show that from config-
uration cij Player 1 either wins immediately or finds a similar config-
uration for ij+1 < ij .
If ij = 0, then L(tij ) 6= L(sij ). Regardless of the immediate choices of
Player 0, we have δ((sij , s′), L(tij )) = ff and Player 1 wins.
Otherwise, ij > 0. By assumption, there is some ij+1 < ij and G ∈
Ξij+1 such that P (sij , G) 6= P (ti0 , G). Without loss of generality we
assume that P (sij , G) > P (tij , G). Indeed, if P (sij , G) < P (tij , G),
then as P (sij , S) = 1 there must be a different set G′ ∈ Ξij+1 such
that P (sij , G′) > P (tij , G′).
Let Sij+1 = G ∩ S. Let (tij , ϕij , f) be the configuration chosen by
Player 0. By disjointness of f , and as P (tij , G) < P (sij , G), there
must be a location sij+1 ∈ G and a location tij+1 /∈ G such that
f(tij+1 , sij+1) > 0. Player 1 chooses cij+1 = (tij+1 , ϕij+1 , v), where
ϕij+1 = δ((sij , sij+1), L(tij )). As tij+1 /∈ G, Player 1 has forced the
game to a similar configuration with ij+1 < ij and eventually wins by
reaching Ξ0. 
The construction of AM is the only reason why we allow p-automata
with infinite state sets. Finite sets Q suffice for finite Markov chains. The
conjunctive operator ∗ used in the construction of AM effectively hides an
exponential blowup. If a Markov chain is label-deterministic (all successors
s′ of location s disagree on their labellings), we can eliminate the use of ∗ in
AM and still secure Theorem 8. But this embedding without ∗ does break
Theorem 8 for Markov chains which are not label-deterministic (as is shown
in Section 6.5 below).
6.3.3 Embedding of PCTL formulae
Each PCTL formula φ over AP yields a p-automaton Aφ, without ∗markings,
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Aφ = 〈2AP, clt(φ) ∪ AP, ρX, ρ(φ), F 〉
that accepts exactly those Markov chains which satisfy φ. The construction
resembles the translation from CTL to alternating tree automata:
• clt(φ) denotes the set of temporal subformulae of φ;
• F consists of AP and all ψ of clt(φ) not of the form ψ1 Uψ2;
• transition function ρX unfolds fixpoints and replaces the threshold con-
text [·]./p with [[·]]./p. That replacement is also done by function ρ for
the initial condition. The effect of these functions is similar to that
achieved by using  transitions to translate CTL formulae into two-way
tree automata. Function ρX and auxiliary function ρ are defined at
follows:
ρX(a, σ) = tt if a ∈ σ
ρX(a, σ) = ff if a /∈ σ
ρX(¬a, σ) = tt if a /∈ σ
ρX(¬a, σ) = ff if a ∈ σ
ρX(Xϕ1, σ) = ρ(ϕ1)
ρX(ϕ1 Uϕ2, σ) = (ρ(ϕ1) ∧ ϕ1 Uϕ2) ∨ ρ(ϕ2)
ρX(ϕ1 Wϕ2, σ) = (ρ(ϕ1) ∧ ϕ1 Wϕ2) ∨ ρ(ϕ2)
ρ(a) = a
ρ(¬a) = ¬a
ρ(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = ρ(ϕ1) ∨ ρ(ϕ2)
ρ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = ρ(ϕ1) ∧ ρ(ϕ2)
ρ([Xϕ1]./p) = [[Xϕ1]]./p
ρ([ϕ1 Uϕ2]./p) = (ρ(ϕ1) ∧ [[ϕ1 Uϕ2]]./p) ∨ ρ(ϕ2)
ρ([ϕ1 Wϕ2]./p) = (ρ(ϕ1) ∧ [[ϕ1 Wϕ2]]./p) ∨ ρ(ϕ2)
We have ψ ∈ clt(φ) for subformulae [ψ]./p of φ. Also, [ψ1 Uψ2]./p may
be an element in clt(φ) whereas [[ψ1 Uψ2]]./p can only be an element of
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[[clt(φ)]]> = {[[ψ]]./p | ψ ∈ clt(φ), ./ ∈ {≥, >}, p ∈ [0, 1]}; it wraps ψ1 Uψ2 in
the probabilistic quantification [[·]]./p of Aφ.
Theorem 9
For every PCTL formula φ over AP and all M ∈ MCAP, we have M |= φ iff
M ∈ L(Aφ). Deciding M ∈ L(Aφ) is polynomial in the size of M and linear
in the size of φ.  
The above result is optimal as it matches the lower complexity bound of
PCTL model checking [88].
The proof of Theorem 9 uses structural induction on PCTL formulae
(i.e., state formulae) to show that for all locations s in M and all PCTL
sub-formulae ϕ′ of PCTL formula ϕ we have s ∈ Jϕ′K iff val(s, ρ(ϕ′)) = 1
for configuration (s, ρ(ϕ′)) in the acceptance game for decidingM ∈ L(Aϕ).
As for the complexity, the membership game for M ∈ L(Aφ) collapses to
solving a sequence (linear in the size of φ) of weak stochastic games with
solely probabilistic configurations. Such games are solvable in polynomial
time, see e.g. [50].
Proof
We prove
For every location s of M and subformula ϕ′ of ϕ we have s |=M
ϕ′ iff the configuration (s, ρ(ϕ′)) has value 1 for Player 0 in the
acceptance game of Aϕ on M .
by induction on the structure of the formula. For a proposition a, notice that
the value of (s, a) depends on the values of (s′, ρX(a, L(s))) for successors
s′ of s. By definition, ρX(a, L(s)) = tt if a ∈ L(s) and ff otherwise. The
claim holds similarly for negated propositions, and by induction on Boolean
combinations of formulae.
Consider a subformula of the form ϕ′ = [Xψ]./p. By induction s′ |=M
ψ iff the configuration (s′, ρ(ψ)) is winning for Player 0. By definition
ρ([Xψ]./p) = [[Xψ]]./p. Consider the function f : [1]× Succ(s)→ [0, 1] such
that f(1, s′) = 1 iff val(s′, ρ(ψ)) = 1. By assumption,∑
s′∈Succ(s)
f(1, s′)val(s′, ρ(ψ)) ./ p .
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The claim follows.
Consider a formula of the form ϕ′ = [ψ1 Uψ2]./p. By induction s |=M
ψi iff the configuration (s, ρ(ψi)) is winning for Player 0, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Consider the stochastic weak game induced by the SCC of ψ1 Uψ2 in the
structure of Aϕ. The optimal strategy for both players is memoryless and
pure. Restricting our attention to these memoryless pure strategies we can
think about the game as restricted to configurations of the form (s′, ρ(ψ1)),
where all configurations are probabilistic. A play that is winning for Player 0
is exactly a play that remains in states s′ such that s′ |=M ψ1 until reaching
states s′′ such that s′′ |=M ψ2 (as ψ1 Uψ2 is “unfair”). It follows that the value
of (s, ψ1 Uψ2) in the stochastic game is exactly Prob(s, ψ1 Uψ2). Finally,
ρ([ψ1 Uψ2]./p) = ρ(ψ1) ∧ [[ψ1 Uψ2]]./p ∨ ρ(ψ2) .
Consider a location s and the configuration (s, ρ([ψ1 Uψ2]./p)). If config-
uration (s, ρ(ψ2)) is winning for Player 0, then clearly (s, ρ([ψ1 Uψ2]./p))
is winning as well. Otherwise, by assumption s |= [ψ1 Uψ2]./p, so it must
be the case that s |= ψ1. It follows that Player 0 can choose the disjunct
ρ(ψ1) ∧ [[ψ1 Uψ2]]./p. Furthermore, the function f : [1] × Succ(s) → [0, 1]
that associates val(s′, ψ1 Uψ2) with s′ is disjoint. The claim follows.
The treatment of a formula of the form ϕ′ = [ψ1 Wψ2]./p is similar, and
so omitted.
The treatment of bounded strong Until and of bounded weak Until is a
variant of the above cases, and so omitted. 
Example 53
For ϕ = [aU[X b]>0.5]≥0.3 we have
Aϕ = 〈2{a,b}, clt(ϕ) ∪ {a, b}, ρX, ρ(ϕ), F 〉
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where
clt(ϕ) = {aU[X b]>0.5,X b}
ρ(ϕ) = (a ∧ [[aU[X b]>0.5]]≥0.3) ∨ [[X b]]>0.5
F = {X b, a, b}
ρX(X b) = b
ρX(aU[X b]>0.5) = (a ∧ aU[X b]>0.5) ∨ [[X b]]>0.5 . 
Corollary 4 and Theorem 9 imply that any algorithm for solving language
emptiness or containment of p-automata would prove that satisfiability of
PCTL is decidable. Decidability of PCTL satisfiability is a well-known open
problem [90, 30]. Therefore we can not expect that e.g. language emptiness of
p-automata will be solved easily. On the other hand, for solving the language
emptiness problem for p-automata one might be able to take advantage of
the powerful techniques that were developed in automata theory. Thus the
above results could open a new line of attack to the long-standing problem
of PCTL satisfiability.
For p-automata which correspond to qualitative PCTL, i.e. a PCTL frag-
ment for which satisfiability is known to be decidable [30], language empti-
ness should be decidable, too. A proof for this conjecture is part of the
future work suggested in Section 7.3.
In comparing automata and temporal logic, automata usually can count
but temporal logics cannot. Thus, just as alternating tree automata are
more expressive than CTL and CTL*, p-automata are more expressive than
PCTL. We show that p-automata are more expressive than PCTL, using an
adaptation of the known result by Pierre Wolper showing that LTL cannot
count [181].
Let AW = 〈2{a,b}, {q0, q1}, δ, [[q0]]>0, {}〉 be a p-automaton with transition
function δ as follows:
δ(q0, {b}) = δ(q1, {b}) = δ(q0, {a, b}) = δ(q1, {a, b}) = tt
δ(q0, {a}) = [[q1]]>0
δ(q0, {}) = ff
δ(q1, {}) = δ(q1, {a}) = [[q0]]>0
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Lemma 15
Every Markov chain M ∈ L(AW ) has a finite path s0s1 . . . sn with n > 1
such that b ∈ L(sn) and for all 0 ≤ i < n, either i is odd or a ∈ L(si).  
We do not prove formally that L(AW ) 6= L(Aφ) for all PCTL formulae
φ over {a, b}. However, as the path from Lemma 15 is finite, its existence
is equivalent to the probability of such a path being greater than 0. Thus,
if it were possible to express this property in PCTL it would be possible to
express it in CTL as well.
First we note that as both q0 and q1 are not fair, a winning play for
Player 0 has to be finite and end with a transition that reads b. Before
reaching b a winning play includes moves of the following form:
• Going from configurations of the form (s2i, [[q0]]>0) to configurations
(s2i+1, [[q1]]>0) such that P (s2i, s2i+1) > 0 and a ∈ L(s2i).
• Going from configurations of the form (s2i+1, [[q1]]>0) to configurations
(s2i+2, [[q0]]>0) such that P (s2i+1, s2i+2) > 0.
This implies the existence of a path as required.
Additionally, p-automata can encode recursive, probabilistic properties
that we believe to be not expressible in PCTL. For example,
AR = 〈2{a}, {q1}, δ, [[q1]]>0, {q1}〉
with δ(q1, {a}) = [[q1]]≥0.5 and δ(q1, {}) = ff, asserts the recursive, proba-
bilistic property that a location is labelled a, and that the probability of
its successors with the same property is at least 0.5. A naive attempt of
expressing this in PCTL would be η = a ∧ [(¬a ∨ [X a]≥0.5) W¬a]≥1. Then
L(Aη) ⊂ L(AR) but this inclusion is strict.
6.4 Simulation of p-automata
We now define simulation of p-automata as a combination of fair simulation
[92], simulation for alternating word automata [79], probabilistic bisimula-
tion [131], and the games defined in Section 6.1. This simulation takes into
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account the structure of p-automata, their acceptance condition and local
probabilistic constraints. It under-approximates language containment: if
p-automaton B simulates p-automaton A (denoted A ≤ B), then L(A) is
contained in L(B), under qualifications detailed in the formal theorem be-
low. We furthermore show that whether B simulates A can be decided in
EXPTIME.
We define simulation through a series of gamesG≤ on the product of states
and transitions of A and B: state u of B simulates state r of A iff Player 0
wins from configuration (r, u) in the corresponding game. More general
configurations (α, β) are such that α is part of a transition of A and β is part
of a transition of B. The classification of α and β as unbounded, bounded
with ∗, bounded with ∗∨, or simple classifies (α, β) as one of 9 types. Here,
we restrict our attention to the case that A and B do not use the ∗∨ operator.
Furthermore, a state that is part of a bounded SCC in B cannot simulate
a state that is part of an unbounded SCC in A. These restrictions lead to
the consideration of five cases, and are sufficient for handling simulation of
automata that result from embedding PCTL formulae or Markov chains.
For sake of simplicity, p-automata
A = 〈Σ, Q, δ, ϕina , F 〉 and B = 〈Σ, U, δ, ψinb , F 〉
satisfy Q∩U = {} and we use δ for the transition function of both automata
and F for both acceptance conditions. We determine whether B simulates
A by a sequence of weak and stochastic weak games.
The strict versions of the partial orders on equivalence classes of A and
B are well-founded and so their lexicographical ordering is a well-founded
ordering ≺ on the sets of configurations of the game. Namely, (((ϕ)), ((ψ))) ≺
(((ϕ˜)), ((ψ˜))) if either ((ϕ)) ≺A ((ϕ˜)) or (((ϕ)) = ((ϕ˜)) and ((ψ)) ≺B ((ψ˜))).
Consider a pair of equivalence classes (((ϕ)), ((ψ))), where ϕ is in A and ψ
is in B. As before, all pairs larger than (((ϕ)), ((ψ))) with respect to ≺ have
already been handled: for every ϕ′ and ψ′ with (((ϕ)), ((ψ)) ≺ (((ϕ′)), ((ψ′))))
value val(ϕ′, ψ′) 6= ⊥ is pre-seeded.
Case 1: Let ((ϕ)) and ((ψ)) be SCCs where ((ϕ)) has no transitions in Eb,
and ((ψ)) no transitions in Eu and no ∗∨ markings. We set val(ϕ,ψ) = 0;
bounded-with-∗ states cannot simulate unbounded states.
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Case 2: Let ((ϕ)) and ((ψ)) be SCCs such that both ((ϕ)) and ((ψ)) have no
transitions in Eb. Then G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) is a stochastic weak game with
V = {(ϕ˜, ψ˜) | ϕ˜ A ϕ and ψ˜ B ψ} Vp = {}
where V0, V1, and E are defined as follows:
V0 = {c ∈ V | ∃ϕi, ψi : c = (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ψ1 ∨ ψ2)} ∪
{c ∈ V | ∃q′ : c = (q′, ψ1 ∨ ψ2), or ∃u′ : c = (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, u′)}
V1 = {c ∈ V | ∃q′, u′ : c = (q′, u′)} ∪
{c ∈ V | ∃ϕi, ψ : c = (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ψ), or ∃ϕ,ψi : c = (ϕ,ψ1 ∧ ψ2)}
E = {((q′, u′), (δ(q′, σ), δ(u′, σ))) ∈ V × V | σ ∈ Σ} ∪
{((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, ψ), (ϕi, ψ)), ((ϕ,ψ1 ∧ ψ2), (ϕ,ψi)) ∈ V × V | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ψ2 ∨ ψ2), (ϕi, ψj)) ∈ V × V | i, j ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, u′), (ϕi, u′)), ((q′, ψ1 ∨ ψ2), (q′, ψi)) ∈ V × V | i ∈ {1, 2}}
As pre-seeded values val(ϕ˜, ψ˜) for configurations (ϕ˜, ψ˜) with (((ϕ)), ((ψ))) ≺
(((ϕ˜)), ((ψ˜))) may be in the open interval (0, 1), we treat G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) as a
stochastic weak game.
Intuitively, Player 1 resolves disjunctions on the left and conjunctions on
the right and does this before Player 0 needs to move. Player 0 resolves
conjunctions on the left and disjunctions on the right when Player 1 cannot
move. From configurations of the form (q′, u′), where q′ is a state of A and
u′ is a state of B, Player 1 chooses a letter σ ∈ Σ and applies the transitions
of q′ and u′ reading σ.
Finally, an infinite play in G≤(((q)), ((u))) is winning for Player 0 if ((ϕ))∩
Q ⊆ F implies ((ψ)) ∩ U ⊆ F .
By Theorem 1 every configuration c has a value for Player 0. We set val(c)
to that value.
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Case 3: Let ((ϕ)) and ((ψ)) be SCCs such that both have neither transitions
in Eu nor ∗∨ markings. Then G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) is a weak game. Let
ϕ˜ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn)
ψ˜ = ∗([[u1]]./′1p′1 , . . . , [[um]]./′mp′m)
Fϕ˜,ψ˜ = [n]× [m]→ [0, 1]
Also, f ∈ Fϕ˜,ψ˜ is disjoint if there is {ai,j ∈ [0, 1] | i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]} with
(a)
∑
j∈[m] ai,j = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and (b)
∑
i∈[n] ai,j · pi · f(i, j) > p′j for
all j ∈ [m], or ∑i∈[n] ai,j · pi · f(i, j) = p′j and either ./′j is ≥ or there is i′
with ai′,j > 0 and ./i′ is >. Let F∗ϕ˜,ψ˜ be the set of disjoint functions. The
configurations of G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) are
V = {(ϕ˜, ψ˜, f) | ϕ˜ ∈ ((ϕ)), ψ˜ ∈ ((ψ)), and f ∈ F∗
ϕ˜,ψ˜
} ∪
{(ϕ˜, ψ˜), (ϕ˜, ψ˜, v) | ϕ˜ A ϕ, ψ˜ B ψ, and v ∈ [0, 1]}
where V0, V1, and E are as follows:
V0 = {(α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∨ β2, v), (α1 ∧ α2, , v), (γ, β1 ∨ β2, v), (γ, )} ∪
{(α, β, v) | val(α, β) 6= ⊥ and v > val(α, β)}
V1 = {(γ, , f), (α1 ∨ α2, β, v), (α, β1 ∧ β2, v)} ∪
{(α, β, v) | val(α, β) = ⊥ or v ≤ val(α, β)}
E = {((α1 ∨α2, β, v), (αi, β, v)), ((α, β1 ∧ β2, v), (α, βi, v)) | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((γ, ), (γ, , f))} ∪
{((α1 ∧ α2, , v), (αi, , v)), ((γ, β1 ∨ β2, v), (γ, βi, v)) | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((γ, , f), (δ(qi, σ), δ(uj , σ), f(i, j))) | f(i, j) > 0 and σ ∈ Σ} ∪
{((α1 ∧ α2, β2 ∨ β2, v), (αi, βj , v)) | i, j ∈ {1, 2}}
In these definitions α and β range over formulae in transitions of A and B,
respectively, γ and  range over formulae in [[Q]]∗ and [[U ]]∗, respectively.
The set V above is uncountable and infinitely branching, as branching
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includes a choice of a function f : [n] × [m] → [0, 1]. Standard techniques
can be used to make these games finite branching. If both A and B are
finite, the games will be finite, too.
For (γ, ) ∈ [[Q]]∗ × [[U ]]∗ with
γ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn)
 = ∗([[u1]]./′1p′1 , . . . , [[um]]./′mp′m)
in order to show that  simulates γ, Player 0 needs to show that the proba-
bility of  (and its partition) can be supported by γ. Accordingly, from (γ, )
Player 0 chooses f : [n] × [m] → [0, 1] and moves to configuration (γ, , f).
Such a configuration relates to the claim that qi is related to uj with pro-
portion f(i, j) and that f can be partitioned (using the {ai,j} to support
the different uj ’s). Then, Player 1 chooses i and j such that f(i, j) > 0 and
an alphabet letter σ ∈ Σ, leading to a configuration of the form
(δ(qi, σ), δ(uj , σ), f(i, j)) .
Conjunctions and disjunctions are resolved in the usual way until the game
either reaches another configuration in [[Q]]∗ × [[U ]]∗ × [0, 1], in which case
the value f(i, j) is ignored (as f(i, j) ≤ 1), or until the play reaches a
configuration with a pre-seeded value v. Then, if f(i) ≤ v Player 0 has
fulfilled her obligation and she wins. If f(i) > v, Player 0 failed and she loses.
An infinite play in G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) is winning for Player 0 if ((ϕ)) ∩ Q ⊆ F
implies ((ψ)) ∩ U ⊆ F .
By Theorem 1, every c ∈ V has a value in {0, 1} for Player 0. We set
val(c) to that value.
Case 4: Let ((ϕ)) and ((ψ)) be SCCs where ((ϕ)) has transitions in Eb
without ∗∨ markings, and ((ψ)) has transitions in Eu. Then G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ)))
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is a stochastic weak game with
V = {(ϕ˜, ψ˜) | ϕ˜ A ϕ and ψ˜ B ψ} ∪ [[Q]]× U × Σ
V0 = {(α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∨ β2), (α1 ∧ α2, u), (γ, β1 ∨ β2)}
V1 = {(α1 ∨ α2, β), (α, β1 ∧ β2), (γ, u)}
Vp = [[Q]]∗ × U × Σ
E = {((α1 ∨ α2, β), (αi, β)) | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((α, β1 ∧ β2), (α, βi)) | i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((α1 ∧ α2, β1 ∨ β2), (αi, βj)) | i, j ∈ {1, 2}} ∪
{((γ, u), (γ, u, σ)), ((γ, u, σ), (δ(qi, σ), δ(u, σ)))}
and
κ((γ, u, σ))((δ(qi, σ), δ(u, σ))) = pi
where α, αi and β, βi range over formulae in transitions of A and B, respec-
tively, while γ and u range over [[Q]]∗ and U , respectively. For probabilities
pi that do not sum up to 1, we add a sink state (losing for Player 0) that
fills that gap.
An infinite play in G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) is winning for Player 0 if ((ϕ))∩Q ⊆ F
implies ((ψ)) ∩ U ⊆ F .
By Theorem 1 every configuration c has a value. We set val(c) to the
value of configuration c for Player 0.
Intuitively, a state u measures the probability of some regular set of paths,
and a state [[q]]./p can restrict the immediate steps taken by a Markov chain
as well as enforce some regular structure on paths. Thus, this stochastic
weak game establishes the conditions under which a Markov chain accepted
from [[q]]./p can be also accepted from u.
Case 5: The case when ((ϕ)) or ((ψ)) is a trivial SCC is subsumed by at
least one of the four preceding cases. As for the acceptance game, this
ambiguity is unproblematic as the game values in G≤(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) are then
determined by the propagation of pre-seeded game values.
We are now in a position to state the formal definition for simulation
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between p-automata.
Definition 71 (Simulation)
We say that B simulates A, denoted A ≤ B, if the value of configuration
(ϕina , ϕ
in
b ), computed in the previous sequence of games, is 1. 
Theorem 10
Let A and B be p-automata over 2AP that contain no occurrence of ∗∨. If A
and B are finite, then
A ≤ B implies L(A) ⊆ L(B) (6.2)
and A ≤ B can be decided in EXPTIME.
For p-automata which stem from Markov chains this implication becomes
an equivalence: If A is AM for a Markov chain M ∈ MCAP, then A ≤ B iff
L(A) ⊆ L(B) for all B ∈ MCAP.  
The second part of the theorem, i.e. the coincidence of simulation and
language inclusion for p-automata of Markov chains, is crucial for the com-
pleteness of the p-automata framework for full PCTL. In fact, the full com-
pleteness result follows as direct Corollary 5 from the above theorem.
Another direct consequence of the theorem is that N ∼M iff AM ≤ AN .
Before we prove the theorem we give a proof sketch first: The first claim
of Theorem 10 is proved as follows. Assuming M ∈ L(A) and A ≤ B
we consider configurations (s, ϕ) and (ϕ,ψ) in the corresponding games,
respectively. This determines a configuration (s, ψ) in the acceptance game
for M ∈ L(B). We show an invariant, that
val(s, ϕ) · val(ϕ,ψ) ≤ val(s, ψ)
for all such “synchronised” configurations. In particular, we get val(sin, ϕin) ·
val(ϕin, ψin) = 1 · 1 ≤ val(sin, ψin) which proves M ∈ L(B). Extending this
result to infinite-state automata seems to require the treatment of infinite
converging products of real numbers, which we do not pursue in this thesis.
The second claim of Theorem 10 follows since the simulation game col-
lapses to an acceptance game when the automaton of the left in (6.2) is
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derived from a Markov chain.
Proof
We note that when A equals AM for some M ∈ MCAP, the simulation game
for AM ≤ B and the acceptance game for M ∈ L(B) collapse to the same
game. Thus, regardless of whetherAM orB is infinite-state we haveAM ≤ B
iff M ∈ L(B). The latter is equivalent to L(AM ) ⊆ L(B) by Lemma 14 and
Theorem 8.
In order to prove (6.2) for finite-state A and B, consider a Markov chain
M = (S,P, L, sin). Consider two formulae ϕ and ψ such that ϕ appears in
the transition of A and ψ appears in the transition of B.
We construct a strategy for Player 0 in GB and plays in GA, GB, and
G≤ such that the plays start from (s, ϕ), (s, ψ), and (ϕ,ψ), respectively and
such that the values of these plays satisfy
val(s, ϕ) · val(ϕ,ψ) ≤ val(s, ψ) .
Thus, we prove that M ∈ L(A) implies M ∈ L(B).
Suppose that the claim holds by induction for plays starting in configura-
tions (((ϕ˜)), ((ψ˜))), where (((ϕ˜)), ((ψ˜))) ≺ (((ϕ)), ((ψ))).
• In case that ϕ ∈ Q and ψ ∈ [[U ]]∗ we have val(ϕ,ψ) = 0 and the claim
holds trivially.
• Suppose that both ϕ and ψ are in unbounded SCCs. The game GA is
a stochastic weak game and Player 0 secures val(s, ϕ) in configuration
(s, ϕ).
Consider the configurations (s, ϕ), (s, ψ), and (ϕ,ψ) in the games GA,
GB, and G≤, respectively.
If ϕ is a disjunction, then the strategy of Player 0 in GA instructs her
to choose a disjunct ϕ1 of ϕ. Then (ϕ,ψ) is a Player 1 configuration in
G≤ and we instruct Player 1 to choose the successor (ϕ1, ψ). If ψ is a
conjunction, then Player 1 chooses a successor (s, ψ1) of (s, ψ) in GB.
We update the game G≤ by mimicking the same choice of Player 1
from (ϕ,ψ). If ϕ is a conjunction and ψ is not a conjunction, then
the strategy of Player 0 in G≤ instructs Player 0 to choose a conjunct
ϕ1 of ϕ. This choice can be mimicked in GA in which Player 1 needs
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to move. If ϕ is not a disjunction and ψ is a disjunction, then the
strategy of Player 0 in G≤ instructs Player 0 to choose a disjunct ψ1
of ϕ. This choice resolves Player 0’s choice in GB.
Consider three plays produced in this way. If all plays are infinite, the
claim follows from the winning condition in G≤ and the values of the
plays in GA and GB. If one of the plays is finite then the claim follows
from the induction assumption, as the play passes in G≤ to a different
SCC.
• Suppose that ϕ and ψ are in bounded SCCs. The game GA is a
weak game and Player 0 secures val(s, ϕ) in configuration (s, ϕ). By
definition val(s, ϕ) ∈ {0, 1}.
There is nothing to show if val(s, ϕ) = 0.
Suppose that val(s, ϕ) = 1, i.e., Player 0 wins from configuration (s, ϕ)
in GA. In G≤ we have val(ϕ,ψ) ∈ {0, 1}. Again there is nothing to
show if val(ϕ,ψ) = 0, so let’s suppose that val(ϕ,ψ) = 1. We now have
to give a strategy for Player 0 in GB such that val(s, ψ) = 1.
Let ϕ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , ... , [[qn]]./npn) and ψ = ∗([[u1]]./′1p′1 , ... , [[um]]./′mp′m).
Let f : [n] × Succ(s) → [0, 1] be the function chosen by Player 0’s
strategy in GA and let f ′ : [n]× [m]→ [0, 1] be the function chosen by
Player 0’s strategy in G≤. We set Player 0’s strategy in GB to choose
the function f ′′ : [m] × Succ(s) → [0, 1] where f ′′(j, s′) is the minimal
value in vals,ψ that is at least maxi∈[n] f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j). We have to
show that f ′′ is disjoint.
Claim 1
f ′′ is disjoint.  
Proof
Let aj,s′ =
∑
i∈[n] ai,s′ · ai,j . First, one can see that for every s′ ∈
Succ(s) we have∑
j∈[m]
aj,s′ =
∑
j∈[m]
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · ai,j =
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′
∑
j∈[m]
ai,j =
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ = 1
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Second, consider some j ∈ [m]. Then,∑
s′∈Succ(s)
aj,s′ · f ′′(j, s′) · P (s, s′)
=
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · ai,j
 · f ′′(j, s′) · P (s, s′)
≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · ai,j
 ·max
i∈[n]
(f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j)) · P (s, s′)
≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · ai,j · f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j) · P (s, s′)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · ai,j · f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j) · P (s, s′)
=
∑
i∈[n]
ai,j · f ′(i, j) ·
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · f(i, s′) · P (s, s′)
./
∑
i∈[n]
ai,j · f ′(i, j) · pi
./′ pj
and ./ is > if for some i ∈ [n] we have ./i equals > and then ./′ is ≥,
otherwise either ./′ is > or ./′j is ≥ and the claim is proved. 
With f ′′ established as disjoint, we get back to the games. In GB
Player 1 chooses j and s′ ∈ Succ(s) and moves to
(s′, δ(uj , L(s)), f ′′(s′, j)) .
We mimic this choice in GA by making Player 1 choose the state qi
such that f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j) is maximal. The game thus moves to
(s′, δ(qi, L(s)), f(i, s′)) .
We mimic this choice in G≤ by making Player 1 choose the states qi,
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uj , and the letter L(s) leading to configuration
(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(uj , L(s)), f ′(i, j)) .
If the plays continue indefinitely inside the same SCC in G≤ the claim
follows from the winning condition in G≤ and the winning conditions
of GA and GB.
If the plays exits the SCC in G≤, the triplet of configurations is
(s′′, ϕ′′, v1), (s′′, ψ′′, v2), (ϕ′′, ψ′′, v) .
By induction assumption val(s′′, ϕ′′) · val(ϕ′′, ψ′′) ≤ val(s′′, ψ′′) holds.
Furthermore, we have to show that val(s′′, ψ′′) ≥ v. Let (s, ϕ), (s, ψ)
and (ϕ,ψ) be the last configurations that are part of the SCC before
reaching the above triplet of configurations. It follows that
val(s′′, ψ′′) ∈ vals,ψ .
By the choices of f , f ′ and f ′′ we know that v is the minimal value
in vals,ψ that is at least maxi∈[n] f(i, s′) · f ′(i, j). In addition, the last
choice in GA was exactly the state qi such that i is maximal. We
know that val(s′′, ϕ′′) ≥ v1, and that val(ϕ′′, ψ′′) ≥ v. It follows that
val(s′′, ϕ′′) · val(ϕ′′, ψ′′) ≥ v · v1. But, v2 is exactly v · v1 leading to the
desired result.
• Suppose that ϕ is in a bounded SCC and ψ is in an unbounded SCC.
The game GA is a weak game while the games GB and G≤ are stochas-
tic weak games. The interesting cases are only those where
val(s, ϕ) = 1 and val(ϕ,ψ) > 0 .
Given a strategy of Player 1 in GB, we show how to use the winning
strategies of Player 0 in GA and G≤ to produce a winning strategy
for Player 0 in GB. We also resolve all the choices for Player 1 in GA
and G≤ leading to both G≤ and GB being reduced to Markov decision
processes. These Markov decision processes capture all the possible
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evolutions of the games in GB and G≤ according to the possible choices
in probabilistic configurations in GA. We then show how to use these
Markov decision processes to prove that the claim holds.
Consider three configurations (s, ϕ′) in GA, (ϕ′, ψ′) in G≤, and (s, ψ′)
in GB. If ψ′ is a conjunction, then, in GB, Player 1 chooses a con-
junct of ψ′. The same choice is mimicked in G≤ by making Player 1
choose the same conjunct. If ψ′ is a disjunction, then Player 0’s strat-
egy in G≤ instructs her to choose one disjunct. The same choice is
mimicked in GB. If ϕ′ is a conjunction, then Player 0’s strategy in
G≤ chooses a conjunct of ϕ′. We make Player 1 in GA choose the
same conjunct. If ϕ′ is a disjunction, then Player 0’s strategy in
GA chooses a disjunct of ϕ′. We make Player 1 in G≤ choose the
same disjunct. The remaining cases are where ψ′ = u is a state of
B and ϕ′ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn). The configuration (s, u) in GB
is probabilistic. The configuration (ϕ′, u) in G≤ is a Player 1 config-
uration. We make Player 1 choose L(s) in G≤ leading to configura-
tion (ϕ′, u, L(s)), which is probabilistic. The configuration (s, ϕ′) is a
Player 0 configuration in GA. The strategy of Player 0 on GA instructs
her to choose a disjoint function f : [n]× Succ(s)→ [0, 1]. Let {ai,s′}
be witnesses to the disjointness of f . Consider a location s′ that is
chosen with probability P (s, s′) in GB. Here, we make multiple possi-
ble choices of continuing in the games, giving rise to Markov decision
processes (with a matching between the choices in them). Consider
all indices i such that ai,s′ > 0. It follows that for every such index
there is a way to continue unraveling the plays by making Player 1
in GA choose the successor (s′, δ(qi, L(s)), f(i, s′)) and continuing to
configurations (δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) in G≤ and (s′, δ(u, L(s))) in GB.
By using these strategies, this effectively creates from GB and G≤ a
Markov decision processes where the choices are angelic in GB and
demonic in G≤. That is, the actual value of GB is the best possible
value in the Markov decision process arising from GB and the value in
G≤ is the worst possible value in G≤. Hence, it is enough to show one
choice such that the value in the Markov decision process arising from
GB satisfies the requirement of the claim. Indeed, the actual value in
GB could only be higher while the actual value in G≤ could only be
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lower.
Consider now three configurations (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′), and the
resulting Markov decision processes from (ϕ′, ψ′) and (s, ψ′). By the
construction of the strategy, every play starting in (s, ψ′) is associated
with plays that start in (s, ϕ′) and (ϕ′, ψ′) such that at every stage
the three configurations use the same state of the Markov chain and
formulae in the transitions of A and B. We consider four cases:
(1) Consider a triplet of configurations (s′, ϕ˜), (ϕ˜, ψ˜′), and (s′, ψ˜)
such that (ϕ˜, ψ˜) is not in the equivalence class of (((ϕ)), ((ψ))). By
induction val(s′, ψ′′) ≥ val(s′, ϕ′′) · val(ϕ′′, ψ′′).
(2) Consider a triplet of configurations (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′)
such that there is some choice in the Markov decision process that
arises from GB such that all plays which start in (ϕ′, ψ′), remain in
(((ϕ)), ((ψ))) and are winning for Player 0 in G≤. The matching choice
of plays starting from (s, ψ′) are winning for Player 0 in GB. Indeed,
if this were not the case, there would be a play in GB that is losing. It
follows that the corresponding play in G≤ does not satisfy the accep-
tance of A and that the play in GA is losing. However GA is a weak
game and this is impossible.
(3) Consider a triplet of configurations (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′)
such that for all choices in the Markov decision process that arises
from G≤ we have all plays starting in (ϕ′, ψ′) remain in (((ϕ)), ((ψ)))
and are losing for Player 0 in G≤. One can see that val(s, ψ′) ≥ 0.
(4) Consider now a triplet (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′) such that
(ϕ′, ψ′) ∈ (((ϕ)), ((ψ))) and there is no choice in the Markov decision
process arising from G≤ such that (i) all paths are winning for Player 0
and (ii) for all choices the probability for Player 0 to win is positive.
As the automata and the Markov chain are finite, so are the resulting
Markov decision processes. It follows that the probability of winning
in G≤ equals the probability of getting to one of the previous three
types of configurations. Then we show that the probability to reach
198
one of the three previous types of configurations in n steps satisfies
the requirements of the theorem, for every n. The requirement of the
claim will follow.
For every triplet (s′, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s′, ψ′) let P0(ϕ′, ψ′) be val(ϕ′, ψ′)
and P0(s′, ψ′) be val(s′, ψ′) if (ϕ′, ψ′) is one of the three types of con-
figurations mentioned above. Let P0(ϕ′, ψ′) and P0(s′, ψ′) be 0, other-
wise.
Consider a triplet (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), (s, ψ′) such that
ϕ′ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./np2) and ψ′ = u
such that P0(ϕ′, ψ′) = P0(s, ψ′) = 0 but for some successor s′ of s
there is a choice of i such that P0(δ(qi, L(s′)), δ(u, L(s))) > 0 and
P0(s′′, δ(u, L(s′))) > 0. Let I denote the set of such indices i. Then
P1 satisfies the following requirement:
P1(s, u) =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
P (s, s′)P0(s′, δ(u, L(s)))
From this equation we now derive P1(s, u) ≥ P1(ϕ′, u) as follows, where
each step of the derivation is explained:
P1(s, u) =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
P (s, s′)P0(s′, δ(u, L(s)))
For all such s′, we have P0(s′, δ(u, L(s))) = val(s′, δ(u, L(s))).
. . . =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
P (s, s′) · val(s′, δ(u, L(s)))
We have already proven the requirement of the theorem
for these configurations.
. . . ≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
P (s, s′) · val(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) · val(s′, δ(qi, L(s)))
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By val(s′, δ(qi, L(s))) ≥
∑
i∈I f(i, s
′) · ai,s′ .
. . . ≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
P (s, s′) ·
∑
i∈I
f(i, s′) · ai,s′ · val(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
Changing the order of summation.
. . . =
∑
i∈I
val(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) ·
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
f(i, s′) · ai,s′ · P (s, s′)
By f being disjoint,
∑
s′∈Succ(s)|∃i∈I.ai,s′>0
f(i, s′) · ai,s′ · P (s, s′) ≥ pi.
. . . ≥
∑
i∈I
val(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) · pi
Finally:
. . . = P1(ϕ′, u)
Consider a triplet (s, ϕ′), (ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′). The strategy defined
above fixes most such configurations as deterministic in their respective
Markov decision processes. The only interesting case is when ϕ′ ∈ [[Q]]
and ψ′ ∈ U . In this case (ϕ′, ψ′) and (s, ψ′) are probabilistic configu-
rations and the strategy includes some choice in the matching between
successors of (ϕ′, ψ′) and (s, ψ′). Let ϕ′ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn)
and ψ′ = u. Then,
Pn+1(s, u) =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) · Pn(s′, δ(u, L(s)))
Recall that the way to extend the game from configuration (ϕ′, u)
(matching a move to δ(qi, L(s)) with the move to (s′, δ(u, L(s)))) de-
pends on which ai,s′ are positive in a disjoint function f .
Pn+1(ϕ′, u) =
∑
i∈[n]
max
i:ai,s′>0
val(s′, δ(qi, L(s))) ·Pn(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
We now assume by induction that for possible matching triplets (s, ϕ′),
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(ϕ′, ψ′), and (s, ψ′) we have:
Pn(s, ψ′) ≥ val(s, ϕ′) · Pn(ϕ′, ψ′)
and prove the same for Pn+1. We concentrate on the only interesting
case, where ϕ′ = ∗([[q1]]./1p1 , . . . , [[qn]]./npn) and ψ′ = u. Again we write
explanations in between the steps of the derivation:
Pn+1(s, u) =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) · Pn(s′, δ(u, L(s)))
By induction, where is′ is such that
val(s′, δ(qi′s , L(s))) · Pn(δ(qi′s , L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
is maximal among all i ∈ [n].
. . . ≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) · val(s′, δ(qis′ , L(s))) · Pn(δ(qis′ , L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
By
∑
i∈[n]ai,s′ = 1, for all s
′.
. . . =
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) · (
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′) · val(s′, δ(qis′ , L(s))) · Pn(δ(qis′ , L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
By choice of is′ such that
val(s′, δ(qi′s , L(s))) · Pn(δ(qis′ , L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
is maximal.
. . . ≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) ·
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · val(s′, δ(qi, L(s))) · Pn(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
By choice of f and win in GA,
we have val(s′, δ(qis′ , L(s))) ≥ f(is′ , s′).
. . . ≥
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
P (s, s′) ·
∑
i∈[n]
ai,s′ · f(is′ , s′) · Pn(δ(qis′ , L(s)), δ(u, L(s)))
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Change order of summation.
. . . =
∑
i∈[n]
Pn(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) ·
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · f(i, s′) · P (s, s′)
By choice of f and ai,s′
we have
∑
s′∈Succ(s)
ai,s′ · f(i, s′) · P (s, s′) ≥ pi.
. . . ≥
∑
i∈[n]
Pn(δ(qi, L(s)), δ(u, L(s))) · pi
Finally:
. . . = Pn+1(ϕ′, u) 
Deciding simulation is EXPTIME complete, which is potentially a severe
restriction for practical applications as the models in real applications tend
to be large. Nevertheless the decidability of simulation is an important
result – even from a practical perspective – as simulation soundly under-
approximates language inclusion for which we do not yet know whether or
not it is decidable.
We now get sound and complete verification of M |= φ through simula-
tions, in the sense of Dams and Namjoshi [58], using simulation as abstrac-
tion.
Corollary 5
For every infinite M ∈ MCAP and PCTL formula φ over AP we have M |= φ
iff there is a finite p-automaton A with AM ≤ A and A ≤ Aφ.  
Proof
To see this, any such A implies L(AM ) ⊆ L(A) and L(A) ⊆ L(Aφ) by both
parts of Theorem 10 – noting that neither AM nor Aφ have any occurrence
of ∗∨. Thus, M |= φ holds by Theorems 8 and 9.
Conversely, if there is no such A, then Aφ can also not be such an A. Since
Aφ ≤ Aφ this implies AM 6≤ Aφ and so L(AM ) 6⊆ L(Aφ) from the converse
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of (6.2). So there is some M ′ ∼ M with M ′ 6|= φ. Since M ′ ∼ M , we get
M 6|= φ as well by Lemma 14. 
This method for verifying M |= φ via simulation is thus complete in the
sense of [58]. To our knowledge, this is the first such completeness result for
PCTL and Markov chains.
6.5 Wrong embedding of Markov chains
To shed some light on the motivation and development of the ∗ operator
(and its dual ∗∨), we show that a simpler conversion of Markov chains to
automata without ∗ operator produces automata that accept Markov chains
which are not necessarily bisimilar to the original one.
Consider Markov chainM = (S,P, L, sin). We suggest the following very-
weak embedding of a Markov chain in a p-automaton. We define the follow-
ing p-automaton AwM = 〈Σ, Q, δ, ϕin, α〉, where
Q = {(s, s′) | P (s, s′) > 0}
ϕin =
∧
s′∈Succ(sin)
[[(sin, s′)]]≥P (sin,s′)
α = Q
δ((s, s′), σ) =
∧
{s′′|P (s′,s′′)>0}
[[(s′, s′′)]]≥P (s′,s′′) if σ = L(s)
δ((s, s′), σ) = ff if σ 6= L(s)
A state (s, s′) represents the transition from s to s′. The embedding is the
same as the one defined in Section 6.3.2, except that this automaton uses ∧
instead of ∗.
Consider the Markov chain M in Figure 6.5. No distinct locations of M
are bisimilar. Let M1 be M with s1 as initial location, and let M2 be M
with s2 as initial location. We show that AwM1 accepts M2 although M1 and
M2 are not bisimilar.
The Markov chains M1 and M2 are not bisimilar, as the transitions from
s1 to locations whose label is b have probability 23 and the transitions from
s2 to locations whose label is b have probability 13 .
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Figure 6.5: A Markov chain M whose very weak embedding accepts
non-bisimilar Markov chains.
Nevertheless, AwM1 accepts M2 and is therefore not a “correct” embedding
of M1.
Lemma 16
The automaton AwM1 accepts M2.  
Proof
The initial configuration of the acceptance game for M2 ∈ L(AwM1) is config-
uration (s2, ϕin). As ϕin is a conjunction, Player 1 can choose one of three
successor configurations:
(s2, [[(s1, s3)]]≥ 1
3
)
(s2, [[(s1, s4)]]≥ 1
3
)
(s2, [[(s1, s5)]]≥ 1
3
)
One can see that Player 0 wins from the latter two.
Suppose that Player 1 chooses the configuration (s2, [[(s1, s3)]]≥ 1
3
). Player 0
chooses the configuration (s2, [[(s1, s3)]]≥ 1
3
, f) where f is the function that
sets f(1, s4) = 1 and f(1, s5) = f(1, s6) = 0. The next configuration is
(s4, [[(s3, s1)]]≥1, 1). We complete a cycle by going back to configuration
(s2, ϕin).
This completes a winning strategy for Player 0. 
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6.6 Summary of chapter
We presented a novel kind of automata, called p-automata, that read an
entire Markov chain and either accept or reject that input. We demonstrated
how this acceptance can be decided through a series of stochastic weak games
and weak games, at worst case exponential in the size of the automaton and
in the size of the Markov chain.
We proved that p-automata are closed under Boolean operations; that lan-
guage containment and emptiness are inter-reducible; and that the language
of a p-automaton is closed under bisimulation. The bisimulation equiva-
lence class of a Markov chain, and the set of models of a PCTL formula
were shown to be expressible as such languages. In particular, the complex-
ity of the acceptance game matches that of probabilistic model checking for
automata which stem from such formulae.
These results suggest that emptiness, universality, and containment of p-
automata are all tightly related to the open problem of decidability of PCTL
satisfiability.
We developed a (fair) simulation between p-automata that stem from
Markov chains or PCTL formulae. We proved this simulation to be decid-
able in EXPTIME and to under-approximate language containment. For
p-automata AM that stem from Markov chains, simulation AM ≤ B is even
equivalent to language inclusion L(AM ) ⊆ L(B), which is essential for prov-
ing that p-automata are complete for full PCTL.
Finally, we proved that p-automata are a complete abstraction framework
for full PCTL. If an infinite Markov chain satisfies a PCTL formula, there is
a finite p-automaton that abstracts this Markov chain and whose language is
contained in that of the p-automaton stemming from that PCTL formula.
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7 Evaluation
In this chapter we set the results from this thesis in the context of relevant
related work; we reflect on the achievement of our initial research aims; and
we suggest directions for future work which could continue from the main
results in this thesis.
As relevant related work we discuss work on completeness of abstractions
for linear-time, branching-time and probabilistic logics; and work on au-
tomata and games for probabilistic logics.
To evaluate our achievements, we re-visit the research aims as they are
set out in Section 1.7.
The suggested future work builds on our results from Chapter 5 and Chap-
ter 6, with a particular focus on the p-automata framework which opens a
whole range of promising future research questions.
7.1 Related work on completeness of abstractions
Historically the completeness of abstractions came up in the contexts of op-
timality and precision of (sound) abstractions [48, 57, 61, 116, 44]. First
completeness results were developed for safety properties, e.g. the ACTL*
fragment of CTL* which also contains the safety properties of LTL, [44]. For
safety properties conservative approximations are already sufficient for com-
pleteness. Liveness, i.e. existential quantification, and the related notions
of fairness were more difficult [48]. Completeness for full LTL was achieved
by Yonit Kesten and Amir Pnueli [117]. They overcame the problems with
liveness properties by augmenting the concrete model with so-called progress
monitors prior to abstraction. These progress monitors explicitly encode
fairness constraints into the model. A conservative approximation of the
augmented model then yields sound and complete abstraction for full LTL.
For branching time logics, e.g. CTL and CTL*, abstraction techniques
were developed and evaluated with respect to their precision [48, 57, 44].
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To find a complete abstraction framework for branching time turned out
to be much more difficult than for LTL. Abstract models with 3-valued
labels or “may- and must-transitions” were important developments, but
these techniques were not sufficient to achieve completeness for full CTL.
Thus a new class of more expressive abstract model had to be developed.
Already in 1994 Edmund Clarke suggested that such abstractions would
require “more complex finite-state model[s] such as AND/OR graphs” to
preserve enough information about the branching behaviour of the concrete
model [44]. Completeness for branching-time logics was finally achieved by
Dennis Dams and Kedar Namjoshi [58], and several complete abstraction
frameworks were consecutively developed.
Dams and Namjoshi defined focused transition systems (FTS) as the first
complete abstraction framework for branching-time logics [58]. Focused
transition systems are “a class of transition systems that closely corresponds
to [alternating tree] automata” [58]. The models use focusing and de-
focusing operations which “are the transition system analogues of the OR
and AND operators in alternating tree automata” [58].
Some weaknesses of focus transition systems were pointed out by Har-
ald Fecher and Michael Huth in [73]. Other abstract models, that were
developed for complete abstraction frameworks, include alternating transi-
tion systems [146], disjunctive modal transition systems (DMTS) [73] and
hypermixed Kripke structures [74]. All these abstract models use some kind
of “OR transition to sets of successors” to abstract the concrete branching
behaviour. Dams and Namjoshi conjecture that “any abstraction framework
that is complete is likely to correspond closely to the [alternating tree] au-
tomaton framework” [58].
The completeness question for branching time was brought to a conclu-
sion through the correspondence between the modal µ-calculus and alter-
nating tree automata. By phrasing the completeness problem purely in the
automata framework, with automata both as models and as specification,
Dams and Namjoshi provide a unifying view on the other proposed complete
abstractions [59]. The automata framework also provides a very elegant so-
lution for the completeness problem as the finite automaton which corre-
sponds to the logical specification, by definition, constitutes a finite state
abstraction of all automata which correspond to models of that specification
[59].
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There is only little work on the completeness problem for probabilistic
logics, in particular over discrete-time Markov chains which are the main
focus of this thesis. Abstraction for continuous-time stochastic processes
which respects certain fragments of the widely used Continuous Stochastic
Logic (CSL) [12, 13, 19] over continuous-time Markov chains are consid-
ered in [18] and [21]. Bisimulations which preserve CSL over continuous-
time Markov decision processes are discussed in [147]. In particular [21]
discusses abstractions which preserve liveness and safety properties respec-
tively. Micheal Smith presents compositional abstractions for continuous-
time Markov chains based on aggregation of states and on stochastic bounds
[162, 163]. These abstraction techniques resemble state lumping [64] and
interval Markov chains [39] respectively, and yield useful bounds for CSL
reachability properties. Finite-state abstractions for PCTL over infinite-
state discrete-time Markov chains are constructed via predicate abstraction
in [100]. The method is shown to be – in a certain sense – optimal, but is
not complete. In the context of PCTL satisfiability, the synthesis of finitary
descriptions of infinite models for formulae of qualitative PCTL is addressed
in [30]. A 3-valued abstraction for continuous-time Markov chains is dis-
cussed in [109]. The non-determinism of Markov decision processes allows
for similar abstraction hierarchies as for non-probabilistic models. Abstrac-
tion refinement techniques for Markov decision processes have been studied
in [65, 126, 63]. The game-based abstraction of Markov decision processes
in [126, 113] was shown to be not complete by Kattenbelt and Huth in
[111]. None of these works address the completeness question for PCTL
over (discrete-time) Markov chains.
7.1.1 Related Work on Automata and Games
Hintikka games as a means to define an operational semantics have been used
for various non-probabilistic logics. Colin Stirling developed semantic games
[167] and model-checking games [166, 129] for CTL* and the µ-calculus.
Model-checking games for the modal µ-calculus [72, 146] also played an
important role in achieving completeness for branching time [146, 58, 59].
Quantitative parity games are developed and shown to correspond to
model checks for formulae of a quantitative µ-calculus in [78]. However,
winning strategies are no longer memoryless in general as they may have
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to “make up” for discount factors encountered en-route in a play – even in
games with finite set of configurations.
In [142], a quantitative µ-calculus (qMµ) is defined over models that con-
tain both non-deterministic and probabilistic choice but no discounting. A
denotational semantics generalising Kozen’s familiar one [121] is given. For
any finite-state model and formula of qMµ a probabilistic analogue of parity
games is given, and the determinacy of this game is shown. It is also proved
that its game value equals that of the denotational semantics for the model
and formula in question and that there exist memoryless winning strategies.
We are not aware of any previous effort to develop a game-based seman-
tics for PCTL over Markov chains. Nevertheless games are an established
method to reason about PCTL over Markov decision processes where they
allow for “angelic” respectively “demonic” interpretation of non-deterministic
choices. The stochastic games of [126, 113] abstract Markov decision pro-
cesses as 2-person games where two sources of non-determinism, stemming
from the Markov decision process and the state space partition respectively,
are controlled by different players. This separation allows for more precise
abstractions but is not complete in the sense of [58], as shown in [111].
Rabin’s probabilistic automata [157] give only rise to probabilistic lan-
guages of non-probabilistic models.
In [176], automata also accept Markov chains – when interpreted as co-
algebras of a certain functor. These automata are shown to be equivalent to
a fixed point logic that enjoys the finite model property. Since PCTL does
not have that property, these co-algebraic automata cannot express PCTL –
notably its path modalities. Also, this work does not feature simulations or
other abstraction mechanisms.
Probabilistic processes [108] use automata-theoretic techniques for refine-
ment checking only. Probabilistic verification of specifications written in
linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [173, 175] uses automata-theoretic machin-
ery but cannot reason about combinations of LTL operators and probability
thresholds as found in PCTL.
7.2 Evaluation of achievements
The aims for our research are stated in Section 1.7. We now re-visit these
aims and assess how our achievements match our aims.
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The overall aim of this thesis was to find a complete abstraction framework
for PCTL over discrete-time Markov chains. This goal was achieved in full
through our p-automata framework in Chapter 6.
Further we set out to develop a better understanding of PCTL and prob-
abilistic verification in general. Our operational semantics for PCTL in
Chapter 5 contributes to this aim, as does the identification of a “benign”
PCTL fragment in Chapter 4 for which we secured completeness via 3-valued
unfoldings. Our p-automata enhance the understanding of PCTL further, as
they open a new line of attack on the open problem of PCTL satisfiability.
Our last aim was to develop the complete abstraction framework in such
a way, that it will be useful above and beyond answering our completeness
question. This aim was met, as our p-automata constitute a novel frame-
work for Markov chains and PCTL which provides the foundation for an
automata-based approach to discrete-time probabilistic verification.
7.3 Future work
The most promising direction for future work based on the achievements
in this thesis, is clearly the further development of our p-automata. The
other two main results, i.e. the Hintikka game and completeness for a PCTL
fragment via unfoldings, offer less potential for future work. Nevertheless,
all of our results should scale reasonably well to standard extensions of the
class of discrete-time Markov chains considered in this thesis, such as Markov
chains with multiple initial states or with a distribution over a set of initial
states.
The fragment of PCTL for which completeness can be achieved with 3-
valued unfoldings is fully defined and its maximality is proved. The work
on this result is therefore finished and we do not intend to pursue further
research on this fragment. For practical applications it could be of interest to
explore the usability of specifications which are restricted to that fragment.
For Markov decision processes not even our fragment PCTL> is complete
as shown in [112].
Our Hintikka game could possibly be extended from PCTL to PCTL*, but
Colin Stirling’s games for CTL* [167] indicate that such an extension would
need to be rather complex. An extension to PCTL with a suitable semantics
over Markov decision processes should be reasonable straightforward, as the
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non-determinism of Markov decision processes can be captured by adding
another non-probabilistic, non-deterministic choice for one of the two players
in the Hintikka game.
The Hintikka game for PCTL over Markov chains provided valuable in-
sights into PCTL and enabled us to understand the limitations of 3-valued
abstractions for achieving completeness for full PCTL. Based on these in-
sights we developed our p-automata, which solve the completeness problem
for full PCTL. Our p-automata are more general than PCTL*, i.e. PCTL*
can be embedded into p-automata just as PCTL can. The automata-based
framework for PCTL and Markov chains uses games for acceptance and re-
finement. These games resemble, respectively generalise, our Hintikka game.
Thus we do not expect much added value from extending the Hintikka game
to, e.g., PCTL*. More interesting would be to relate future developments
on probabilistic µ-calculi and the corresponding games [142] directly to our
p-automata.
Our p-automata achieve completeness for full PCTL, and therefore fully
answer the main research question of this thesis. Beyond the completeness
question, our p-automata form a novel framework for automata based prob-
abilistic verification. This opens a whole range of new research questions
and suggests some promising directions for future work. In particular we
would like:
1. To develop a notion of p-automata that embed Markov decision pro-
cesses and stochastic games.
2. To understand the difference between alternating and non-deterministic
p-automata, where the latter notion still needs to be defined.
3. To prove or refute Theorem 10, i.e. that simulation implies language
inclusion, for infinite-state p-automata.
4. To develop a more general notion of game such that acceptance of
input for non-uniform p-automata can be decided by solving a single
such game.
5. To prove matching lower bounds for acceptance by p-automata.
In Section 6.3.3 we define an embedding of PCTL into p-automata which
establishes some highly interesting connections and potential for future re-
search. In particular acceptance of p-automata is directly related to PCTL
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model checking, and language emptiness for p-automata is related to PCTL
satisfiability. As we mention in Section 6.3.3, we believe that language empti-
ness is decidable for p-automata which correspond to qualitative PCTL, i.e.
a PCTL fragment for which satisfiability is known to be decidable. Future
work in this direction could attempt to prove this conjecture. Furthermore,
it could investigate the relations between p-automata and other formalisms
for which PCTL model checking or satiability is known to be decidable
[90, 30].
Another interesting direction for future research is to leave the setting of
PCTL over discrete-time systems which we fixed for this thesis. It could be
interesting to transfer the results from this thesis to other settings, e.g. to
other probabilistic logic and probabilistic models in particular in continuous-
time settings. Many of our results can be lifted to continuous-time Markov
chains by uniformising continuous-time Markov chainM and considering its
embedded discrete-time Markov chain [19]. An approach via uniformisation
and embedded discrete-time Markov chains is appealing and has been used
in the context of model checking before [110, 19]. Nevertheless, our results
clearly live in a discrete-time world. It is not clear whether and how our step-
based game semantics and our p-automata framework could be transfered
to a continuous-time logic such as CSL.
Some of these questions for future work are currently addressed in joint
work with Michael Huth and Nir Piterman. This research is work in progress
and beyond the scope of this thesis.
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